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ABSTRACT 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) occur across developed and developing economies and 
are likely to change the economic and social landscapes due to the faster movement of 
capital and technological growth. However, research has shown that 83% of all M&A 
deals have failed to deliver shareholder value, and that this failure could be attributed to 
the lack of effective post-merger integration between the merging companies. Due to the 
importance of the post-M&A integration process in M&A performance, researchers have 
called for more studies of post-merger integration to explore how process dynamics 
influence M&A outcomes. The specific aim of this study is to enhance our understanding 
in regards to how the level of alignment that exists between various organizational 
components (strategy, responsibility, standards, structure, conflict and identity) of the two 
parties involved in an acquisition affect the post-acquisition performance of the new 
organization. Performance is measured by considering the degree of financial success 
after the merger process is finalized.   
This study is unique as it examines the key alignment issues that firms can face at different 
stages of the integration process in relation to strategic and organizational fit (Salter and 
Weinhold, 1979) during an M&A can affect its overall performance. More specifically, 
from a practical standpoint, the findings of the study are expected to provide organizations 
(particularly those likely to undergo M&A) with methods to enhance the effectiveness of 
inter-organizational integration.  
In addition, the outcome of the study provides valuable insights into the sequence of steps 
that must be taken to achieve successful mergers in an emerging economy. The study 
adopted a mixed method approach and used both qualitative and quantitative methods. In 
terms of findings, structure, responsibility, standards, conflict and identity were found to 
impact organizational culture, job satisfaction and organizational commitment. Job 
satisfaction was found to have the greatest impact on merger success.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces the role of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) in corporate growth. It is 
worth mentioning that the merger of JSW and ISPAT attracted the attention of many academic 
institutions, including Harvard University, because of its unique marketing approach. The 
work’s aims and objectives, research questions and contribution to research are all elaborated 
in this chapter. The ownership characteristic of the company (family owned business), which 
is similar to many organizations in the emerging economies, is taken into consideration in the 
analysis. 
 
 
 
[15] 
 
1.1 Significance and Purpose of Study 
1.1.1 Introduction  
This study is unique in the sense that it examines the key inter-organizational alignment issues 
at different stages of the integration process during M&A, and thus offers new scholarly 
insights. This chapter presents the purposes of the study, its aims, gap in the literature, and 
contributions to research. It also provides an overview of the work, its key findings and how it 
can contribute to closing the gap in the literature.  
1.1.2 Purpose of the study 
The findings of the study are expected to provide organizations (particularly those likely to 
undergo M&A) with suggestions about which aspects within the process are worth more 
attention and with procedures that can be used to enhance the effectiveness of inter-
organizational collaborations. Though M&A is popular in the West, it is a relatively new 
phenomenon in the Middle East and South Asia. It started in the UAE with the flagship deal of 
Dubai World acquiring P&O Nedloyds in 2006 for US$9 billion.  
1.1.3 Gap in the Literature  
After a review of the literature it became apparent that there was a relative lack of research on 
M&A with regard to mergers and acquisitions in India. While there is a great deal of literature 
on the subject in relation to western entities. This led to the development of the research 
questions after consultation with the reseacher’s supervisor. The researcher was unable to find 
Indian literature on investigating cultural issues during a legal merger. Western studies indicate 
that cultural integration starts with the merger. There are significant cultural similarities 
between India and the UAE, as indicated in Hofstede’s Cultural Indices for 40 Countries 
(Hofstede 2011): 
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Similarities in key leadership dimensions between India and the UAE were also found to be 
high in the following table taken from the GLOBE study of 62 states (Javidan et al., 2004). 
 
This suggests that the findings of the case study on M&A integration in the Indian context 
would also be relevant to the UAE context. The main contribution of the thesis is an 
investigation of an acquisition that took place over a short period of time while also examining 
the alignment in the structure and culture of the two organizations.  
1.2 Objectives and Research Questions 
This study seeks to understand how two companies can successfully merge, especially when a 
merger takes place relatively faster than the usual pace. The aim of the study is to understand 
the role that various organizational components play (strategy, responsibility, standards, 
structure, conflict, identity, Organization culture and Organizational commitment.) in the 
success of a merger. Special attention will be placed on the alignment of the two organizations 
across those dimensions and more specifically whether a close alignment improves financial 
performance. The Organizational Value Profiler for M&A, as proposed by Trompenaars and 
Aser (2010) and Higgins 8-S model (2005) of strategic alignment forms the framework for this 
study  
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Research Questions: 
RQ-1: What are the strategic fit dimensions using a qualitative study of the upper level 
management of the combined firms.    
RQ-2: What are the organizational fit dimensions using a quantitative study of the front-line 
managers that formed part of the M&A before and after merger?   
RQ-3: How the process of integration is achieved between the two organizations to achieve 
success, the output being in the form of actions in the pre-merger, merger and post-
merger phases 
RQ-4: What are the conditions under which success can be achieved that will help other 
organizations to choose the appropriate path forward to achieve inter-organizational 
alignment? 
Answering the above questions will ultimately allow for better understanding how other 
organizations can choose the appropriate path forward to achieve inter-organizational 
alignment and post-merger success. 
1.3 Research Contributions 
The contributions that will be provided by the research can be divided into two parts- 
Contribution to literature and contribution to practice. 
1.3.1 Contribution to Literature: 
This thesis contributes to scholarship on M&A in the following ways. First, it examines the 
processes of alignment of the various organizational dimensions during inter-organizational 
integration. It discusses how their similarity and differences impacts on the process. Second, it 
focuses on the role that speed of the merger plays in performance. Third, it examines a variety 
of alternative dimensions of strategic alignment and evaluates the conditions under which a 
merger is more likely to be successful. 
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1.3.2 Contribution to Practice: 
The first contribution of this thesis is on explaining how mergers can reach higher levels of 
performance and within that respect what characteristics firms that can be potentially acquired 
need to have in order for acquisitions to be successful. The second contribution of this research 
is that it provides direction to the M&A team that can lead the acquisition process in order to 
develop and achieve the mission and goals of the merged organization. The third contribution 
is the presentation of key priorities regarding due diligence, integration planning, and 
challenges faced during decision-making and the business dilemmas arising during a merger. 
1.4 Research Stages  
Gersick, Davis, Hampton and Lansberg (1997) designed a three-dimensional model that 
provides a framework to understand the growth of the JSW group. The first stage involves 
finding evidence of financial success of the merger of JSW and ISPAT in the public domain. 
The study focused on financial success given that this is a measure that can be easily quantified 
in relation to subjective measures of performance and because increased financial performance 
is one of the main motivators for acquisitions especially in low-tech industries such as steel. 
After studying the financial data on the JSW and ISPAT merger, this research has established 
that the organization increased its (1) market share, (2) sales, (3) additional shareholder wealth, 
(4) profitability, and (5) economies of scale as published in the public domain. Independent 
financial analysts from the business press have also confirmed that the merger between the two 
organizations has achieved its financial goals in the short run. However, this financial success 
may depend on different macro and micro factors and data available in the public domain cannot 
shed light on this issue. 
The second stage examines strategic fit, that is, the underlying values and behaviour of the 
leaders and managers in merging their old identities and developing a new organization. Most 
of the research in this area has been conducted in Western countries, particularly in North 
America, and consequently may not be applicable to emerging economies and India in 
particular, considering its recent liberalization and the dominance of business houses.  This begs 
the question, of whether the process within which mergers take place are different in relation 
to the West. Stahl and Chua (2012) point out that the nationalities of employees have an impact 
on the success of an acquisition and suggest that acquisitions need to consider contingencies in 
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the cultural and institutional contexts in which the acquired firms are embedded. This indicates 
that differences in cultures (including organizational structures) might have an effect on the 
performance of an organization that has recently acquired a new one.  
In this regard the “Dilemma Framework” (Trompenaars and Asser, 2010), which is likely to 
assist in the alignment of visions and values at the level of higher management, will be tested 
for its applicability to Indian conditions using qualitative research.  
The third stage explores the organizational fit, highlighting the role of organizational culture, 
job satisfaction and organizational commitment among frontline managers. The process 
involves aligning previously separate entities to develop a common platform for developing 
human capital, core values and talent management. Because of the complexity of the post-M&A 
integration process in M&A performance, researchers (REFs) have called for both qualitative 
and quantitative approaches for post-merger integration to explore how process dynamics 
influence M&A outcomes.  
Table 1: Three-dimensional Development Model of Family Business  
Ownership Dimension Family Dimension Business Dimension 
Controlling Owner Young Family Business Start-Up 
Sibling Partnership Entering the Business Expansion/Formalization 
Cousin Consortium Working Together Mature 
 Passing the Baton  
Source: Gersick, K. E., Davis, J. A., Hampton, M. M., and Lansberg, I. (1997). Generations to 
Generations: Life Cycles of the Family Business. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
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Presently, the organization is at a mature stage where the family maintains tight control, with a 
large number of professional managers overseeing the operational aspects. It is worth 
mentioning that the family management systems of both entities (JSW and ISPAT) have similar 
characteristics. Further exploration of the characteristics of business groups is presented in the 
literature review in Chapter 2. 
The problems organizations experience during M&As could be attributed to a ‘merger 
syndrome’ (Marks and Mirvis, 1985). Indeed, the process is likely to lead to uncertainty about 
change- both favourable and unfavourable. This creates stress among employees and is likely 
to affect their perceptions and judgments, interpersonal relationships, and the dynamics within 
the fused entity. A key reason for merger failure is that the focus of M&A has been guided by 
the “strategic fit” rationale concerned with the link between performance and the strategic 
attributes of the combining firms. The neglect the “organization fit” rationale concerned with 
the cultural, organizational and behavioural attributes of the combining firms. These arguments 
are supported by a meta-analysis of 93 prior empirical studies on the determinants of M&A 
performance by King et al. (2004). This study concluded that post-acquisition performance is 
moderated by many variables, that there are many unspecified factors in the existing research 
and called for a greater recognition of the process and organizational dimensions of mergers 
and acquisitions.	Having considered the motives that are likely to be relevant for strategic fit, 
the researcher determined that factors such as taking advantage of size and value chain 
economies need to be further examined, as they represent a gap in present research (Callahan, 
1986; Lipton, 1982; Rappaport, 1982). 
1.4.1 Approach for the Research  
The purpose of this research is to establish the conditions under which M&A will be most 
successful. The research seeks to examine the issues of merger speed and similarities. A seminal 
study by Larsson and Finkelstein (1999), which examined M&A processes during the 1980s, 
indicated that a theoretical understanding of the processes was lacking. This question still 
remains unanswered. They further posited that M&A are multi-faceted phenomena which are 
poorly understood, partly due to the incomplete and partial application of theories from separate 
fields. However, the fragmented literature on M&As needs a theoretical synthesis, which will 
be attempted in the present research.  
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Figure 1 provides an approach for the present study. 
 
Source : Larsson, R., and Finkelstein, S. (1999). Integrating Strategic, Organizational, and Human 
Resource Perspectives on Mergers and Acquisitions: A Case Survey of Synergy Realization. 
Organization Science, 10 (1), 1-26. 
Figure 1: A Literature Overview and Integrative Model of Mergers and Acquisitions 
This figure indictates the main factors in the integrative model of mergers. It outlines the key factors in 
model and the most important scholars in this theoretical model. 
The strategic motives for a merger or acquisition mirror the potential benefits that can be 
realized through organizational integration and HRM.  The research identifies how merger 
success is realized through the organizational integration of M&A and how different areas can 
be integrated.   
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1.4.2 Assumptions 
Having examined a range of seminal works on this topic, the following assumptions have been 
adopted: 
i. The majority of M&A initiatives fail as a result of non-economic issues. (King et al., 
2004). 
ii. While the mapping of synergies is relatively easy, the actual implementation of these 
synergies is a challenge. 
iii. Melding cultures into a single unit is one of the most important challenges. This is because 
after the initial stages there is little monitoring of the merging process. Pre-planning and 
planning immediately after mergers can help increase the chances of success. 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
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1.6 Role of mergers and acquisitions in corporate growth  
A major reason why organizations choose to acquire or merge with other organizations is to 
facilitate their entry into a new market or product line or to pursue strategic objectives that 
would otherwise be too costly and risky to achieve on their own (Haspeslagh and Jamison, 
1991a; Reuvid, 2008). According to Caselli, Gatti and Visconti (2006) mergers and acquisitions 
are a strategic decision. They aim to substantially increase shareholder value. This can be 
achieved by changing a firm’s strategic positioning within the industry, increase market share 
and economies of scale, by revenue enhancement, risk reduction, sharing cost of product 
development, and through improved access to internal and external markets and new 
technologies (Price, 1999). Value creation is possible if a combination of research, invention, 
production, distribution and support activities is efficiently undertaken. Pooling resources and 
knowledge through Mergers and Acquisitions (hitherto referred as M&A) is a strategy that can 
be used by organizations to maintain or extent their competitive edge.  
However, research has shown that acquisitions lead to the generation of wealth in an integration 
process can only be achieved by successfully aligning the values and structures of the two or 
more entities (Auerbach, 2008). Despite this, a meta-analysis of 93 empirical studies conducted 
by King, Dalton, Daily and Covin (2004) revealed that the post-acquisition performance of 
acquired firms often fails to live up to the pre-acquisition expectations. Many major studies on 
M&A centered on strategic and financial factors, however, a new field of inquiry has emerged 
that focuses on cultural and human resources issues involved in the integration of acquired or 
merging firms (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006). Key variables such as cultural fit 
(Björkman, Stahl and Vaara, 2007; Chakrabarti, Gupta, Mukherjee and Jayaraman, 2009; 
Harding and Rouse, 2007), attention to cultural and human resources issues in the due diligence 
process (Stahl and Voigt, 2008), and the perception of managers’ values and attitudes towards 
addressing cultural dilemmas (Kavanagh and Ashkanasy, 2006; Sitkin and Pablo, 2005) are 
well documented. The social climate surrounding a takeover (Birkinshaw, Bresman and 
Håkanson, 2000; Ashkenas, DeMonaco and Francis, 1997) is also understood to be vital to the 
success of M&A. 
Given the above, it is important to gain a greater understanding of the conditions under which 
a merger can succeed, especially in an emerging economy. These conditions, in addition to 
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cultural and HR compatibilities might include relatedness of the merging organizational 
structures and favourable political climate. Recent studies suggest (REF) that there is a need to 
establish a framework for identifying the different human resource related issues in M&A and 
how those issues have been addressed in the context of an emerging economy. 
1.7 Role of Liberalization of Indian Economy and Steel Industry  
Prior to the liberalization of the Indian economy (circa 1991), Indian steel manufacturers had 
to deal with shortages, subsidies, controls and regulations of prices and allocations, leaving 
them with little or no time to hone their marketing skills. Deregulation led to a significant 
changes, resulting in the creation of a highly competitive market. India is the fourth largest steel 
producer in the world (87.67 million tonnes of steel were produced by it during 2013-2014) and 
is emerging as one of the major producers in the global steel arena. The emergence of JSW as 
the 30th largest producer in the world, out-pacing local rivals such as Tata Steel, in a span of 
three years, may be attributed to the success of its effective merger with ISPAT. Acculturation 
can be defined as a process in which beliefs, attitudes and values of two organizations, 
previously independent, develop shared values (Larsson and Lubatkin, 2001) 
Nevertheless, closer scrutiny of the process indicates that the organization adopted a different 
approach. It began a pre-merger integration before embarking on acculturation. Resistance to 
the acculturation process is often referred to as a ‘culture clash', that is, a situation in which 
employees show less commitment, job satisfaction, turnover and poor operating performance 
(Weber, 1996; Very, Lubatkin, Calori and Veiga, 1997). Within this light, this study considers 
different academic streams such as strategic management relating to M and A but also human 
resource management and finance, that may hinder or assist the assimilation process (Marks 
and Mirvis, 1985; 1992a; 1992b; 2010; 2011; Weber and Schweiger, 1989; Larsson, 1993).  
1.8 Reasons for Choosing the Steel Industry and JSW-ISPAT Merger 
Twenty-six major organizations have undertaken M&A during the last decade in India. They 
include Tata Steel, DRL, TCS, Ranbaxy, Hindalco, JSW-ISPAT, Tata, Matrix, Ballapur and 
other organizations. However, JSW Steel is one organization that faced competition as well as 
the recession in the steel market effectively and successfully by implementing an inter-
organizational alignment process in a series of phases. Furthermore, organizations such as 
 
 
[25] 
 
P&G, J&J, IBM, and Pfizer all implemented M&A strategies, coupled with organic growth 
strategies. All companies are seeking to managing risk in the context of engaging political, 
monetary and regulatory convergence. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that different groups 
of organizations would employ the same inter-organizational alignment processes. Some have 
partnerships with key competitors, while others pursue integration with other businesses in 
certain markets or product categories.  
JSW Steel was chosen for this study because of its established track record. The steel industry 
is under significant pressure due to over-capacity, which it has never been experienced in its 
history, and lower profit margins due to high levels of competition (from 2010 to 2015). 
However, JSW Steel is the only organization that has shown consistent financial success and 
improved its competitive strength during this period. It has risen from 33rd to 30th position in 
the world steel market, according to the World Steel Report 2014. The profitability of the 
organization has been maintained at rates of 17.02% (March, 2013), 17.75% (March, 2012), 
19.56% (March, 2011), and 18.93% (March, 2009). The combined entity's profits from 2012 
have been reported and examined and there was consistency in the profitability of the new 
organization in the short-term. 
Interviews with senior executives of the organization during the initial survey indicated that 
this success is due to the following:  
i. Re-evaluation of the vision and mission of the old business entities. 
ii. Assessment of the new challenges that are faced by the business. 
iii. Reaching the final customer (at the end of the value chain) and making the Shoppe 
successful. JSW Steel launched Shoppe in December 2007. JSW Shoppe is a retail 
network that aims to deliver quality steel products closer to individual customers, 
especially in the rural markets, especially for small and medium enterprises. There are 
over 400 JSW Shoppes across India. 
iv. Putting more emphasis on R and D 
v. Defining Core Values and key purposes for the new integrated organization. 
vi. Linking values with effective behaviour at different levels of the organization.  
 
 
 
 
[26] 
 
1.8.1 Jindal Group  
Mail Online (2013) reported that the Jindal Group was created by Om Prakash Jindal who was 
born in 1930 and worked initially as a farmer in Haryana's Nalwa village. Mr. Om Prakash later 
began a small bucket-manufacturing unit in Hisar to be followed by a pipe making plant under 
Jindal India limited in 1964. His business expanded allowing him to set up his first major 
factory in Calcutta in 1969. Mr Om Prakash gave back to the community by starting welfare 
projects such as schools and hospitals in poor areas. Thirty years later, Mr om Prakash decided 
to enter politics and hence he decided to split the business empire with his sons were Sajjan 
Jindal to be in charge of mild steel plant, Jindal Iron and Steel Co and Jindal Vijaynagar Steel 
Ltd and Ratan Jindal to be the managing director of Jindal Strips Ltd and Jindal Stainless 
Limited. Also, Naveen Jindal to control Jindal Strips Sponge Iron division at Raigarh Naveen 
and Jindal Power. All of these entities were apart of Sun Investments, a holding company with 
equity in the group of companies were all members of the Jindal family have a stake. 
1.9 Key Findings 
This study provided finding on the issues that firms can face at different stages of the integration 
process in relation to strategic and organizational fit (Salter and Weinhold, 1979) during an 
M&A can affect its overall performance. More specifically, from a practical standpoint, the 
findings of the study provided methods to enhance the effectiveness of inter-organizational 
integration. In addition, the outcome of the study provides valuable insights into the sequence 
of steps that must be taken to achieve successful mergers in an emerging economy. In terms of 
findings, structure, responsibility, standards, conflict and identity were found to impact 
organizational culture, job satisfaction and organizational commitment. Job satisfaction was 
found to have the greatest impact on merger success 
1.10 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has established the importance in studying the JSW and ISPAT merger and the 
process of M&A in general. The need for the study has been demonstrated.  The significance 
of the study was established by relating it the current business environment. The research 
questions are classified into two segments one relating to the contribution to the literature and 
the other relating to practice. The research approach and assumptions have been presented.   
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CHAPTER 2: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS; IMPACT AND 
REASONS - LITERATURE REVIEW 
Organizations engage in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) to address interdependencies, 
especially to deal with the political and legal environment. The experience of Indian 
organizations and advanced economies are discussed with appropriate references. It focuses 
exclusively on the theories regarding M&As especially in regard to Emerging economies. It 
does not deal with issues such as tax benefits and other financial benefits in detail. The role of 
culture and the reasons why organizations choose to pursue M&A are examined to establish the 
gaps that are summarized in chapter three.  
 
 
 
[28] 
 
 
2.1 History of M&A 
M&A is not a new phenomenon, but it developed within a globalized economy. In fact, it dates 
back to as early as the 19th century. Cyclic waves were observed at different times due to the 
variation in the motivations of different organizations (Nelson, 1959; Jansen, 2002; Picot 2002). 
M&A is currently undergoing its sixth wave, which has been characterized by mergers in many 
industries or sectors (Angwin, 2001).  M&As continue to be highly popular methods of 
corporate development and, according to the Ernst and Young Capital Confidence Barometer 
(October 2012), the Worldwide total value of M&As in 2012 was US$2.25 trillion across 
36,865 M&As. Performance outcomes of M&A 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) are often considered a popular form of corporate 
development. However, they have achieved mixed results as the investors in a targeted 
organization may benefit in the short-term, and the taking over organization shareholders may 
get only long-term benefits (Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000; and Conn and Cosh, 2001). Gregory 
(1997) and Limmack (1997) conducted studies which demonstrated a failure on in terms of 
value creation in the long-term performance of United Kingdom acquiring firms. Harding and 
Rouse (2007) found that 83% of the acquiring firms failed to deliver value. These studies 
indicate that M&As were not able to achieve the desired synergy that would to justify the 
valuation. Gallet (1996) examined the relationship between mergers in the U.S. steel industry 
and market power. He analysed yearly observations over the period between 1950 and 1988, 
revealing that during the period of 1968 to 1971 mergers did not have a significant effect on 
market power in the steel industry, whereas mergers from 1978 to 1983 slightly boosted market 
power. 
Coyle (2000) defines a merger as the combination of the resources of two or more companies 
into one single entity. More precisely, a merger is a situation where two or more companies 
combine into one single entity or identity. No fresh investment is made in the process, however, 
there is an exchange of shares between the parties. Generally, the company that survives is the 
buyer, while the seller entity no longer exists (Ramaiya, 1977). A merger is assumed to have 
been fully consummated when (1) neither company involved is portrayed as the acquirer or the 
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acquired; (2) the structuring of the firm is agreed upon by all the involved parties and (3) all the 
shareholders, for all the companies, have rights in the final merged company.  
This study addresses both Strategic fit (Qualitative Analysis) and Organizational fit 
(Quantitative analysis) as well as the theoretical question of how to progress from qualitative 
to quantitative? If the qualitative analysis determines that there is strategic fit, the researcher 
will proceed with the quantitative analysis. Different references will be employed to help 
address these dimensions clearly. 	
A review of the literature showed that while corporate combinations are unsuccessful (Goldberg 
1983), there is evidence suggesting that they often result in an increase in efficiency and 
shareholders' wealth (Jensen, 1984; Healy, Palepu, and Ruback, 1992). There is considerable 
heterogeneity with respect to the definition of performance (Performance of the acquired firm 
or acquiring firm or the combined entity) as well as the measurement of performance, such as 
accounting returns and stock market changes, exists and need to be addressed. A growing body 
of research has investigated these factors in an attempt to predict M&A performance, and clear 
relationships are yet to be established in the form of models, as has been shown by the extensive 
studies of Stahl and Voight (2008). The key factors behind M&A success and the reasons for 
the high M&A failure rate are poorly understood. The studies of Weber and Drori (2008) point 
out that most of the existing research on M&A has been fragmented across different disciplines; 
the research has not been systematic or linked to any comprehensive theory and rarely have 
models been proposed that were applicable across different organizations. These conflicting 
results could be attributed to a dependence on accounting-based measures or measures based 
on stock market valuations (Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1988; Jensen 1988; Ravenscraft and 
Scherer 1987; Shleifer and Summers, 1988; Franks, Harris, and Titman, 1991).  An examination 
of evidence from the past 70 years suggests that the benefits that are supposed to be accrued 
due to M&A are not realized and in many cases there have been disappointing results for 
shareholders (Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker, 1992; Ferreira, Serra, Santos, and Reis, 2010) 
and employees (Buono, Weiss, and Bowditch, 1989; Schweiger, and Denisi, 1991; Marks and 
Mirvis, 1986; Schweiger, and Walsh, 1990).  Financial, strategic, and organizational 
perspectives have not been able to predict or explain these anomalies, while scholars are 
focused on “factors influencing the management of relationships” which are likely to determine 
success or failure. The result is a growing recognition that there is a need to identify the 
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processes through which synergistic benefits come to be realized (e.g., Datta, 1991; Jemison, 
1988).  
One of the most important dimensions of M&A is integration in post-acquisition periods. Poor 
integration has been identified as one of the major factors causing acquisition failure (Kitching, 
1967, 1973). The integration process is likely to not only impact the short-term performance of 
a newly formed firm, but also has far reaching consequences for the long-term viability of the 
combined organization. If the integration process does not go smoothly, management’s 
attention is likely to be consumed by the “firefighting” and organizational activities required to 
attend to the assimilation of a newly acquired unit and in the process, innovation and the 
achievement of visions and goals are likely to be impacted. (Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland, 1990; 
Hitt, Hoskisson, Ireland, and Harrison, 2001). Thus, this is one of the most important 
components of the acquisition process to be studied.  
After an acquisition, some degree of inter-organizational integration is planned. The level of 
integration chosen and implemented is likely to impact the combined organization’s 
performance, as under- or over-integration may result in an inability to create value, or in some 
cases may lead to value destruction. The realization of potential synergies will be short-circuited 
in the event of insufficient levels of integration, but excessive reconfiguration may impede  the 
development of conditions conducive to effective combination, as it may lead to  high-
performing executives leaving the organization in the context of a totally different 
organizational climate being created in the post-acquisition period, depriving the combined 
organization of much needed resources and expertise (Hambrick and  Cannella, 1993; Walsh 
and Ellwood, 1991). Focusing on the factors that influence an organization's post-acquisition 
design strategy is central to understanding key factors relating to the success or failure of the 
combined unit. 
Acquisition is defined as the purchase of shares or assets of another organization to attain 
managerial control (European Central Bank, 2000, Chunali Chen and Findlay, 2003) either by 
mutual agreement or not (Jagersma, 2005). Acquisitions can be either friendly or hostile. 
Friendly acquisitions take place when the target firm agrees to be acquired. In hostile 
acquisitions, the target firm may not agree with the takeover, which forces the acquiring firm 
to purchase large stakes of the target company in order to attain a majority stake. A hostile 
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takeover is defined as an acquisition where shareholders are approached directly with no 
consent from the target company’s management. Hostile takeovers are rarely observed in most 
countries (Andrade et al., 2001). There have been no cases of hostile takeovers in India, mainly 
because 95% of the larger organizations are in the hands of families with dominant 
shareholdings (Mathew, 2007; Armour et al., 2011) and because of the Securities and Exchange 
Board of India (SEBI), which has formulated rules and frameworks for the orderly conduct of 
takeovers (Ramu, 1998; Banaji, 2005; Kaur, 2012). The Reserve Bank of India also imposes 
restrictions on such takeovers.  
In the case of acquisition, the two companies become a single entity. For instance there was no 
hostility in the acquisition process of the JSW-ISPAT merger as ISPAT had world-class 
technology and had been in continuous discussions with lenders, especially the state-owned 
banks. However, there was pressure on the organization, which caused it to search for a buyer 
and ultimately led to the merger. 
For some time, organizations across the world have attempted to capitalize on the political and 
economic environments that are conducive to doing business. In India, these two types of 
environments are interdependent. Organizations which have a strong influence in one 
environment will usually try to develop a strong influence in the other. JSW is likely to have a 
political edge given that its promoters are members of the ruling political party, however, there 
is not much evidence of this in practice. M&A is a broad concept comprising absorption, 
amalgamation, spin-off, equity alliance and strategic alliance. For the purposes of the present 
study, the concept is used in the narrower sense of two entities merging and the dominant entity 
taking over control of the other. 
The study consists of the two businesses, JSW and ISPAT, and their merger into one entity. 
ISPAT, lost its independent existence and the process is called absorption. However, it was not 
a merger by establishment as both organizations did not give rise to another new organization. 
Rather, they merged in what is often referred to as a ‘merger by absorption’ (Cecil, 2000; 
Chunlai Chen and Findlay, 2003; Nakamura, 2005). A merger by absorption or absorption 
merger can be considered a de facto acquisition. It should be noted that mergers and acquisitions 
are two different types of transactions with different consequences in terms of legal and tax 
obligations and are mired in different procedures (Marren, 1993).  
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For the purposes of this study, the M&A are not separated and joint business efforts to achieve 
the goals of the new organization are examined. An M&A may be classified as horizontal, 
vertical or conglomerate, based on their value proposition (Gaughan, 2010). A Horizontal M&A 
occurs when both entities are in the same industry and the literature indicates that, of the three 
M&A modes, horizontal is the mode that has been the most effectively facilitated by 
technological changes and economic liberalization. Figure 2 shows the classification of M&A. 
 
Adopted from Nakamura, H. R. (2005): Motives, Partner Selection and Productivity Effects of 
M&As: The Pattern of Japanese Mergers and Acquisitions. 
Figure 2: Classification of Merger and Acquisitions 
2.2 The macroeconomic environment and implementing Mergers and 
Acquisitions in India vs. developed economies 
In order to address the challenges of globalization, liberalization and privatization through 
technology, economies around the world have implemented a number of structural changes 
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(Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan, 1999; Kohers et al., 2000; Shull and Hznweck, 2001; Streeten, 
2001; Panagriya, 2004; Chandrasekar and Parthapritim, 2006; How et al., 2005; Beena, 2008). 
These economic trends also contributed to the creation of academic literature in India that 
focuses on differences in the participation levels of different sectors, the impact of the post 1991 
reforms, the role of state, the need for organizations to survive and other related areas (Ramu, 
(1998); Basant and Morris (2000); Kumar (2000); Pawaskar (2001); Raju and Deepthi (2004); 
Beena (2001,2008); Agarwal (2002,2006); Agarwal and Bhattacharjea (2006); Kar (2006); 
Kumar and Rajib (2007); Mathew (2007); Mantravadi and Reddy (2007,2008); Jawa (2009); 
Mishra and Chandra (2010); Satyanarayan and Manju (2011; Kaur,2012).  
India addressed these issues in 1991 through structural adjustments to the supply side of the 
economy, improve long term growth by improving efficiency, productivity and 
competitiveness. It was hoped that these adjustments would strengthen the economy both 
externally and internally and that this would lead to growth. Some of the internal restrictions 
are government intervention, controls, and the influence of pricing in the factor market or 
product market. The external rigidities are in the form of restrictions on free trade in some goods 
and services, import and export policies, technology transfer and restrictions on foreign capital. 
The scenario during the 1980’s was marked with such rigidities and it was more pro-business 
than pro-market (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2004, 2005). 
2.3  Waves of M&A in Market Driven Economies  
It is important to consider the waves that have occurred in market driven economies, especially 
in the US. A series of merger waves have occurred in many of the market oriented economic 
systems. Overall, it has experienced six major waves, starting with 1887-1905 (Scherer, 1979).  
In the US economy, the first wave was characterized by mergers of industries operating in the 
same or similar product lines, giving rise to an increased concentration of industries.  
The second wave, from 1922-29, was characterized by vertical integrations and diversified 
mergers. "Mergers for monopoly" and "Mergers for oligopoly" were the two analogous words 
used to describe this wave, which governments considered economically undesirable. Anti-trust 
policies, which were implemented soon after World War II, influenced the third wave, this was 
the start of the third wave (Scherer, 1979). The third wave (1965-1969) witnessed high levels 
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of M&A activity with diversification and conglomerate mergers dominating the movement. 
During the eighties, the nature of mergers was characterized by a return to specialization and 
an increase in the size of the mergers. The merger waves in the US, from the eighties and 
beyond, have been characterized by strong similarities between the combining firms, unlike the 
conglomerate mergers in the sixties and seventies (Weston, et al, 1996).  
The fourth wave (1984-1989) was characterized by the lessons learnt from the inadequate 
performance of conglomerate mergers during the 1970s. The major characteristic of this wave 
was the hostile takeover. This turned into a highly profitable speculative activity. This wave is 
known for its sheer size and some of the mergers were called mega mergers. The petroleum and 
gas industries reaped the greatest benefits. The use of the investment banker, the new 
respectability accorded to the corporate raider, and the aggressive uses of debt are further 
features of this wave.  
The fifth wave started in 1992 after the recovery of the economy from the 1990-1991 recession. 
Banking, financial services and the telecom sectors were the industries that adopted this 
strategy.  Consolidation was one of the major effects of this wave for most of the industries.  
The sixth wave (2001-2007) was characterized by low interest rates, which gave impetus to the 
private equity business sector. The economy was also in a boom period and the market for 
different products was thriving. Private equity firms borrowed money at very low rates and 
were able to initiate the M&A process.  
This brief discussion on global waves provides a panoramic view of what happened in a market-
oriented economy, such as the US, for a century. However, the waves that were experienced by 
India were totally different, because of its unique culture, ownership structure, legal systems, 
size, family businesses and tax structures.   
Most of the research including the seminal analysis conducted by Beena (2000) indicates that 
there were three Indian M&A phases. The first phase was from 1991-1995, the second phase 
from 1996-2000 and the third phase from 2000-2007. The mergers in the early 1990s were 
mostly within business groups (or known as houses) with similar product lines. The mergers 
are believed to have contributed to increases in product volume and increases in asset 
concentration within firms. However, there are some indications that such measures had also 
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been taken in a small number of unrelated foreign-owned organizations. The participation of 
foreign-controlled firms in the merger process has increased significantly since 1992-93. Most 
of the firms strengthened their position by tapping into capital markets.  The chief objective of 
the early phase is to fight the competition that has hitherto not been in existence.  
Table 2: Different Types of Mergers Undertaken by Indian Organizations (1900-1995) 
 
Source: Beena, P. L. (2014). Mergers and Acquisitions: India under Globalization. Routledge 
Table 3: Mergers and Takeovers in India (1974-1994) 
 
Source: Beena, P. L. (2014). Mergers and Acquisitions: India under Globalization. Routledge. 
Year
T Assets % Share T Assets % Share T Assets % Share T Assets % Share
1990-91 131,721 60.36 86,515 39.64 0 0 218,236 100
2 40 3 60 0 0 5 100
1991-92 43,987 7.98 19,187 3.48 488,021 88.54 551,195 100
2 40 2 40 1 20 5 100
1992-93 0 0 360,096 66.25 183,418 33.75 543,514 100
0 0 7 87.5 1 12.5 8 100
1993-94 18,210 2.57 683,247 96.3 8,071 1.14 709,528 100
1 12.5 6 75 1 12.5 8 100
1994-95 0 0 231,474 15.87 1,227,361 84.13 1,458,835 100
0 0 4 66.67 2 33.33 6 100
Total 193,918 5.57 1,380,519 39.66 1,906,871 54.77 3,481,308 100
5 15.63 22 68.75 5 15.63 32 100
CONGLOMERATE HORIZONTAL VERTICAL Total
Year Non-Maf Maf Total Non-Maf Maf Total
1974-79 48 108 156 0 11 11
Avg 10 22 31 0 2 2
1980-84 39 117 156 0 15 15
Avg 8 23 37 0 3 3
1985-89 33 79 113 6 85 91
Avg 10 23 35 2 17 18
1990-94 108 128 236 8 47 55#
Avg 22 25 47 NA NA NA
Mergers Takeovers
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Tables 2 and 3 reveal three important aspects of the merger movement. Firstly, the horizontal 
mergers are the most common when there is a need for product concentration to face 
competition and business houses wanted to have resource mobility and more internal 
reconstruction (Beena, 2000).  Secondly, it is clear from Table 3 that organizations have used 
mergers and takeovers as a means of achieving growth since the 1970s.  
The number of mergers increased during the liberalization years of the 1990s and that the 
mergers occurred across related groups or the same group with the same decision makers sitting 
on the board of directors. While these are the characteristics of M&A activity in 1990-1995, the 
next wave is across different industry sectors.  
Table 4: Sector-wise M&A Activity in India (1996-2000) 
 
Source: Bhalla, P. (2014). Mergers and Acquisitions in India: A sectorial analysis. International Journal 
of Business and Economic Development, 2(2). 
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From 1996 to 2000, 1,253 M&A transactions occurred in India where most of them (411) took 
place in 1999 (Table 4). The chemicals, drug and fertilizer industries conducted the most 
transactions, followed by information technology (IT), telecom and financial services. Metal 
producers, especially in the steel industry, comprised minimal proportion of M&A (Sharma, 
2013). The steel industry, to a large extent, operates within the public sector, with an employee 
ratio of 132 per ton manufactured compared to eight in the private sector. Similarly, the private 
sector is dependent on state governments as well as the central government for power, coal and 
transportation by rail. It is generally believed that these dimensions have a limiting impact on 
organizations operating in the sector. The post 2000 phenomenon is provided in Table 5, which 
indicates that there has been a seven-fold increase in the amount of M&A activity in India. Most 
of the documentation regarding the M&As is in the form of case studies (Kumar, 2011; 2012, 
Kar, 2006).  
Table 5: Sector-wise M&A Activity in India (2001-2007) 
 
Source: Bhalla, P. (2014). Mergers and Acquisitions in India: A Sectorial Analysis. International 
Journal of Business and Economic Development, 2(2). 
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These developments in M&A in India indicate that the horizontal combination of two entities 
was dominant. M&As were intended to obtain economies of scale, technical efficiency, 
eliminate the duplication of facilities and operations, broaden the product line and reduce 
working capital requirements. In the case of JSW and ISPAT, a horizontal merger was 
undertaken. However, this also reaped other benefits, including backward integration to secure 
raw materials and other input resources. It is crucial to identify the exact nature of the synergy 
that JSW achieved and how this helped it to succeed. 
2.4 Different Laws that control M&As in India 
This section outlines relevant legislation to appreciate key legal aspects of due diligence. The 
terms mergers and amalgamation are not defined in the Companies’ Act. Amalgamation is 
defined in the Indian Income Tax Act, 1961 and classified into two categories. 
The first category of amalgamations occurs where there is a genuine pooling of assets and 
liabilities of the entity’s shareholders’ interests and of the businesses. Such amalgamations are 
defined as ‘mergers’ and the financial statements of such transactions should reflect assets, 
liabilities, capital and reserves approximately representing the sum of these entities. The JSW 
and ISPAT case is a merger and the resulting balance sheet reflects this. The process of M&A 
is court driven. It is initiated by common agreements; however, an agreement alone is not 
legally binding. The sanction of the High Court is required to bring it into effect. The 
Companies Act, 1956 has a number of provisions relating to mergers and acquisitions and other 
related issues of compromises, arrangements and reconstructions, and the Central Government 
has a part to play in this process, acting through the Regional Director of the Ministry of 
Company Affairs. 
The Companies Act, 1956 for Sections 391 to 394 
The Companies (Court) Rules, 1959  
Depositories Act, 1996  
Competition Act, 2002  
However, it is further amended in the year 2015 which is not applicable for the present study.  
Combination Regulations, 2011 under Competition Act, 2000.  
Listing Agreement.  
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999.  
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Accounting Standards of Institute of Chartered Accounts of India- Accounting standard 14. 
The Income Tax Act, 1961.  
Indian Stamp Act, 1899. 
An approval or no objection certificate is required from the following agencies and entities to 
conduct a merger: 
1. Competition Commission of India  
2. Board of Directors  
3. Stock Exchange  
4. Shareholders  
5. Equity and others  
6. Creditors – Secured and Unsecured  
7. Regional Director / Registrar of Companies  
8. Official Liquidator  
9. High Court 
2.5 Discussion on need for Study of ‘Business Group’  
The representative unit of Indian capital is the ‘business group’ or the ‘business house’ (Dutt, 
1984, Ghose, 1972, Goyal, 1988 and Hazari and Oza, 1966). The business group generally 
consists of a large number of legally independent firms which function as a single entity under 
the command of a single decision-making authority (Chandransekar, 1999). A group of 
independent firms acting as a single unit constitutes a ‘business group’. The independent firms 
within the ‘business group’ have corporate investments for expansion; however, the 
shareholders may lose, as the investment may not flow to the best alternative. This unique 
feature of Indian business caused the Indian Government to implement legislation that curbed 
market concentration by providing quotas and licenses so that certain groups would not be 
exploited. Even so, the Indian Government could not curb them and the groups continued to 
dominate the Indian economy. Most of the regulations under the Monopolies and Restrictive 
Trade Practices Act, 1969, were removed to facilitate trade. The business house concept is the 
most relevant in India as approximately 95% of the private sector is dominated by 20 major 
business groups. JSW is a conglomerate with ten organizations in India, with 52 companies 
operating in one group and owned by Sun Investments Group.  
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2.6 Examination of Studies Regarding Merger and Acquisitions – Motives 
Studies conducted from the beginning of liberalization to the present are examined in this thesis 
to determine the nature of merger and acquisition studies in India. Some references to 
international mergers will be made to contextualize the issues raised in Indian mergers. 
According to Cartwright and Cooper (1993), many effective acquisitions have been employed 
to achieve rapid entry into high growth markets, to gain expertise in engineering and product 
manufacturing, to establish brands and a market presence, to gain experienced managers, to 
reduce vulnerability to danger, and to complement ongoing internal product development. 
Acquisitions minimize the costs and time lag associated with the internal development of 
products and breaking into markets and are expected to better support the structure of firms. 
They are particularly useful where product life cycles are short, or the possibility of a profitable 
market window closing is high (Cartwright and Cooper, 1993; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). 
Grotenhuis (2009) posited that M&A have become attractive options in emerging markets not 
solely for their financial attractiveness, but also because they are viewed as a strategic 
investment. Kumar and Alka Chadha (2008) examined the case of the steel industry, which has 
become an important sector of overseas activity for Chinese and Indian companies, with a string 
of major acquisitions of foreign multinational enterprises to acquire key assets and natural 
resources. However, despite mixed evidence regarding M&As capacity to improve 
performance, the question remains; what motivates managers to seek this route to growth? 
Scholars have suggested three reasons for continued interest in M&A despite the financial 
failure of several major initiatives.   
These include: 
i. Organizations and CEO’s may be pursuing goals other than shareholder wealth 
maximization such as hubris and, thus, shareholder wealth is an inaccurate measure of 
performance. 
ii. Managers may be vulnerable to optimism bias, thinking that the next merger will be 
successful. 
iii. Past empirical studies which were relied upon may be at fault due to errors in data 
collection, and the time-periods that were covered.  
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Brouthers, Hastenburg and Van Den Ven (1998) conducted studied this further and found the 
following motives behind interest in M&A. 
i. Economic motives for M&A: Managers believe that M&A may lead to economies of 
scale, create shareholder value, reduce costs and risks, reduce marketing expenses and 
increase profitability. 
ii. Personal motives: Managers believe that M&A may lead to increased sales, managerial 
challenges due to the acquisition of inefficient management, and potentially enhancing 
managerial prestige. 
iii. Strategic motives: M&A may result in the pursuit of market power, the acquisition of 
a competitor or raw materials and the creation of barriers to entry. 
2.7 Merger and Acquisition Teams  
Teams in M&A are powerful forces for organizational change and for executing complex tasks 
during post-acquisition integration (Haspeslagh and Jamison, 1991b). However, when teams 
are used, their purpose and configuration need to be carefully mapped out (Angwin and Arnott, 
2001). Different terms are used to describe the teams such as task forces, high power 
committees, joint working committees, steering committees, merger integration teams, gate 
keeping units and transition teams (Bauman, Jackson and Lawrance, 1997). Different labels 
and tasks are assigned to the teams, indicating that there is a need to understand the nature of 
the team’s work in different contexts of M&A. This was particularly significant in the case of 
JSW-ISPAT as the negotiations for the entire merger were completed within a record time of 
twelve days in December, 2010. Preliminary research indicates that the merger team was 
formed immediately.  
The question subsequently arises, what is the role of the team in a family owned firm? How 
does it function? The teams were primarily used as change agents to ensure cultural change and 
better cultural integration. It could be argued that the team’s primary role is to identify the areas 
of autonomy and sharing of resources between the two entities and to ensure that the required 
cultural change is brought about using participatory methods (Hayes and Hoag, 1974; Dunphy 
and Stance, 1988; Cartwright and Cooper, 1993; 2014; Angwin and Arnott, 2001). The role of 
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teams during a merger has thus been identified as an issue that requires further exploration in 
this study. 
2.8 Data on the impact of Post-Acquisition Integration on Performance 
and Impact of Corporate and National Cultural Differences on Post-
Acquisition Integration 
An examination of the seminal work conducted by Weber, Tarba, and Reichel (2001) and the 
summary of their findings in tables 6 and 7 indicates that there are a variety of theories and 
views on the impact of integration on performance. Gaps relating to the study are established 
and explained in chapter three.  
Table 6: Summary of Empirical Research examining the Impact of Post-Acquisition 
Integration on Performance 
 
 
Reference Sample (no.) Integration definition Performance measure(s)
Impact of 
integration
Calori et al. (1994)
Cross-border; 
questionaire (25)
Formal control
Earnings, sales, and market 
share of the acquired Firm
Negative
Calori et al. (1994)
Cross-border; 
questionaire (25)
Informal control
Attitudes toward job, 
enthusiasm, and willingness to 
help others in the Acquired firm
Positive
Cannella and Hambrick 
-1993
Domestic (97) Degree of autonomy removal
Turnover of managers of the 
acquired firm
Positive
Chatterjee et al. (1992)
Domestic; 
questionnaire
Tolerance for multicultur-
alism (autonomy removal)
Stock market value Negative
Datta (1991) Domestic Level of integration
Rate of return, earnings per 
share, stock price, cash flow, 
and sales Growth
No relationship
Hambrick and Cannella 
-1993
Domestic (97) Degree of autonomy removal
Turnover of managers of the 
acquired firm
Positive
Lubatkin et al. (1999)
Domestic; 
questionnaire (69)
Degree of autonomy removal
Turnover of managers of the 
acquired firm
Positive
Morosini et al. (1998) Cross-border (52)
Implemented post-acquisition 
strategy
Growth in sales No relationship
Ranft and Lord (2002)
Domestic; case studies 
(7)
Degree of autonomy removal
Preservation of acquired firm’s 
tacit and/or socially complex 
knowledge
Negative
Saxton and Dollinger 
(2004
Mixed; survey by fax 
(212)
Degree of integration
Perceived acquisition outcomes 
for the acquiring firm
Positive
Singh and Zollo (1998)
Domestic; 
questionnaire (250)
Degree of integration 
(autonomy removal)
Performance of the acquiring 
firm: return on Assets
Positive
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Table 7: Key Findings of Studies examining the Impact of Corporate and National Cultural 
Differences on Post-Acquisition Integration 
 
Singh and Zollo (1999)
Domestic; 
questionnaire (250)
Degree of integration 
(autonomy removal)
Performance of the acquiring 
firm: return on Assets
Positive
Very et al. (1997)
Mixed; questionnaire 
(159)
Degree of autonomy removal
Earnings, sales, market share of 
the acquired firm
Negative
Weber (1996)
Domestic; 
questionnaire (52)
Degree of autonomy removal
Return on assets of the 
acquiring firm
Positive
Weber and Pliskin 
(1996)
Domestic; 
questionnaire (69)
Degree of information 
systems integration
Marketing, R&D, operations, 
production, and personnel 
management
Positive
Weber et al. (1996)
Mixed; questionnaire 
(52)
Degree of autonomy removal
Degree of co-operation and 
commitment
Negative
Zollo and Singh (2004)
Domestic; 
questionnaire (228)
Degree of autonomy removal
Performance of the acquiring 
firm: return on assets
Positive
Reference Sample (no.) Cultural dimension Integration definition
Impact of 
cultural 
differences
Chatterjee et al. (1992)
Domestic; 
questionnaire
Corporate culture 
differences
Tolerance for multiculturalism 
(autonomy removal)
Positive
Child et al. (2000) Cross-border Different countries
Integration and control 
(strategic and operational)
Positive
Child et al. (2001) Cross-border Different countries
Integration and control 
(strategic and operational)
Positive
Datta (1991) Domestic
Differences in 
management styles
Level of integration No relationship
Larsson and Finkelstein 
(1991)
Mixed; case studies 
(61)
Management style 
similarity
 Level of organizational 
Integration
No relationship
Lubatkin et al. (1998) Mixed
Uncertainty avoidance and 
power distance
Level of centralized control Positive for both
Morosini and Singh 
(1994)
Cross-border
Uncertainty avoidance and 
power distance acquired 
company
Level of integration Positive for both
Pablo (1994) High multiculturalism Low level of integration Negative
Pitkethly et al. (2003) Cross-border Different countries
Integration and control 
(strategic and operational)
Positive
Van Oudenhoven and 
deBoer (1995) 
Domestic Culture similarity Level of integration Positive
Weber (1996)
Domestic; 
questionnaire (52)
Corporate culture 
differences
Degree of autonomy Removal Positive
Weber et al. (1996)
Mixed; questionnaire 
(16)
Corporate culture 
differences
Degree of autonomy Removal Negative
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The reasons for JSW’s takeover of ISPAT are not clear from secondary sources of data and this 
is the first gap that the present study aims to address. A study by Ma, Pagan, and Chu (2009) 
analysed 1,477 M&A deal at various companies in ten Asian Markets that resulted in higher 
profits to their shareholders near the time of the merger announcement and found that investors 
benefitted from M&A deals.   
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) capital injection into the Indian market after independence 
was looked at by Kumar (1995) and found that it was directed at the industrial sector with strong 
emphasis on skilled labour due to the government policies towards the industrialization of India. 
Multinational companies (MNCs) were examined by Ranjan (1997) to assess their strategic 
directions in evaluating opportunities in newly liberated economies and to offer a model for 
Indian local companies to use against the aggressive attack of MNCs particularly regarding 
managerial implications. This is relevant to the JSW-ISPAT merger, as the new JSW entity 
must respond not only to MNC’s offensive strategies, especially strategies from major Chinese 
steel firms, but also to the strategies of Indian business houses, which are not well documented 
by way of published papers. How two major business groups undertake a merger in the Indian 
context, with no major international competitor present, is yet to be explored. This is another 
significant gap in knowledge.   
Pradhan and Abraham (2004) examined the rules followed by, and motivations of 
organizations, and found that the majority of overseas M&As came from the services sector. 
The primary incentive for Indian firms’ overseas acquisitions was to enter international 
markets, and this has generally been firm specific. Kumar (2006) analysed the increasing 
outward investments made by Indian organizations, particularly since the onset of economic 
reforms. He suggested that Indian firms are likely to increase their investments overseas. The 
findings of the study suggested that Indian enterprises draw upon their competencies in areas 
of manufacturing experience; lower labour cost; reverse engineering ability; massive market 
size which impacts the local Indian firms positively in a nonlinear effect; and the ability to 
export their product as outward investors. 
Furthermore, those factors considered to be the most relevant by upper level management may 
be different from those factors already documented in relevant studies. The capabilities of 
Indian firms, emerged over a period of time. Kumar and Bansal (2008) studied the claims of 
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the Indian corporate sector that domestic M&As enabled them to generate synergies. The study 
used secondary data and statistical correlation to highlight that companies have higher 
expectations of achieving financial and operating synergies. The results showed that companies 
that engage in domestic M&A are more likely to achieve financial synergy to include better 
cash generation, larger market share, and reduction in costs. However, the manner in which 
synergies are achieved by M&As in the steel Industry, and if human resource synergies are 
planned, is not studied in the Indian context in the current literature.  
Kumar (2008) studied the reasons why the origins of ownership of large Indian organizations 
matter in terms of success. He explained that roots of the owners can help navigate cultural and 
political climate in India which will yield competitive advantage for them to manage large 
companies located in multiple jurisdiction with different cultural backgrounds while keeping 
costs low.  
Zhu and Malhotra (2008) studied a sample on Indian companies that acquired American firms 
between 1995 – 2005 and the impact of these acquisitions on the share price of the related 
companies at the Indian stock market. The study indicated that there was a very limited short 
gain that lasted for three days due to pressure effect but then turned negative as the short-term 
gain was not based on the informational effect.  
By contrast, how did JSW generate short-term profits, but also concentrate on long-term 
profitability? What are the human resources strategies used to achieve this success based on 
the views of the employees of an organization? The data from these questions form the most 
important dimensions of the study. 
Athukorala (2009) analysed M&A transactions between 1999 to 2002 and concluded that post-
merger profitability of the acquiring firms did not improve when compared to the net worth of 
the company prior to merger. Publicly listed Indian companies where analysed by Sharma and 
Mahendru’s (2009) to evaluate their ability to make an open offer in the capital market. The 
Indian stock market regulation specifies that for a company to make open offer, it must make 
an open offer for at least 20% of the issued capital. Singh and Jain (2009) looked at outward 
foreign direct investment in India and found that Government policies were in line with 
increasing of outflow of foreign direct investment. Though the study discusses broad issues 
relating to M&A, it is not specific to the issues relating to the M&A process employed by 
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business houses that are exposed to cheaper imports from other countries such as China. The 
M&A strategy requires a multi-dimensional process with a focus on human resource 
dimensions.  
At present the business environment is encouraging mergers. A study on cross border mergers 
and acquisition in India was conducted by Beena (2010) and it found that the current increase 
in cross-border M&A deals was due to regulations constraints by the home country such as 
market restrictions, lower production cost, and increased competition and at the same time due 
to attraction factors from foreign firms. These include factors such as the wider market 
available, and more advanced technology and efficient operation, suggesting that CBMA 
should be viewed from a multi-factor dimension. A number of studies noted the 
multidimensional nature of M&A, however, these studies generally employed macroeconomic 
perspectives or financial perspectives, rather than a comprehensive study based on the 
perceptions of upper level management perception and human resource factors.  These 
dimensions are addressed in the present study.  
In Sinha, Kaushik, and Chaudhary (2010) study on the impact of M&A on fiscal productivity 
in financial  of selected financial establishments in India, they have discovered that major 
variations in the profits of the shareholders. Their approach was based on using a ratio analysis 
approach to calculate the position of the companies during the period 2000 – 2008 and to 
measure the productivity of these companies using a non-parametric “Wilcoxon signed rank 
test”. Their results confirmed that the liquidity of the companies remained constant and 
acquiring firms are able to generate good value. However Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar and 
Chittoor (2010) offered a different perspective as they have conducted a study on 425 cross-
border acquisitions by Indian companies during 2000 – 2007 in order to evaluate if international 
acquisitions generated higher value to the owners; and whether these acquisitions were 
conducted in emerging or developed markets and the impact of the nature of the markets on 
generating higher value to the owners or shareholders. Their research shows that international 
acquisitions in advanced markets allows for the capitalization on tangible and intangible 
resources, therefore resulting in higher value creation. Shrivastava (1986) examined 327 
companies during 1982 – 1983 to study the relationship between earnings and dividends on 
stock market performance. He concluded that high dividend rates are linked with higher share 
prices however, the study found that the Modigliani-Miller model is not related in the Indian 
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market. There are also several studies which suggest that the Indian stock market is susceptible 
to malpractices, and that the Miller and Modigliani Model is not applicable. Such studies argue 
that significant reforms are required in the capital markets (Sahni (1985), Kothari 1986), Lal, 
(1990), Chandra (1990b), Francis (1991), and Gupta (1992).  
The non-applicability of established models in India is one of the key issues that is addressed 
in the current study. However, to what extent are they applicable or not applicable? Is there a 
specific Indian model which is applicable? If there is a specific model what are its 
characteristics? Bhat (1988) explored the Indian stock market monthly data from 1971 – 1985 
to establish the relationship between the regional market indices and concluded that his study 
was not able to confirm the existence of an integrated national market. Subramaniam (1989) 
wanted to understand the impact of political uncertainty on the market and found that the share 
values will increase with lower complexity and higher clarity in the political environment. 
These regional differences render inefficient capital markets, which make the M&A process 
prone to volatility, complexity and uncertainty. Thus, the stock market reaction to M&As and 
financial indices are not sufficient indicators of merger success. There may be other human 
factors, however, that need to be explored to establish the success or otherwise of M&A, 
especially in the Indian context. 
2.9 Merger as a Response to Organizational Interdependencies 
The literature on M&A has mainly focused on exploring the motives of firms engaging in M&A 
transactions. Pfeffer (1972) examined the role of mergers in managing the interdependencies 
between firms. He argued that the decisions of organizations are to a large extent bound by the 
conditions of their political and legal environments. Based on behavioural theory, Cyert and 
March (1963) postulated that organizations do attempt to establish a negotiated environment. 
Hazard (1961) also argued that organizations seek some certainty in their environments. In 
addition, Katz and Kahn (1966) posited that organizations generally attempt to manage external 
dependencies. Thus, it may be argued that a merger provides an opportunity for a firm to take 
on the competition because of economies of scale than if it relied simply on organic growth if 
a suitable political environment is available. Selznick (1949) examined a case study of the 
Tennessee Valley Authority, finding evidence of co-option and the success of co-option to 
realize organizational goals. Pfeffer (1972) suggested that there are three types of control of the 
 
 
[48] 
 
environment that can be achieved by organizations; reducing symbiotic interdependency, as in 
the case of steel producers to merge with coal producers (Hawley, 1950); 2) buying competitors 
to reduce competitive pressure or communalistic interdependence; and 3) diversifying into 
different sectors within the industry (Baum, Li and Usher, 2000; Vanhaverbeke, Duysters and 
Noorderhaven, 2002). An examination of studies conducted in the United States economy 
indicates the following characteristics:  
1. The firm’s strength in the political environment may be used in the economic environment.  
2. Firms may attempt to reduce competition by buying large competitors.  
3. Firms may attempt to diversify into different segments within the industry.  
JSW Steel had these factors in mind in their pursuit of growth in the steel industry. The choice 
of the above characteristics is guided by the research that seeks to develop a framework for 
achieving alignment between key organizational components for successful inter-
organizational collaboration during a merger. Trautwein (1990), Cox (2006) and Gaughan 
(2002) offered a methodical review of the motives.  
Trautwein (1990) explained that M&A executives always use synergy and value creation as the 
main drivers for the takeover. Predictably, there are neither claims that their motive was to 
achieve monopolization, nor instances where managers referred to their own benefits as 
justification for an M&A deal. The same study also noted that there is little evidence, either in 
practice or research, of a predatory approach as postulated by the “raider” theories. Gaughan 
(2002) wanted to understand the motives behind M&As, so he studied the theories behind these 
motives using a multiple empirical case studies. He summarized the motives for M&A to 
include growth; economies of scale; access to cash at lower borrowing costs; and better 
experienced management. M&As are determined by different motives which differ from one 
deal to the other and cannot depend on one theory such as “one size fit all”. 
The importance of mergers is stressed by Ellis, Reus and Lamont (2009) who had identified 
that ‘M&As are still key strategic tools for many companies to achieve diversification, 
corporate growth, and economies of scale’. Prior M&A studies predominantly focused on (a) 
exploring the factors driving organizations to merge with and acquire others, (b) the 
 
 
[49] 
 
performance outcomes of M&As and (c) analysing the factors which impact on M&A 
performance. Ellis, Reus and Lamont, in their preliminary studies confirm the validity of some 
of the issues addressed by them. This information is not available in the public domain, and 
middle managers may not have access to the complete data.  
Thus, obtaining information from upper level management, especially those who are in the 
M&A team, is likely to help the researcher to confirm or raise questions about the available 
literature.   
The factors that motivate firms to pursue M&As may be classified as; value creation, 
managerial self-interest, environmental factors and firm characteristics (King et al., 2004). 
Value creation is likely to happen as a result of enhanced market power, as having fewer firms 
in an industry increases firm-level pricing power. This is supported by an analysis of airline 
mergers that occurred during the 1980’s, which showed that prices on routes serviced by 
merging firms increased relative to those of a matched sample unaffected by the merger (Kim 
and Singal, 1993). Another reason for enhanced value creation is improved efficiency due to 
resource sharing. This was supported in a study by King et al. (2008) which showed that an 
acquiring firm’s abnormal returns were associated with the degree to which acquirer and target 
firm resources complemented each other. Similarly, Banerjee and Eckard (1998) found that the 
market bid higher for horizontal mergers due to resource complementarity. Thus, it is assumed 
that firms will not commit systematic mistakes that markets are efficient and the market value 
of a firm reflects its intrinsic value. Consequently, a firm will only acquire another firm if it 
increases the combined value of the merged firms (Baker and Nofsinger, 2010). Any M&A 
type will always involve synergistic sources of value creation which would not be attainable 
without M&A, based on the motive of profit maximization. However, given some of the large-
scale failures in M&A and the non-applicability of western models, it would be naive to believe 
that markets are rational and efficient and that no mistakes are committed by managers. The 
researcher intends to strongly counter this argument, as there are a number of reasons to believe 
that the M&A process is far more complex.  
Another important motivator for firms to pursue M&As is managerial self-interest. Several 
studies have found that acquiring CEOs’ post-acquisition compensation increased with no 
correlation to the performance of the M&A (Harford and Li, 2007; Grinstein and Hribar, 2004; 
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Bliss &Rosen, 2001). The discretionary power of the acquiring organizations’ CEOs also 
increased after the merger (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997). Firth (1991) argued that the 
rationale for corporate takeovers is often to maximize shareholder wealth. However, Mikkelson 
and Ruback (1985) argued that “corporate takeover decisions can be viewed as investment 
decisions in which interests of management and stockholders are likely to diverge”. Jensen et 
al. (1985) argue that senior managers whose tenure with the firm is limited may place lower 
value on cash flows occurring beyond their working terms. M&A activity is more likely to be 
influenced by managerial compensation. Therefore, the senior managers in both organizations 
have fiduciary obligations as agents of their shareholders and due diligence is one of the most 
important aspects which need to be studied.  
Despite most mergers being driven by motives of profit maximization, research indicates a 
larger number of M&As are financial failures and produce undesirable can be attributed to 
unmeasured sources of real economic factors such as synergy, or may be attributed to some 
other managerial process undertaken by organizations (Pazarskis et al., 2006). Therefore, this 
researcher aims to study the merged entity to find the factors that impact upon the success or 
failure of any M&A. Research has shown that 83% of all M&A deals have failed to deliver 
shareholder value (Harding and Rouse, 2007), M&As affected employee morale (DE Meuse 
and Marks 2003; Mische, 2001), and 70% of target firm executives departed due to 
acculturative stress (Krug and Aguilera, 2005). These studies do not necessarily discredit 
M&As, but rather the results may be attributed to the processes used to bring organizations 
together (Marks and Mirvis, 2011). Research has shown some of the outcomes of these failures. 
In 2004, 60% of investors expressed a preference for share buybacks or a dividend increase 
instead of re-investment in companies (Mamdani et al. 2004). The preference for the return of 
cash to shareholders emphasizes investors’ unwillingness to entrust management with decisions 
regarding the deployment of resources.  
Inter-organizational collaborative capacity can be understood as ‘the capacity of organizations 
(or a set of organizations) to enter into, develop, and sustain inter-organizational systems in 
pursuit of collective outcomes’ (Jansen, Hocevar, Rendan, and Thomas 2008). Thus, it is 
imperative that the researcher establishes the strategic fit as well as the organizational fit. While 
strategic fit has to be established using qualitative methods, organizational fit must be explored 
through quantitative methods.   
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2.10 Learning and Unlearning in Mergers 
In the world of business,’ the life-cycles of organizations are often very limited. Only those 
who are able to adapt to the new circumstances are able to stay competitive and to retain market 
share. The organization needs to be learning organizations, to deal with crises and the 
opportunities provided by technological innovations. A learning organization is one that 
enables its members to learn. This is essential if a business is to be a transformative one and to 
deal with the challenges and to benefit from opportunities(Klammer & Güldenberg, 2016). 
There are a number of characteristics of a learning organization and they include a commitment 
to self-development and self-mastery. That is it encourages people to learn, be better and 
develop a culture that promotes learning. Learning organizations are able to reflect on their 
systems and are capable of changing. Then they have the ability to reinvent themselves and to 
create mental models that facilitate changes. It is important that all stakeholders in an 
organization have a shared vision and work as a team(Klammer & Güldenberg, 2016). 
Leadership is essential for any learning organization. However, to meet the challenges of the 
time, an organization needs to be also an unlearning organization(Klammer & Güldenberg, 
2016). In short, the knowledge acquired by an organization often becomes obsolete and this can 
harm the survival and success of an organization. It is no longer sufficient to learn new 
knowledge it is also important to unlearn (Rouzies et al 2019: Rabier, 2017). Only in this way 
is an organization able to acquire new knowledge and develop a culture that keeps them 
competitive. 
Learning and unlearning is essential for the success of a merger. This does not matter the type 
of merger. The integration of two often dissimilar organizations means that they both have to 
learn and also to learn. According to Rouzies et al learning and unlearning are important in a 
merger, if there is to be a successful integration. Those who fail to learn and unlearn are more 
likely to experience a ‘distorted integration’ (2019, p. 273).  Therefore it is recommended that 
mergers proceed with both parties being committed to sharing a vision for the future and 
working as a team. This can be very difficult in a merger process, which is typically 
accompanied by a degree of friction. Rabier argues that acquisitions that are mainly motivated 
by the desire for synergies need to know about the organization they are taking over and also 
be prepared to ‘unlearn’ (2017). However, he also argues being a learning organization does 
not guarantee success but can increase the probability of a better outcome and a successful 
 
 
[52] 
 
merger. It is important that the acquiring organization has the right motives and this requires 
learning new knowledge with regard to the market. The post-acquisition phase is critical for 
acquisition performance. Teerikangas and Thanos argue that  
‘that integration-related factors do not bear directly upon acquisition performance. Instead, their 
effect is mediated by functional organizations in both firms’ (2018, p. 366). 
Therefore the nature of the organizations involved in the mergers needs to able to manage the 
merger. Among these are behavioural and cultural factors. They act as functional mediators that 
promote the successful integration of two organizations. This requires a great deal of flexibility 
and this is only possible if they are both learning organization and are prepared to abandon old 
methods and obsolete knowledge. One of the barriers to successful integration is businesses' 
inability to learn and to forego old systems and methods. According to Zollo and Meier (2008), 
‘M&A performance is a multifaceted construct; there is no one overarching factor capturing all 
the different ways used to proxy it’. Among these factors is the ability to meet customer 
expectations and to achieve synergies.  These require sharing new knowledge and methods and 
especially learn how to collaborate. Organizational learning is important as merging companies 
need to be able to abandon old methods and learn new routines and practices. This can help 
them to make synergies and achieve integration(Klammer & Güldenberg, 2016). Moreover, it 
can help to overcome the cultural barriers that often stop mergers from becoming a financial 
success. Papadakos and Thanos argue that learning a new culture and negotiating between two 
different organizational cultures is very important if an acquisition is to be successfully 
integrated into an existing company (2010). Moreover, according to Rabier, both organizations 
need to unlearn some of their old ways of doing things and ideally create a new organisational 
culture (2017). Therefore, learning and unlearning are required to enhance the prospects of 
success when it comes to a merger. This can 
The process of learning and unlearning can be very difficult. Klammer & Güldenberg, 
recommend that managers encourage the ‘abandonment of routines, procedures, and daily 
practices’ by employees (2017, p 314). They also need to change the terms of references for 
staff members' roles, so that they are more amenable to change. Learning and forgetting are 
difficult when it comes to a merger or an acquisition that involves a family firm(Klammer & 
Güldenberg, 2016). These firms can be very difficult to acquire and to integrate into an existing 
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organization. If the family members remain, stakeholders, they can even prevent synergies from 
occurring and even result in the loss of customers (Klammer & Güldenberg, 2016). Family 
firms are often seen as more conservative and they often view a firm as a family business even 
if it is no longer one (Klammer & Güldenberg, 2016). Moreover, they will seek to maintain the 
identity of a business and its culture out of a sense of family honour and pride. They are reluctant 
to engage in the forgetting that is necessary for both vertical and horizontal integration can 
occur. Moreover, they are resistant to change and many family members are reluctant to 
acknowledge the new reality, especially with regard to a loss of control. In the words of ‘the 
organization has no intentionality or explicit desire to lose accumulated knowledge’(Klammer 
& Güldenberg, 2016).  It is important that the company merging with a family firm to recognize 
how family factors can influence the performance of the company after a merger, especially in 
pre-merger cases.  
2.11 Chapter Summary 
This chapter summarizes the empirical research that has been carried out in different countries 
on the successes and failures of M&A. There is a clear difference between the waves that are 
experienced by market driven economies and those in India. Seminal studies that analysed 
different industrial sectors in India were examined. Key legislation and various areas in which 
organizations must receive outside approval are listed. It demonstrated the success factors in a 
merger. It also pointed out the motive for mergers which are mainly driven by competition and 
profit maximization and the inherent financial risks in mergers. However, in the case of JSW it 
is a success and it is still continuing as a success. The reduction of organizational 
interdependencies and the use of political clout as means of gaining economic clout is 
discussed. There was a gap in the literature in relation to the motivations and the rationale for 
mergers and the success factors that are involved in the process of creating a single entity in the 
business world. This led to the development of the research question and the methodology for 
answering this question is presented in the next section.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE MERGER AND ACQUISITION PROCESS – 
A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter explores the M&A process to address one of the research question of this study. 
The key themes to be addressed will be discussed in detail. The type of M&A integration 
approaches is clarified and there is a synthesis of the main theories on mergers. The importance 
of the strategic and organizational fit is emphasized and their significance is explained. The 
theoretical stance and the definitions adopted for the present research are articulated. In this 
chapter the main themes that emerged from the literature on M&A in India are presented. 
 
The M&A process generally follows three phases: planning, implementation and integration 
(Picot, 2002). However, this model is fairly broad and in order to better understand the process, 
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the five stages of the “Watson Wyatt Deal Flow” model proposed by Galpin and Herndon 
(2000) will be examined to gain richer insights. Furthermore, Carey, Aiello, Watkins, Eccles 
and Rappaport (2001) also presented a five-stage model for successful implementation of a 
M&A. A comparison of these models indicates that the Watson and Wyatt Deal Flow Model 
provides a pragmatic view, whereas the Aiello and Watkins Model is more prescriptive. While 
these models follow a linear process, the real process is iterative, especially at the stage of 
integration. Sudarsanam (1995) reviewed the decision-making process of managers in M&A 
and highlighted the need to create a shared perspective, ambiguous expectations and the 
diversity of motives of managers leading to suboptimal results. 
 
Figure 3: The Merger and Acquisition Process (1) 
 
Source: Aiello, R. J., and Watkins, M. D. (2010). Harvard Business Review on Mergers and 
Acquisitions. 
Figure 4: The Merger and Acquisition Process (2) 
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An acquiring firm is defined as a firm which has acquired a significant share of stocks in another 
firm. This can occur in three ways: 
i. Total shares are taken by the acquired organization, in the sense of a 100% takeover.  
ii. The acquiring firm takes a dominant position with more than 51% of the equity capital, 
as it may help them to have a substantial say in the organizational business strategy and 
implementation. 
iii. The acquiring firm makes a capital injection or acquires a minority position, less than 
50% of the issued capital.  
3.1 Key Themes in the Literature of M&A 
Role of Teams in Mergers – Teams play a crucial role in the management of M&A. It is difficult 
to evaluate the process without the input of executives who facilitate that process (Hayward and 
Hambrick, 1997). They primarily act as negotiators on behalf of their organization and 
determine how the target entity should be run post-acquisition. They are catalysts that ensures 
both the organizations operate as a single entity. However, before further examining the 
literature on the role of teams in mergers, it is important to define and examine ‘strategic fit’ 
and ‘organizational fit’. Strategic fit is the extent to which the expected value is realized from 
the given merger Burton (2004). This type of strategy is one that is suitable for the resources, 
skills and structure of a company and is aligned to its objectives (Hayward and Hambrick, 
1997). Trautwein (1990) examined the motives behind mergers and argued that the principle 
motives are the following. To improve efficiency (efficiency theory), wealth transfer (raider 
theory) from the targeted firm (in the present case from ISPAT) and empire building, as owners 
and managers derive psychological satisfaction from being the number one producer of steel in 
India. A similar study by Angwin (2007) provides further evidence for these motives.  
The question must now be asked, what were JSW’s motives for the JSW-ISPAT merger? 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) stated that better information about the market than the target 
entity can provide is important for the merger. However, in the case of JSW-ISPAT, the 
information advantage may not have been available as five different competitors have examined 
ISPAT’s financial records, which allow it to understand not only the company but also the 
sector. JSW did not have better information on the market than other competitors. However, 
ensuring that strategic fit is positive does not preclude organizational integration, which is likely 
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to provide greater value, although it may not be visible. Such value is created through a 
capability transfer, which may be in the form of the sharing of functional skills, general 
management skills, resources and assets (Porter, 1987). Bowman and Ambrosini (2000) defined 
this as the difference between capability prior to a merger, and what is to be captured, based on 
the market mechanism. Another definition based on capability transfer is the “dimension of 
strategic interdependence’, as articulated by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991).  This is where the 
merged entity compliments each other and leads to an increased ability to deliver to the 
customer. They described this as the extent to which the two merging entities need to exchange 
and share capabilities and posited that higher interdependence leads to greater value creation. 
This assertion is based on the “Resource-Based” view of the firm (Penrose, 1959; Hart, 1995; 
Miller and Shamsie, 1996; Dierick and Cool, 1989), which suggests that each organization has 
capabilities that are unique, which combine to form its distinctive competence. Organizations 
are viewed as a bundle of capabilities- immobile, valuable, unique and difficult to replicate or 
substitute (Barney, 1986; 1991).  
Moreover, regardless of how seamlessly a strategic change may be designed, its value still 
depends on several factors such as cultural understanding; cultural differences; communication; 
cultural acceptance; trust; commitment and co-operation. Internal capabilities can affect firm 
performance and the effectiveness of the firm’s M&A strategy. Lin, Hung and Li (2006) showed 
that a firm’s HR capability is more important when the firm makes an acquisition where 
integration is more challenging. Thus, inter-organizational integration during M&A requires 
the alignment of other organizational dimensions of effective strategic change. 
Acquisitions may provide an opportunity to augment assets and the value created may indeed 
justify the M&A process undertaken. Various labels have been applied to these unique 
resources such as core competencies ((Haspeslagh and Farquhar, 1994; Prahalad and Hamel, 
1990). Merging two organizational entities requires a focus on identifying differences in culture 
between the acquiring and acquired companies, and the psychological consequences of trying 
to integrate such differences (Siehl and Smith 1990, Mirvis and Marks, 1992a; 1992b; 2003). 
The concept of autonomy may be used to address the organizational fit phenomena. The level 
of autonomy may be equated to the cultural integrity of the acquired company. The higher the 
cultural integrity, the higher the autonomy and if the organization that makes initiates the 
merger adopts an aggressive approach without taking cultural integrity into consideration, it 
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may give rise to reduced commitment and motivation, anger, resentment and hostility from the 
employees of the acquired company (Buono and Bowditch,2003) something that in turn can 
reduce a firm’s productivity (Vaara 2010) The concept of autonomy emphasizes the need to 
preserve the integrity and capabilities of the acquired company. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) 
created a contingency matrix (Figure 5) by combining the two dimensions of strategic 
independence and autonomy. This matrix outlines four distinct styles relating to the need to 
create value. These four styles are: 
  
Figure 5: Types of Acquisition Integration Approaches 
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“Holding” (low autonomy, low strategic interdependence). 
“Symbiotic” (high autonomy, high strategic interdependence). 
“Preservation” (high autonomy, low strategic interdependence). 
“Absorption” (low autonomy, high strategic interdependence). 
Hayes and Hoag (1974) pointed out that higher organizational autonomy reduces upper level 
management turnover after a merger. The literature on M&A also points to the importance of 
Managing Executives. The clashes between managing executives in facilitating, or impeding 
the process are also articulated by the popular press (Chen and Meindl, 1991) with heroic or 
villainous characterizations.  In general in the literature there is a gap when it comes to the need 
for organizational autonomy and interdependence is not adequately, with regard to the 
management of a merger.  
3.2 Alignment Models 
Nadler and Tushman (1980) proposed a Congruence Model of organizational behaviour that 
concentrates on the transformation process and reflects organizational interdependence. Their 
model focuses on the various components of an organization such as tasks, people, and 
structure. The better the fit, the more effective the organizational performance is likely to be. 
Kotter’s (1980) research has shown that 70% of all major change efforts in organizations fail 
as organizations tend not to take the holistic approach required to see the change through. He 
has outlined an “8-Step Process for Leading Change” designed to increase the chances of 
success. This 8-S model is founded on the formation of the new culture in an incremental 
manner, through creating a desire for alteration and then supplying the necessary support to 
align with the new vision of change. 
Higgins’ (2005) Eight ‘S’s model ¬was an adaptation of Waterman's Seven S's model. The 
model is depicted on Figure 5. 
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Source: Higgins, J. M. (2005). The eight ‘S’s of successful strategy execution. Journal of 
Change Management, 5(1), 3-13. 
Figure 6: Higgins eight S Model of Innovation Management 
This model replaces the skill of the 7S model with resources and introduces another dimension 
called strategic performance.  
Strategy (S1) has three types of strategic levels: corporate, business, and operational. The 
corporate strategy outlines the nature of the occupation; the business strategy decides pricing, 
products, and competition strategy to win market share; and the functional strategy includes 
finance, sales, human resources and operations. Structure (S2) means the authority to perform 
the task and its commission to several departmental heads through operating procedures and 
controls for managers, as shown in the organization chart. Systems (S3) and procedures are set 
in office to ensure that the company runs from day to day. These arrangements and processes 
may include IT, CAPEX, production, Q/A, and performance measurement schemes. Style (S4) 
refers to the style of management used by the leadership of the company when dealing with 
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their employees, either transactional, short-term or transformational long-term. There are four 
leadership styles: Authoritarian, Consultative, Consensus, or Democratic. Staff (S5) represents 
the various types of employees at the company that are needed to help it to meet its strategic 
goals. Resources (S6) are important for the company to meet its objectives and may be financial, 
such as monetary, or operational, such as technology. Shared Values (S7) are values that are 
recognized by the company’s employees and are ingrained in the company’s culture. According 
to Higgins (2005), all the 7-Ss should be focused in the same direction for the eighth S or for 
successful Strategic Performance (S8) to be achieved. This is the holistic approach of 
integration of different functional areas to ensure financial performance. 
Gulati and Kletter (2004) found that successful organizations recognize the importance of each 
of the four dimensions of relational architecture. In the ‘Relationship Centric Organization’ 
model, critical relationships between the three external dimensions; customer, supplier, and 
alliance partner, are interconnected and synergistic (Gulati and Kletter 2004). Therefore, 
collaboration with customers necessitates close collaboration with alliance partners, with 
suppliers and among internal business.  
Burke and Litwin (1992) provided another causal model of organizational performance that 
emphasised key organizational elements that need to be addressed during periods of 
transformational or transactional changes. Transformational change, as in the case of M&A, is 
dictated by environmental contingencies and can only be achieved if three fundamental aspects 
are addressed; leadership, strategy and culture, which in turn impact all other elements within 
organizations. When incremental and transactional changes are introduced within existing 
paradigms, organizations only need to focus on transactional elements such as structure, 
systems, processes, work practices, and individual motivation. (Burke and Litwin 1992). 
Schneider et al., (2003) focused on strategic alignment in service organizations and provided 
evidence that companies that paid more attention to service excellence had more satisfied 
customers. Furthermore, they reported that service excellence could only be achieved when 
organizational elements such as organizational practices, strategy, systems and HR practices 
were aligned with and supported each other. 
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3.3 The Theoretical Stance for the present research 
Differences in organizational structures, cultures and employee turnover   
Borys and Jemison, (1989) discussed the necessity of inter-organizational alignment of the 
company’s processes to the achieve synergy which in turn will “create congruent organizational 
frames of reference” (Schweiger, Csiszar, and Napier, 1994).  
Earlier research confirms that the acquired firm will be expected to comply with acquirer’s 
culture as highlighted by (Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger, and Weber, 1992). The integration 
process between the firms will be difficult and some case complex and it would require joint 
cooperation but sometimes this may change quickly as the acquirer may impose his own 
policies, and procedures (Buono and Bowditch, 2003; Datta, 1991; Hambrick and Cannella, 
1993; Shanley, 1987; Shanley and Correa, 1992). Most changes are implemented in the 
acquired company by the top executives of the Acquirer (Schweiger and Walsh, 1990). Two 
important dimensions emerge from this discussion. “Organizational integration process” and 
“employee reaction or employee attitude to the process” which nevertheless are not usually 
addressed to the extent required, something that has been pointed out by the seminal work of 
Larsson and Finkelstein (1999). Even after one and a half decades the issues still remain 
unaddressed (Jemison, 1988; Schweiger and Weber, 1989). This may be due to the less 
objective nature of measurement and methods used for obtaining information.  It has been 
posited that much of the value from the M&A is created during the acquisition integration 
process (Pablo, 1994; Schweiger and Walsh, 1990; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Caves, 
1989). M&As are multi-faceted phenomena which invite a combined approach focusing on 
organizational integration. The study of integration processes after integration is likely to shed 
more light on value creation (Buono and Bowditch 1989, Hitt et al., 1997; Hunt and Downing, 
1990; Borys and Jemison 1988). Given the problems associated with objective measures that 
exclude strategic and human resources dimensions, Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) in a 
qualitative study theorize M&A performance in terms of “synergy realization”. These synergy 
sources include: operational; vertical economies; collusive; managerial; and financial 
synergies. The operational synergy is achieved by economies of scale Loyd, (1976); vertical 
economies is achieved by economies of scope Chandler, (1977) and Seth, (1990); collusive 
synergy is achieved by buying power (Caves and Porter, 1977, Chatterjee 1986; Scherer 1980); 
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managerial synergy is achieved by restructuring of managers (Davis and Stout 1992); and 
financial synergy is achieved by the success of the other synergies (Lubatlun 1983, Seth 1990). 
The number of synergies that can be achieved will determine the likelihood of success of an 
M&A deal (Harrigan,1984; Walter, 1980). The combination potential of M&As is usually 
conceptualized in terms of their degree of relatedness (Datta 1991, Kusewitt, 1985, Singh and 
Montgomery, 1987). In the present case, both firms operate in the steel industry and this can 
help to facilitate a successful merger. This means that those firms are more likely to share 
common organizational structures and management practices which will make their integration 
easier (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). On the other hand, in order to draw benefits from the newly 
acquired firm, differences have to exist at the very least when it comes to the specialized 
technological knowledge and capabilities that firms possess. Such differences can often arise 
from the way that companies are structured and therefore how knowledge flows and combined 
within the organization.  
To make the concept of relatedness clearer, two firms are related when the net present value of 
the cash flow of the combination of these firms is greater than the sum of the net present values 
of the cash flows of these firms acting independently (Copeland and Weston, 1983).  
Relatedness can therefore be explained by NPV(A+B) > NPV(A) + NPV(B). Montgomery, 
(1994) argued that literature shows that merged companies with similar operations mainly focus 
on relatedness and any difference in their strategic objectives are considered less important, the 
same view is shared by Shanley and Correa, (1992). Hitt et al. (1993) explained that theories of 
relatedness may not highlight synergy achievements in terms of more products on offer, larger 
market share, expanded intellectual properties and as such it is considered as an important 
success factor in M&A. Therefore, it is posited that Synergies can be achieved when the two 
merged entities have similarly operations and varied experience. Datta, (1991) indicated that 
strategic partnerships in the form of M&A may not always yield a positive synergy and Hunt, 
(1990) confirmed that synergy achievement will depend on how the new merged entity is 
managed after the merger. Schweiger et al., (1987) concluded that synergy success will depend 
on the management of the newly formed entity.	How	 organizational	 fit	 and	 strategic	 fit	 are	achieved	is	not	explored.	It	is	only	referred	to	if	at	all	in	a	general	way	and	not	in	a	comprehensive	way	and	this	is	a	significant	gap	in	the	literature. 
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One key important element of success for any M&A deal is the level of Organizational 
integration between the two merged firms, Buono and Bowditch, (1989) defined the integration 
as the level of co-ordination between the two merged entities. Pablo, (1994) highlighted that 
the extent of interaction between the companies is paramount for their success. Shrivastava, 
(1986), examined the organizational integration processes of various Indian companies and 
concluded that the higher the alignment in the integration between the two companies the more 
likely that their merger will be a success, Yunker, (1983) also concurs with this result. 
Haspeslagh and Jemison, (1991) studied the high and low degrees of integration and argued 
that organizational integration should be conducted in justly without discrimination against the 
acquired firm. 
(Chatterjee et al. 1992, Napier, 1989, Levinson, 1970), concluded that increased alignment 
between the two merged firms is important to yield the strategic interdependencies between 
them. Organizational integration and alignment between the two companies can be determined 
by the level of coordination on restructuring between them and the quality of the team handling 
the implementation of the merger (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, Pablo, 1994, Shrivastava, 
1986). An important non-financial measure of M&A performance is employee turnover. 
Surveys have found that M&As affected employee morale (DeMeuse and Marks 2003; Mische, 
2001), with 70% of target firm executives departing due to acculturative stress (Krug and 
Aguilera, 2005). Studies by (Krug and Hegarty, 1997, Lubatkin, et al., 1999), have shown that 
if the acquiring firm is an international company, it is more likely that the local managers of the 
acquired firm to be terminated or being made redundant due to major cultural differences. Krug 
and Hegarty, (2001) also indicated that turnover is likely to be higher when the acquired firm’s 
managers feel that the merger may have a negative long-term outcome. All of these issues show 
the need for inter-organizational integration to achieve M&A success. As M&As might require 
the abandonment of existing practices and routines and the discovery and development of new 
ones (Marks and Marvis, 2001), failure on the grounds of socio-cultural factors can be viewed 
as a result of a lack of effective inter-organizational integration in M&As. Various researchers 
have argued, but rarely investigated the impact of cultural conflicts, as it may create negative 
sentiments and distrust between the merged entities’ management teams (Buono and Bowditch, 
1989; Olie, 1990; Vaara, 2003). Shrivastava, (1986) explained that different cultures may 
impact managerial decisions particularly in HR policies which will cause inter-company 
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conflict (Birkenshaw, Bresman and Hakanson, 2000; Cartwright and Cooper, 1996; Schweiger 
and Walsh, 1990). 
Cartwright and Coopers’ (1996) developed a model for cultural compatibility with the 
assumption that corporate culture should be similar for the merged entity’s success to be 
achieved.  Companies traditionally are proud of their culture and it can be extremely difficult 
to integrate a new one, hence, studies by (Ahammad and Glaister, 2011a, 2011b; Reus and 
Lamont, 2009; Slangen, 2006; Vaara, Sarala, Stahl, and Bjo¨rkman, 2012; Weber, Tarba, and 
Rozen Bachar, 2011; Weber, Tarba, Stahl, and Rozen Bachar, 2012; Gomes, Angwin, Weber, 
and Tarba, 2013; Gomes, Weber, Brown, and Tarba, 2011; Teerikangas and Very, 2006; Weber 
and Tarba, 2012; Weber, Tarba, and Reichel, 2009, 2011) have all found that cultural 
differences have a negative effect on M&A performance. 
However, studies by (Elsass &Veiga, 1994; Javidan and House, 2002; Nahavandi and 
Malekzadeh, 1988; Olie, 1990; Sales and Mirvis, 1984), have confirmed that cross-cultural 
differences can affect M&A post-acquisition performance in a negative and positive manner. 
Shi, Sun and Prescott (2012) explained that cultural differences will have a negative impact on 
communication and knowledge transfer therefore reducing shared values given the high failure 
rate of M&As. It is possible that the not-so-successful track record of M&As could be attributed 
to the processes implemented to put companies together, as these have been found to affect a 
deal’s success or failure (Marks and Mirvis, 2011). These questions surrounding the 
performance of M&As demonstrates the demand for research into how inter-organizational 
integration should be achieved during M&A. 
The success of an M&A is also affected by the timing of the acquisition. Kaplan (2011) 
investigated 311 companies that announced deals for mergers and acquisitions in 2007 and 2008 
before the economic downturn, and found that the size of the trade plays a significant role in 
their success. He found that smaller deals were more successful than larger ones and domestic 
deals achieved higher rates of success than cross border trades. The most significant finding 
was that the deals announced in 2008 had a higher success rate than those announced in 2007. 
The higher performance of M&A deals in 2008 were probably the result of greater diligence by 
the managers’ and the application of good business principles that fit with the changing 
economic system. Those who facilitated deals in 2007 probably did so with the previously 
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economic conditions in mind. Hyde and Paterson’s (2001) survey of the AstraZeneca 
merger outlined the role that leadership-development initiatives played as vehicles for 
change within AstraZeneca during the first two years of unification. Spangler and 
Tikhomirov (2010) provided insights into how a CEO’s role must evolve in line with the 
changing pre-merger and post-merger objectives and requirements. Similarly, Banal-
Estanol and Seldeslachts (2011) argued that the character of an organisation’s leader is 
vital, and noted that failure often occurs in mergers due to a lack of adequate leadership 
from the two companies. All of these studies make it clear that leaders and directors play 
a critical role in reaching post-merger success.  
Hogan and Overmyer-Day (1994) have pointed out that scholars have tried to determine 
how employees perceive and react to M&As and whether this can shed any light on the 
performance of post-merger systems. Giessner, Ullrich and Dick (2011) showed that 
problems occur in mergers when employees identify more strongly with their pre-merger 
organizations, and highlighted the importance of skilled human resources management 
during mergers to minimize any negative effects on employee welfare. According to them, 
M&A research has mainly concentrated on “organizational-level variables to explain post-
M&A performance, such as whether merging organizations are from related or unrelated 
subject areas, whether companies have experience with M&A activity, or how the pile has 
been executed financially” while ignoring the human resource issues that arise during 
integration (Giessner, Ullrich and Dick, 2011). 
Bohlin et al., (2000) concluded that the primary reason for companies’ failures in mergers 
and acquisitions was that they treat “synergy creation and exploitation” as a formula for 
cost cutting, and by focusing completely on costs, they neglect the human and cultural 
dimensions when merging two companies. Similarly, Schraeder and Self (2003) argued that 
organizational culture is one factor identified as a possible catalyst for M&A success. Their 
article examines pre-and post-merger and acquisition success from an organizational position. 
The primary implication from the pre-merger perspective is the lack of organizational effort 
made to assess cultural compatibility or fit prior to the amalgamation. Nguyen et al, (2003) 
focused on the difficulties associated with cultural changes in M&A and presented the 
“Organizational Marriage Metaphor” (OMM), a tool designed to reduce culture change issues 
and increase the probability of successful mergers and acquisitions. They believe the OMM 
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model will assist organizations in combining different cultures into one culture of shared core 
values, tactical assumptions and lead to high performance. Nevertheless, these works have 
centred on the desegregation of the organizations’ cultures, while neglecting how the 
integration of other organizational variables is accomplished. Marks and Mirvis (2001) 
highlight the importance of the pre-merger and post-merger phases as a ground for the success 
of the fusion. Their work concentrates on the efforts that must be made in the pre-combination 
phase to address strategic and psychological issues. They observed that strategic challenges can 
affect the synergy of structures and cultures, and that psychological challenges must be 
addressed by raising people’s awareness of and capacity to react to the stresses of unification. 
The more these issues are brought up and worked through during the pre-combination period; 
the better-prepared people will be to take on the challenges of consolidation. Carpenter and 
Wyman (2008) suggested that due diligence also plays an important role in the success of cross-
border M&As through a careful assessment of the straight monetary value of risks and a strong 
grounding in the local risk management culture.  
3.4 Organizational Fit  
An important element of 'organizational fit' in acquisitions is the level of compatibility between 
both styles of management. Management styles can be understood as a key element in the 
subjective culture of an organization (Weber, Shenkar and Raveh, 1996; Shenkar, 2001; Sathe, 
1985). It comprises a number of factors such as the management group's attitude towards risk, 
its decision-making approach, and management’s control and communication styles (Covin and 
Slevin, 1988; Khandwalla, 1977; Miller, 1987). Management teams operating in the same 
industry can often have very different attitudes to risk-taking (March, 1988) and varying levels 
of tolerance for change. Mintzberg (1973) indicated that while some management teams follow 
their ‘gut feeling’, others emphasize formalized strategic planning and flexibility (Sine, 
Mitsuhashi, and Kirsch, 2006). There may be differences in participation, or in encouragement 
of participation in decision making (Mitchell, 1982). Buono, Bowditch, and Lewis (1985) 
indicated that the management teams of the two companies may have different styles that either 
compatible or not. But if the style is relatively different then cultural confusion and uncertainty 
will prevail until the acquiring firm’s management style is imposed on the acquired firm. Hirsch 
and Andrews (1983) argued that this dominance approach can result in frustration and loss of 
identity between the management of the firm that is being acquired. A merger “on hold” will 
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emerge as anxiety and lack of trust builds up, resulting in reduced productivity and poor 
performance (Ivancevich, Schweiger, and Power, 1987).  
Davis, (1968) highlighted that management styles will vary from firm to firm and country to 
country with regard to structure, responsibility, standards, conflict and identity resulting in 
barriers to achieve success. Buono and Bowditch (1989), concluded that variations in the style 
of management will result in M&A to fail as the merged entity may fail to achieve the required 
synergy forecasted prior to the merger. Case studies made by (Callahan, 1986; Lipton, 1982; 
Rappaport, 1982) indicated that different styles of will lead to post-merger problems.  Marks, 
(1982) highlighted the firms with strong operational integration will struggle the most due to 
disagreement with the new style of management which is likely to generate conflicts. Davis 
(1968), also emphasized the impact of conflict due to differences in managerial styles on the 
performance of the newly merged entity and concluded that two companies are expected to 
reinforce one another. 
3.5 Motivations  
The desire for growth is likewise a factor that drives learning. Peng and Fang (2010) noted that 
in Taiwan, one of the primary reasons why electronics companies acquire others is because of 
their desire for development. Similarly, Child et al., (1999) confirmed in their study of 201 
United Kingdom firms that acquisition was one of the favoured methods of achieving 
expansion. However, research to date has failed to clearly identify the reasons for this failure 
from a holistic perspective.  
3.6 Integration of Cultures. 
Achieving inter-organizational integration during M&A is the strategic challenge that confronts 
all M&A initiatives. Capron and Pistre’s (2002) research showed that in acquisitions, both the 
target and the acquirer should aim to exchange managerial resources in order to increase the 
chances that an effective synergy be realized. This is difficult as “combination partners typically 
enter a deal with distinct mindsets. In an acquisition, the buyer and the seller usually have very 
different psychological perspectives on the deal” (Marks and Marvis, 2001). M&As have, for 
many years, focused solely on financial and operational factors to meet their objectives of 
growth, cost cuts, increases in market share, or to create synergies (Giffin and Schmidt 2009; 
 
 
[69] 
 
Ahuja and Katila, 2001). Therefore, integrating these views has not been addressed adequately 
in M&A. Wilkof et al., (1995) state that: “Culture is publicly shared and accepted by a given 
group at a given time, binding members together and defining or separating one group from 
other groups”. Several studies have also provided evidence that cultural integration can play a 
very important role in the success of large-scale changes, especially M&As. The differences 
between the organizational cultures of combining firms have been found to have a major impact 
on post-acquisition outcomes. Organisational cultures are the beliefs and norms that guide the 
behaviour of employees and management. For example, Gill’s (2012) study provided evidence 
that M&As, can become more complicated with a probability of failure, increasingly so when 
two different cultures are involved, not only at a national level but also at an organizational 
level. Larsson et al., (2002) estimated that high organizational integration and cultural 
integration can lead to between 60 and 70 percent of synergy realization. 
An organization’s choice of integration strategy and processes and its contingency frameworks 
for post M&A integration (Cartwright and Cooper, 1996; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991) are 
vital to ensuring a positive outcome (Child et al., 1999; Schweiger and Very, 2003). Cerius 
(2012) identified a lack of pre-merger integration planning, and post-merger integration 
execution as the causes of M&A failure. The efficient integration model must therefore take 
into account the distinct phases “organizations go through in the transition from independent to 
integrated entities” (Marks and Marvis, 2001, p. 81).  
3.7 The M&A Phenomenon-Qualitative and Quantitative Research  
This section outlines the actual process of the merger and the stages involved.  
These phases are: 
1. Pre-combination phase: In the pre-combination phase, the authors observed that “a 
financial tunnel vision predominated in the typical disappointing cases” (Marks and 
Marvis, 2001) which is not really surprising. This tunnel vision distracts the people 
involved in the decision-making process from the important issues that can help them 
to make accurate decisions during a proposed acquisition deal. This bias apparently 
results from assembling a team composed of people with strictly financial 
backgrounds. This should serve as a warning to any company considering an M&A. Its 
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team should be composed of people from diverse backgrounds to achieve a holistic 
decision-making process. 
2. Combination phase: The authors’ statement as regards the mindset of those involved in 
combination activities is very insightful; “Combination partners typically enter a deal 
with distinct mindsets. In an acquisition, the buyer and seller usually have very different 
psychological perspectives on the deal” (Marks and Marvis, 2001). Being upfront 
regarding expectations and agreeing on those expectations is crucial and transparency 
is important in every stage (Giessner, Ullrich and Dick, 2011; Bohlin and Daley, 2000; 
and Spangler and Tikhomirov, 2010). 
3. Post-combination phase: The authors found that “veterans of previous mergers and 
acquisitions can share their first-hand experiences with novices” (Marks and Marvis, 
2001, p. 89). The researcher agrees, as the efficient knowledge transference from one 
‘generation’ to another is the life and blood of any organization. Some believe that this 
post-combination phase takes many years to complete (Giessner, Ullrich and Dick, 
2011; Bohlin and Daley, 2000) It has often been stated that in some instances they are 
never completed (Spangler and Tikhomirov, 2010). 
Organizations that engage in M&A have often been guided by the “strategic fit” rationale, 
which is concerned with the link between performance and the strategic attributes of the 
combining firms, while neglecting the “organization fit” rationale concerned with the cultural, 
organizational and behavioural attributes of the combining firms.  However, what these 
dimensions are, and how the process of integration is achieved during M&A is not clearly 
defined in the existing research on M&A. One of the key aspects that are missing is the element 
of the dilemmas faced by the entities which need to be addressed. Objectives need not be 
mutually exclusive; they may be good for one entity, but may not be good for a combined entity, 
and communication problems may serve to increase the intensity of a dilemma. Identifying such 
dilemmas is one of the main objectives of this research and it is critical according to Burke and 
Litwin (1992) 
3.8 Alignment in M&A 
When designing an alignment model, several factors have to be taken into account. The 
alignment model is an important means by which the acquired and acquiring companies can be 
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integrated (Marks and Mirvis, 2011). Similarly, cultural and inter-group clashes are a 
significant consideration in the design of alignment models (Crooke, 2006). The efficiency of 
the model in realizing synergy will have a major impact the on success of the M&A (Larsson 
and Finkelstein, 1999). Moreover, management has to integrate the “beliefs and values of 
merging firms” (Larsson and Lubatkin, 2001). One of the most important aspects of the 
alignment model is how it handles acculturation (Salama, Holland and Vinten, 2003; Hyde and 
Paterson, 2001). Acculturation involves much more than mere communication. Rather, it means 
managing cultural differences and addressing them to work towards the unified organization’s 
goals and objectives (Rizwan, Majed, Muhammad and Numl, 2011). These differences must be 
taken into account when helping employees develop a sense of identity, pre-, during, and post-
merger (Bartels, Douwes, de Jong and Pruyn, 2006). It is no surprise then that acquisition deals 
which are perceived to be hostile have proven to be failures with regards to the creation of 
values (Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2006) as there is often a misalignment in the mindset of the 
people in the two organizations. Research has tried to identify organizational interventions that 
could facilitate cultural alignment between merging firms to avoid negative post-acquisition 
outcomes, Larson and Lubatkin (2001) reported that synergies can be achieved if the merging 
firms adopt acculturation strategies such as formal training interventions and other informal 
integration mechanisms, such as increased opportunities for social interaction. Overall, the 
development of a successful model for a merger in the context of Indian business houses has 
not been explored in the literature or taken as an example for UAE business houses, and this 
represents a gap in the literature.  
Several studies have noted the key role that leaders can play in building an organizational 
culture that facilitates change readiness, particularly during mergers (Kavanagh and Ashkansy, 
2006; Taormina, 2008; Seo et. al., 2012). There is also evidence in recent literature that the 
uncertainties and ambiguities associated with mergers can be reduced substantially through the 
use of social media platforms and related technologies that facilitate dialogue and information 
sharing (Moffat and McClean, 2012). Schewiger and Goulet (2005) argued that the ability to 
manage cultural differences could happen through cultural learning. When cultures within 
organizations are incompatible, people can become frustrated (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 
2006). According to the research model, if M&A personnel’s attitude towards M&A activity is 
positive, this would the chances of successful change. Openness between M&A actors allows 
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them to communicate with one another and align their visions of the firm’s future. The common 
goal of these organizations is to ensure their newly acquired employees believe in the common 
goal of the parent company (Clayton, 2010).  This is critical for acculturation according to many 
scholars (Salama, Holland and Vinten, 2003; Hyde and Paterson, 2001). This means that for 
the integration team, especially in the case of hostile takeovers, an integration model must be 
designed to minimize the negative impact of the hostile takeover. They often fail to take account 
culture (Salama, Holland and Vinten, 2003; Hyde and Paterson, 2001). It has been noted in the 
literature that themes such as customer service, attitudes toward innovation, and employee 
concerns such as loyalty and attitudes should be part of a pre-merger study (Schraeder and Self, 
2003). Haslam and Ellemers (2005) indicated that high levels of social identification among 
employees with the organization results in improved efficiency, better performance, reductions 
in employee turnover and positive attitudes towards the organization. However cultural 
identification is held others to be more important (Salama, Holland and Vinten, 2003). 
It may be concluded from the preceding section that the alignment of key organizational 
elements is fundamental to Strategic Performance and the long-term competitive advantage of 
an organization. However, the probability of misalignment is very high during periods of 
strategic change, particularly during large scale strategic changes such as M&As. Existing 
research has not addressed the effect of alignment on other organizational elements (structure, 
systems,) other than culture. Hence there is a need to identify the key alignment issues that need 
to be addressed during different phases of a merger process. What these are vary but they need 
to be identified beforehand according to Higgins (2005), while Bingham and Eisenhardt (2011) 
believes that it must be they need to be monitored throughout all the phases of the merger 
process. 
Reward and Evaluation 
Napier and Smith, (1987) indicated that the reward and evaluation frameworks are the terms of 
exchange between the company and its employees; Galbraith, (1977) confirmed that these 
frameworks may vary from one company to the other dependent on market or industry. Kerr, 
(1982) argued that company strategy and internal policies will have a bigger impact on the 
reward and evaluation frameworks. Murthy and Salter, (1973) highlighted that performance 
and profitability also contribute to the choice of the reward system. Lorsch and Allen (1973) 
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found that senior managers are evaluated using different scales in big organizations, such as 
“end result” or “intermediate results”. Pitts (1974) found that reward systems may vary based 
on the expansion being achieved via acquisition or internal expansion as was also confirmed by 
Kerr (1985) research where company’s strategy achievement will impact the reward system. 
Govindarajan and Gupta (1985) highlighted the significance of a fit between strategy and 
systems to yield higher performance. Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, (1990) indicated that the 
suitability and acceptance of reward and evaluation system will have a major impact on the 
post-merger success. Govindarajan and Fisher, (1990) stressed that similarities in reward and 
evaluation systems reduce conflicts between the employees and make the integration between 
the two companies easier. However, massive differences between the two firms can result in 
integration complications Diven, (1984).	 Whilst the significance of alignment is being 
increasingly recognized in strategy execution (Higgins, 2005; Kotter, 1980; Nadler and 
Tushman, 1982; and Burke and Litwin 1992) the process of alignment has not been adequately 
explored, particularly within the context of M&As. 
3.8.1 Organizational Decision-Making Processes 
Decision making procedures in organizations are affected by the flow and interlinking of 
decisions, and the nature of the people involved within the system impacts its organizational 
management and execution. Strategy Process research suggests that strategies arise as a result 
of the forces and activities of managerial actions. Organizational decision-making processes 
have been considered in a number of different contexts, including strategy making, culture 
alignment, organizational legitimacy, change management and knowledge transfer in alliances. 
Studies that analysed strategic perspectives found that post-merger synergistic benefit 
realization is made viable through successful integration efforts (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 
1991; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Pablo, 1994; Shrivastava, 1986).	 Decision-making 
involves a series of stages that are inter-linked and different factors play a critical role that can 
either facilitate or hinder the process at different stages. This needs to be explored with regard 
to mergers specifically in India.  
Roll (1986) suggested hubris as a motive for corporate takeovers and amalgamations. “Hubris 
on the part of individual decision makers in bidding firms can explain why bids are made even 
when a valuation above the current market price represents a positive valuation error. Bidding 
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firms affected by hubris simply pay too much for their targets”. Empire building and 
overconfidence are prominent motivating factors relating to hubris. The researcher accepts 
these arguments and will further explore the possibility that this bias exists. However there is a 
distinct lack of evidence with regard to the motivation for a merger. An evaluation of and 
categorization of the motives, is not documented which is important for alignment in particular. 
Bingham and Eisenhardt (2011) analysed the process of organizations merging with other 
organizations as they internationalize. Their theoretical framework proposed that firms learn 
portfolios of heuristics in a phased manner based on increasing experience, starting with the 
selection and procedural heuristics.  These help the decision-making process more effective. 
The survey indicates that superior capabilities for internationalization do not depend on adding 
evermore heuristics, but in the process of simplification to create better heuristics. A study 
related to successful knowledge transfer in international JV showed that knowledge transfer 
occurred through different organizational levels, starting with learning at the individual level, 
then as consensus emerges, moving onto a common language for communication, then 
subsequent creation of a learning network (Inkpen, 2008).  
A number of studies have been conducted to investigate how the interaction / alignment of 
different procedures or issues takes place within organizations. Buch and Wetzel (2001) 
developed a framework to assist organizational leaders and change agents to make alignments 
between their ‘espoused’ and ‘existing’ organizational cultures. They proposed an action-
oriented process consisting of 3 stages. Stage 1 focuses on developing a mental model that 
brings culture to the conscious level of analysis, followed by stage 2, which involves 
active collection of artefacts and espoused values to analyse any misalignment, and finally 
stage 3. This stage, consists of the implementation of a range of change initiatives to be 
taken if cultural analysis reveals any misalignments. Drori and Honig (2013) conducted a 
longitudinal case study to identify a staged process model and found that internal and external 
legitimacy evolve through a process of emergence, validation, diffusion and consensus. 
Organizational legitimacy is continually reproduced and restored by members of an 
organization in concert with external legitimating activities. Similarly, Eriksson and Sundgren 
(2005) focused on how knowledge is acquired to handle change at a large pharmaceutical 
organization. The article suggested that the process involved two change strategies, theories E 
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(programmatic, top down) and O (organizational driven, decentralized) side by side, only on 
different organizational levels and in dissimilar parts of the change process.  
To see how organizational configurations and fit occur, Sigglekow (2001) argued that the 
configuration is influenced by four processes; 1) thickening (reinforcement of an existing core 
element by new elaborating elements), 2) patching (creation of a new core component and its 
reinforcement by new elaborating elements), 3) coasting (no further refinement of a new core 
element in a given period), and 4) trimming (deletion of a core element and its elaborating 
elements).  
In M&A literature, a study by Larsson et al. (2002) argued that achieving synergy realization 
is critical to the success of M&A. They contended that the integration of strategic, 
organizational and human resource factors through a procedure of co-competence is the key to 
success. A co-competence procedure involves combining complementary competencies from 
both sides, rather than promoting the agenda of any single system. However, their study does 
not provide much detail on how co-competence can be accomplished. Birkenshaw et al.’s, 
(2000) study, by contrast, proscribed a two-phase process to achieve integration during M&A. 
In phase one, task integration is limited to the interaction between acquired and acquiring units, 
while human integration proceeds smoothly and leads to cultural convergence and mutual 
respect. In phase two, there is renewed task integration built on the success of the human 
integration, resulting in interdependency between acquired and acquiring units.	However	many	M&As	have	not	been	deemed	a	success	especially	with	regard	to	costs.	M&As have not 
been able to achieve the desired synergy, and studies do not address integration of other 
organizational dimensions. 
In their review of sustaining organizational change, Buchanan et al., (2005) concluded that 
sustainability depends on how the change is implemented and the temporal dimensions 
(timing, sequencing, pacing) of that process. Lewin (1951) identified a process of unfreezing, 
moving and freezing in managing change. Kotter (1995) discovered that change management 
requires a series of steps to facilitate change during different stages of the overall change 
process.  
Pettigrew’s (1985) seminal study of exploring change and continuity, established the procedural 
view of change. He proposed a four-phase model of strategic change 1) problem-identification 
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2) acknowledgement of the problems that need to be tackled, 3) planning and acting, and 4) 
‘stabilization’. 
The above evidence shows that temporal processes play a significant role in the execution of 
complex organizational issues such as strategy development, organizational learning, and 
change management. As M&A are complex, involving the integration of two different 
organizational cultures, it could be expected that temporal processes of decision making would 
be relevant for achieving integration between organizations involved in M&A. Jemison and 
Sitkin (1986) highlighted the need for a process perspective to study M&A, arguing that M&As 
affect varied stakeholder groups and multiple actors whose involvement is temporally and 
functionally separated. The researcher identified 166 case studies in the EBSCO database which 
research aspects of mergers and acquisitions. Pyne (1936) wrote extensively on rationality and 
personality in economic history, documenting how nine organizations merged during the period 
1870 to 1936. His study formed the basis of further studies on the behavioural aspects of 
mergers, especially the rationality of creating wealth and the use of a single personality in 
sustaining an organization in the initial phases of growth; both the owners failed at a relatively 
young age. These and other studies will be examined further in the research methodology 
chapter of this study to argue for the use of the individual case study method.  
3.8.2 Differences in Evaluation System 
There are a number of factors the impact the reward and evaluation systems. The evaluation is 
dependent on the time period that is being assessed, the achievement of key performance 
indicators and indices used to measure performance. Hayes (1979) indicated that higher 
bonuses paid to managers at entrepreneurial companies will be substantially different from 
those paid at Government owned or bureaucratic type companies hence the importance of the 
form and administration of compensation is important as those managers may find it difficult 
to adjust to lower driven performance related pay after an acquisition. This is something also 
mentioned in other studies (Giessner, Ullrich and Dick, 2011; Bohlin and Daley, 2000; and 
Spangler and Tikhomirov, 2010). 
Ferracone (1987) highlighted that potential rise of conflict between employees is still possible 
post acquisition in companies with similar bonus payment scheme as the slightest variations 
will trigger dissatisfaction. Organizational culture can be strengthened with a reward and 
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evaluation systems Kerr and Slocum, (1987), and any alterations made post acquisition to the 
bonus scheme either by amending or replace it with a new one, will generate a negative reaction. 
Jemison and Sitkin (1986) argued that the potential implications that are likely to arise from the 
alteration to an existing reward framework by the acquiring firm on the acquired firm can 
perceived by the employees as defensive due to lack of knowledge of the new firm’s procedures 
and arrogant due the belief that the acquired firm’s systems are better than the acquired firm 
resulting in the new system to be implemented equally after the acquisition. However this 
something that Giessner, Ullrich and Dick (2011), is not as important as often stated. This 
attitude can be detrimental because although a particular system might have been successful in 
the acquiring firm, it may not be applicable to the acquired entity.	While cultural change and 
integration is emphasized, factors contributing to organizational culture are not clear. The 
distinction between culture and climate, which needs to be addressed in the process of M&A, 
is not clearly established, which is important for integration. This is a serious shortcoming in 
the literature. 
Ferracone (1987) indicated that in acquisitions were strong alignment and integration are 
necessary for post-acquisition performance, any alteration to the reward and evaluation 
frameworks can have negative impact on the success of the company. However, when post 
acquisition alignment and integration are not necessary, any changes to the reward and 
evaluation frameworks may not have a major effect on the performance of the company. This 
was illustrated in an example in his article indicating an acquisition involving an industrial firm 
acquiring a financial services firm, the management of the acquiring firm decided to keep the 
two reward and evaluation frameworks separate and independent and therefore protected the 
morale of the employees of the acquired firm. As highlighted above, when alignment and 
integration between the acquiring and acquired firms are important, any changes to the reward 
frameworks must take into consideration the morale problem that could arise between managers 
especially if the new framework is perceived to be inferior. This can be addressed by removing 
any differences between the old and new systems to bring stability and uniformity in the bonus 
and incentive schemes even if it costs more money to the new firm. M&A studies have 
traditionally focused on the role of discrete elements in facilitating integration (Giessner, 
Ullrich and Dick, 2011; Bohlin and Daley, 2000; and Spangler and Tikhomirov, 2010). 
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However, a holistic perspective (alignment between various components of the organization) is 
not really addressed in the literature. 
3.9 Role of Speed in M&A Process  
Earlier research on Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) focused on four areas namely, Structure 
(Datta, 1991; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Larsson and Lubatkin, 2001; Larsson, 2004; 
Shrivastava, 1986); Economics (Goldberg, 1983; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987), Strategy 
(Capron, 1999; Salter and Weinhold, 1978; Walter, 1990; Singh and Montgomery, 1987; Zollo 
and Singh, 2005;) and Finance (Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter 1988; Jensen and Ruback 1983; 
Datta, Pinches, and Narayanan, 1992; Badreldin and Kalhoefer, 2009), Thanos and Papadakis, 
2010, 2012).  
Whilst earlier research by Bragado (1992), Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), Homburg and 
Bucerius (2005), Inkpen, Sundaram, and Rockwood (2002), Olie (1994), Ranft and Lord (2002) 
and Angwin (2004) all posited the importance of speed of merger, it was Bauer and Matzler 
(2014) who stressed on the significance of the speed of integration is essential for success post-
merger, and concluded that the literature needs to be examined further.  
Haspeslagh and Jemison, (1991) indicated that value creation is anticipated to happen after 
M&A however Öberg and Tarba, (2013) argued that additional value starts to happen from the 
minute the decision is taken to proceed with the acquisition and hence speed of merger is 
essential. 
However, Olie (1994) showed that a slow integration process could reduce conflicts between 
the merging entities as was highlighted by Ranft and Lord (2002) that integration can build trust 
between the employees of the merged entities and Bragado (1992) stressed that slow and 
measured methodology is far better in addressing conflicts between the employees. It should 
also be noted that the appropriate speed of integration could depend on the ‘fit’ of the firms 
(Bragado, 1992; Colombo, Conca, Buongiorno, and Gnan, 2007), especially the cultural fit. 
Relatedness in M&A research was discussed by (Lubatkin, 1987; Chatterjee, 1986; Seth, 1990). 
The research by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991); Bragado (1992) and Quah and Young, (2005) 
is related to this study as they underlined the effect of ‘integration speed’ on M&A success, is 
dependent on the level of relatedness. However, these authors did not examine this suggestion 
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using large-scale empirical evidence. Homburg and Bucerius (2005, 2006) investigated the 
post-merger speed of integration and their results showed a weak relationship between speed 
of integration and company success after merger.  
Lubatkin, 1987 indicated that relatedness refers to internal and external factors. External 
relatedness is linked with target market in terms of product quality and price. Capron, Mitchell, 
and Swaminathan (2001), Aydogan, (2002), and Swaminathan, Murshed and Hulland, (2008) 
concluded that a high level of external relatedness regarding the target markets could result in 
synergy achievement however, Shelton (1988) argued that synergy can also happen with low 
external relatedness for target markets. Research on external relatedness has presented 
conflicting findings. Hagedorn and Duysters (2002) confirmed that companies with similar 
technology stand a high chance of success whilst (Barney, 1990; Salter and Weinhold, 1978; 
Harrison et al., 1991; and Srivatsava, 1986) argued that even with low level of relatedness 
regarding market positioning, the merged entities could benefit from each other and eventually 
achieve synergy.  
Chatterjee et al., (1992) indicated that low internal relatedness will affect M&A success. 
Research work by (Datta, 1991; Penrose, 1995; Datta, 1991) on internal relatedness focused on 
the merged entity’s culture. (Hambrick and Cannella, 1993; Ranft and Lord, 2000) explored 
pre-merger performance and (Cartwright and Cooper, 1992; Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; 
Altunbaş and Marqués, 2008; Salter and Weinhold, 1981) studied strategic orientation. Larsson 
and Finkelstein, (1999) confirmed that low internal relatedness could be due to employee 
resistance; Ranft and Lord, (2000) added that it could also include internal instability, whilst 
Hambrick and Cannella, (1993) mentioned hire turnover of staff. Researchers have concluded 
that mergers can cause negative customer reactions as was highlighted in (Morall, 1996; Urban 
and Pratt, 2000), due to various reasons such as change in prices, or reduced quality of products 
and services. Other reasons are related to human interactions where one manager is handling 
an account who is replaced with another post-merger resulting in customer dissatisfaction; also, 
the amount of attention dedicated to the various clients or markets as stated by Bekier and 
Shelton, (2002). Therefore, post-merger speed of integration is important as described by 
(Chakrabarti, 1990; Reichheld and Henske, 1991; Chakrabarti, Hauschildt and Süverkrüp, 
1994; Reichheld and Henske, 1991) where decisions regarding markets, customers, products, 
prices and policy are known quickly by the customers and it will also help to cut rumours 
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(Clemente and Greenspan, 1997). Therefore, speed (customer uncertainty reduction) is higher 
when external relatedness is low.  
Buono and Bowditch, (1989) indicated that internal relatedness is impacted by internal 
instability due to job dissatisfaction, lack of trust in the company, and higher redundancies. 
Cartwright and Cooper, (1993) argued that one of the negatives of a speedy M&A process is 
that it increases internal instability; (Nikandrou, Papalexandis, and Bourantas, 2000; Meeks, 
1977; Schweiger and DeNisi, 1991; Schweiger, Ivancevich, and Power, 1987) also indicated 
that inter-company competition, and conflicts between employees can impact the success of 
merger. Buono, Bowditch, and Lewis, (1985) highlighted that some employees may hold back 
information, and start coalition building resulting in mis-alignment and lack of integration. 
Leroy and Ramanantsoa, (1997) discussed that infighting can have negative impact on the 
performance of the merged entity. Low internal relatedness is impacted by strategy, culture, 
and performance (Olie, 1994; Ranft and Lord, 2002).	With regard to research on the need for 
the integration of culture for effective M&A outcomes  it does not exist, especially with regard 
to alignment and integration. 
Joint cooperation between group members of similar characteristics should lead to better results 
based on the Social Identity theory which is posited to address the issue. Byrne, Clore and 
Smeaton, (1986) discussed the similarity–attraction paradigm at the individual level. 
Rosenbaum, (1986) defined similarity as the level of individual traits that group members share 
resulting in interpersonal similarity. Pfeiffer and Baron, (1984) stressed on the importance of 
social integration and Byrne, Clore, and Smeaton, (1986) confirmed that in individuals seeking 
membership in groups of people with characteristics.  
3.10 Relatedness 
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Figure 7:  Relatedness Homburg, C., and Bucerius, M. (2006).  
Is speed of integration really a success factor of mergers and acquisitions? An analysis of the 
role of internal and external relatedness. Strategic Management Journal, 27(4), 347 – 367. 
The theoretical model given as per Figure 7: (high external relatedness and low internal 
relatedness) advantageous effects of speed is high, disadvantageous effects are weak and overall 
effect of speed on management of success is weak.  
3.11 Summary of Gaps 
The following gaps in the present literature have been identified so far: 
1. What is the motivation for a merger.  
2. The need for organizational autonomy and interdependence is not adequately addressed.  
3. While cultural change and integration is emphasized, factors contributing to organizational 
culture are not clear. The distinction between culture and climate, which needs to be 
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addressed in the process of M&A, is not clearly established, which is important for 
integration.  
4. How organizational fit and strategic fit are achieved is not explored. 
5. An evaluation of and categorization of the motives, is not documented which is important 
for alignment in particular.  
6. Companies pursue M&A due to value-creation, managerial self-benefits, and other factors. 
However, prior M&A studies have not addressed the process of integration. 
7. M&As have not been able to achieve the desired synergy, and studies do not address 
integration of other organizational dimensions. 
8. Insufficient research on the need for the integration of culture for effective M&A outcomes 
exists, especially with regard to alignment and integration. 
9. Decision-making involves a series of stages that are inter-linked and different factors play 
a critical role that can either facilitate or hinder the process at different stages. This needs 
to be explored.   
10. M&A studies have traditionally focused on the role of discrete elements in facilitating 
integration (Giessner, Ullrich and Dick, 2011; Bohlin and Daley, 2000; and Spangler and 
Tikhomirov, 2010). However, a holistic perspective (alignment between various 
components of the organization) is substantially limited in the literature.  
11. Whilst the significance of alignment is being increasingly recognized in strategy execution 
(Higgins, 2005; Kotter, 1980; Nadler and Tushman, 1982; and Burke and Litwin 1992) the 
process of alignment has not been adequately explored, particularly within the context of 
M&As. 
12. Overall, the development of a successful model for a merger in the context of Indian 
business houses has not been explored or taken as an example for UAE business houses 
3.12 Chapter Summary 
This	chapter outlines the key themes that will be addressed in the research. It will address the 
gaps in the literature gaps by offering a contextual understanding of the succession of events 
that unfold during M&As with specific reference to factors that have an impact on merger 
success.		
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CHAPTER 4 – JSW-ISPAT PRE AND POST-MERGER OVERVIEW 
 
4.1 About JSW steel 
The JSW Group is an $11 billion conglomerate that has seen growth of around $5 billion in the 
past 10 years. JSW has been involved in many key industries including Energy, Minerals, Steel, 
Aluminium, Cement, IT, Port and Infrastructure. JSW Steel Ltd. is a well-known and a major 
Steel company based in Mumbai, Maharashtra. JSW Steel's business vision has always focused 
on sustainability and its strategic use of innovative technology. Its technological leadership has 
 
 
[84] 
 
generated path-breaking innovations in steel making and the production of specialty steels, 
while its operational excellence demonstrated through conversion of waste heat into energy and 
transforming low grade iron ore into steel, leading to creation of wealth from waste provides a 
leading competitive edge ranking them among the low-cost steel producers in the world. After 
the merger with ISPAT Steel, JSW Steel has now become India's largest private sector steel 
company with an installed capacity of 14.3 MTPA. 
4.2  JSW steel's growth 
The growth of JSW Steel was achieved mainly through significant expansion and several 
M&As: 
1982 -  Started as Jindal Iron and Steel Company with first steel plant at Vasind near Mumbai 
 Acquisition of Piramal Steel Ltd., which operated a mini steel mill at Tarapur in 
 Maharashtra 
 Renamed it as Jindal Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. (JISCO) 
1994 - Jindal Vijayanagar Steel (JVSL) was setup with its plant located at Toranagallu in the 
Bellary-Hospet area of Karnataka 
2005 - Merger of Euro Ikon Iron and Steel Pvt Ltd, Euro Coke and Energy Pvt Ltd, and JSW 
Steel and JSW Power Ltd 
 JISCO and JVSL merged to form JSW Steel 
2007 - Acquisition of Jindal SAW's US plant 
2009 -  JFE Steel Corporation, the world renowned Japanese steel company enters into an 
 historic collaboration agreement with JSW Steel Ltd and buys under 15% stake in 
 JSW  Steel 
2010 - JSW Steel invested Rs.2, 157 crores in ISPAT Steel and announced merger of ISPAT 
with JSW Steel 
2011 -  JSW Steel signed a joint venture agreement with Japanese Marubeni-Itochu Steel Inc. 
MISI) to set up a steel processing centre at an investment of Rs 122-crore in north India 
2013 - JSW Steel sets up Steel Processing Centre with Marubeni-Itochu Steel Inc. 
 JSW ISPAT merger integration completed 
2014 -  Acquisition of Welspun Maxsteel Ltd in a deal valued at around 1,000 crores 
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4.3 JSW's financials 
The gross turnover of JSW Steel for 2013-2014 was Rs. 49,638 crores with a 32% increase 
compared to the previous year (Table 8). The total share capital of the firm has increased by 
89% YoY to Rs. 1,067 crores. Its net current assets turned from red to black with Rs. 726 crores 
in 2013 -2014 and total assets grew by 35% to Rs. 49,259 crores. Its total income was Rs. 
44,180 crores while the total expenses were Rs. 36,759 crores, both increasing by 25% YoY.  
Table 8: JSW Steel Financials and other details 
---- in Rs. Cr. ---- Mar '10 Mar '11 Mar '12 Mar '13 Mar '14 
Sources of Funds 
 
          
Total Share Capital 527.11 563.18 563.18 563.18 1,067.19 
Reserves 9,179.23 16,132.71 17,934.31 19,374.19 23,216.99 
Net worth 9,706.34 17,225.27 18,497.49 19,937.37 24,284.18 
Secured Loans 8,987.51 7,675.82 9,495.46 10,991.55 16,685.63 
Unsecured Loans 2,597.59 4,275.52 2,806.76 5,552.24 8,289.35 
Total Debt 11,585.10 11,951.34 12,302.22 16,543.79 24,974.98 
Total Liabilities 21,291.44 29,176.61 30,799.71 36,481.16 49,259.16 
Application of Funds 
 
          
Gross Block 21,795.58 27,407.35 35,118.06 37,558.49 49,638.09 
Less: Accum. 
Depreciation 
4,929.44 6,305.20 8,000.44 9,919.70 12,343.01 
Net Block 16,866.14 21,102.15 27,117.62 27,638.79 37,295.08 
Capital Work in Progress 6,684.27 6,169.05 3,153.51 5,074.54 6,857.47 
Investments 1,768.35 4,098.81 4,413.42 4,636.06 4,380.55 
Inventories 2,585.77 4,138.41 5,179.08 4,799.10 6,196.57 
Sundry Debtors 563.25 838.65 1,362.06 1,862.20 2,218.74 
Cash and Bank Balance 117.4 136.26 1,259.47 1,401.79 465.72 
Total Current Assets 3,266.42 5,113.32 7,800.61 8,063.09 8,881.03 
Loans and Advances 2,216.05 3,324.43 6,407.82 9,202.87 11,011.55 
Fixed Deposits 169.71 1,750.62 1,698.13 0 0 
 
 
[86] 
 
Total CA, Loans and 
Advances 
5,652.18 10,188.37 15,906.56 17,265.96 19,892.58 
Current Liabilities 9,415.28 11,984.37 19,531.58 17,792.63 18,782.13 
Provisions 264.22 397.4 259.82 341.56 384.39 
Total CL and Provisions 9,679.50 12,381.77 19,791.40 18,134.19 19,166.52 
Net Current Assets -4,027.32 -2,193.40 -3,884.84 -868.23 726.06 
Miscellaneous Expenses 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Assets 
 
21,291.44 29,176.61 30,799.71 36,481.16 49,259.16 
Contingent Liabilities 6,990.48 8,870.90 9,374.17 22,749.93 17,505.51 
Asset Turnover Ratio 0.9 0.92 1.07 1.06 1.06 
 
---- in Rs. Cr. ---- Mar '10 Mar '11 Mar '12 Mar '13 Mar '14 
Income           
Sales Turnover 19,456.64 25,130.76 34,671.85 35,491.81 45,297.72 
Excise Duty 1,289.18 2,031.91 2,630.90 0 0 
Net Sales 18,167.46 23,098.85 32,040.95 35,491.81 45,297.72 
Other Income 474.25 199.05 -594.95 -106.33 -1,361.25 
Stock Adjustments 64.74 747.37 330.7 172.46 244.1 
Total Income 18,706.45 24,045.27 31,776.70 35,557.94 44,180.57 
Expenditure           
Raw Materials 11,415.86 15,995.19 22,397.47 24,193.12 29,236.47 
Power and Fuel Cost 1,014.82 1,181.52 1,683.84 1,964.09 3,313.64 
Employee Cost 365.2 534.47 615.59 670.97 799.58 
Other Manufacturing 
Expenses 
299.18 476.58 690.87 0 0 
Selling and Admin 
Expenses 
724.63 819.68 1,105.58 0 0 
Miscellaneous Expenses 138.95 200.4 294.21 2,527.27 3,409.54 
Total Expenses 
 
13,958.64 19,207.84 26,787.56 29,355.45 36,759.23 
Operating Profit 4,273.56 4,638.38 5,584.09 6,308.82 8,782.59 
PBDIT 4,747.81 4,837.43 4,989.14 6,202.49 7,421.34 
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Interest 900.26 850.92 1,186.41 1,724.48 2,740.13 
PBDT 3,847.55 3,986.51 3,802.73 4,478.01 4,681.21 
Depreciation 1,123.41 1,378.71 1,708.17 1,973.89 2,725.88 
Profit Before Tax 2,724.14 2,607.80 2,094.56 2,504.12 1,955.33 
Extra-ordinary items 96.03 161.89 0 0 0 
PBT (Post Extra-ord 
Items) 
2,820.17 2,769.69 2,094.56 2,504.12 1,955.33 
Tax 797.43 759.02 468.7 702.9 620.82 
Reported Net Profit 2,022.74 2,010.67 1,625.86 1,801.22 1,334.51 
Total Value Addition 2,542.78 3,212.65 4,390.09 5,162.33 7,522.76 
Preference Dividend 28.92 27.9 27.9 27.9 27.9 
Equity Dividend 177.7 273.32 167.34 223.12 287.66 
Corporate Dividend Tax 34.31 48.87 31.68 42.66 49.93 
Per share data 
(annualized) 
          
Shares in issue (lakhs) 1,870.49 2,231.17 2,231.17 2,231.17 2,417.22 
Earnings Per Share (Rs) 106.59 88.87 71.62 79.48 54.05 
Equity Dividend (%) 95 122.5 75 100 110 
Book Value (Rs) 504 735.8 816.54 881.08 973.01 
 
Almost all of the sales and profit metrics have followed a rising trend from the announcement 
of the JSW ISPAT merger in 2010 to its completion in 2013-2014. 
The researcher conducted an in-depth analysis of JSW’s financial statistics along with an 
evaluation of its market position in the overall steel sector, which has been summarized below: 
4.4 Market position of JSW steel in Indian steel industry 
The Indian steel industry developed significantly in 2007-08, due to a booming economy and a 
high demand for steel. Over the last decade, the Indian steel industry has grown exponentially 
in terms of revenue and profits.  
The Indian steel industry has achieved a number of significant milestones, including a growth 
in capacity, production and exports. It has become a key player in the global steel industry. 
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Between the fiscal years of 2008 and 2013, India’s steel production achieved a compound 
annual growth rate (CAGR) of about 7 percent. Industry revenues (top four companies) 
increased close to 4 times, while operating profits increased by approximately 5 times during 
the past 10 years (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8: Total finished Steel production for India (in million ton) 
The Indian steel industry comprises both private and public-sector enterprises. The private 
sector is responsible for the most production, accounting for almost 78 percent of the finished 
steel output; while the public sector has higher capacity utilizations. The top Indian Steel 
companies are displayed in Figure 9 based on their share of production capacity to the country’s 
total production. 
 
Figure 9: Top Indian Steel companies by capacity share (2013) 
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4.5 Financials of JSW w.r.t. its top competitors 
JSW’s operating profit seems have to steadily increase over the last few years, while Tata steel 
seems to have steadily decreased over the last 14 years and that of top performing SAIL has 
been decreasing over the last 5 years at an average of 19%. After the merger in 2013, JSW’s 
operating profit showed a significant increase of 39%, while its competitors showed a marked 
decrease (Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10: Comparison of operating profit of JSW Steel with top competitors 
JSW’s net sales seem to have steadily increased over the last few years, while Tata Steel have 
steadily decreased over the last 14 years and that of SAIL seems to be a fluctuating one over 
the last 5 years.  After the merger in 2013, the net sales of JSW showed a significant increase 
of 28% (Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11: Comparison of net sales of JSW Steel with top competitors 
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JSW and its competitors’ total assets seem to have steadily increased over the past few years. 
After the merger, JSW’s total assets showed a significant increase of 35% (Figure 12). 
 
Figure 12: Comparison of total assets of JSW Steel with top competitors 
JSW and its competitors’ net worth has steadily increased over the past few years. After the 
merger, the JSW’s net worth showed a significant increase of 21% (Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13:  Comparison of net worth of JSW Steel with top competitors 
Based on the financials, it is evident that JSW steel has seen steady growth and it has 
outperformed TATA Steel and SAIL w.r.t. YoY for the past five years. 
 
 
[91] 
 
4.6 About ISPAT steel 
As reported by Steel world Consultants, Chandekar (2007) article described ISPAT Industries 
Limited as being owned by Global Steel Holdings Limited. The production capacity of ISPAT 
steel stood at 14 million tonnes. The holding company is also involved in mining, energy and 
infrastructure. The company is managed by Mr. Premed Mittal and Mr. Vinod Mittal both of 
which implemented the highest international standards and supported continuous innovations 
to allow Ispat steel to achieve maximum returns to its shareholders.  
Dolvi plant, owned by ISPAT Industries has pride itself on implementing the highest 
technology in steel making to produce quality products. However, despite its top technology 
and experienced labour force, ISPAT started to make losses due to cash flow mismanagement. 
Whilst ISPAT ensured that the best raw material is used in the plant, it has failed to achieve 
backward integration. Therefore, as the company is losing money, and it is heavily in debt, JSW 
Steel announced in Dec 2010 that it will invest Rs. 2,157 crores to save ISPAT from bankruptcy. 
JSW Steel cash injection in ISPAT will buy it controlling interest in a company worth about $3 
billion. The merged entity was named JSW ISPAT and the merger was completed in April 
2013. 
4.7 ISPAT's growth 
1984 -  Incorporated as Mittal Galvazinc Ltd. 
1985 - Company's name was changed to the present one 
1986 - Setting up cold rolling mill in Kalmeshwar, Nagpur in collaboration with companies 
like  Nippon Denro and Hitachi Ltd., of Japan 
1991 - Setting up a 1 million TPA sponge iron project at district Raigad near Mumbai 
1995 - Bahrain Ispat Ltd. was incorporated to set up a 1.2 million tonnes sponge iron plant area 
in Bahrain 
1997 - Agreement with KFW (Kreditanstalt Fur Wiederaufbau), Germany, and International 
 Finance Corporation (IFC), Washington, for Rs. 1,198 crore fund infusion as 
part of the foreign currency requirement for its Rs. 4,792 crores integrated steel project 
at Dolvi 
1998 - MoU between Ispat and Europe-based Usinor for acquisitions 
2002 -  Vinod Mittal becomes the Managing Director of ISPAT Industries 
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2004 - Acquisition of NSC's rolling mill 
2005 - Acquisition of Kremikovtzi, Bulgaria 
2010 - Strategic Alliance with JSW 
2011 - Company name stands changed from ISPAT Industries Ltd. to JSW ISPAT Steel Ltd. 
4.8 Rationale for acquisition for JSW steel 
JSW Steel has been an aggressive player in the Indian Steel business with the aim of becoming 
the largest Steel producer in India and the World. In 2010-11, its total production capacity was 
about 11 Million tonnes and it ranked as the 3rd largest Steel Company in India next to TATA 
Steel (23.8 and 13.5 Million tonnes respectively).  
In order to fulfil its vision, the company sought expansion on a large scale. The green field 
expansion, according to Mr. Sajjan Jindal had become a difficult task due to its tediousness, 
large time consumption to yield benefits and stricter government setup. Hence, n field 
investment was the way ahead. With this goal in mind, JSW Steel tracked the developments in 
the Indian Steel industry closely, especially with regard to ISPAT Industries, which was 
incurring heavy losses, year after year and got into a debt of over $1 Billion. The lenders and 
bankers had stopped funding / re-financing ISPAT and the company had no working capital. 
All overseas investments were incurring losses. Finally, the company was declared sick and 
referred to BIFR, an Indian Government’s Board for Industrial Finance and Reconstruction. 
ISPAT’s Management had no other option but to sell off the company as the Managements 
personal assets were pledged and were to be diluted by lenders and bankers to recover the debt.  
Hence in 2010, all of the top Steel firms in India were called on to perform due-diligence and 
make a deal with ISPAT. JSW Steel was one of the companies there. The bankers were more 
supportive of JSW taking over ISPAT because they were the same financial source for both 
firms and the bankers were aware of and trusted JSW's financial stability. Thus, a 10 member 
JSW management team arrived at the Dolvi plant in December 2010 to carry out the due 
diligence and within ten days, the deal was finalized. 
Some of the major reasons for JSW’s acquisition of ISPAT: 
ISPAT was a perfect fit for JSW's business model and pursuit of expansion in the right way  
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1. JSW Steel were reaching optimum expansion at their existing Steel Plant at Vijayanagar 
and hence, looking at setting up new Steel Plant in West Bengal. However, this green 
field investment to set up a new plant would take a lead-time of at least 5 – 6 years; hence 
acquiring ISPAT was helping JSW Steel to expand their Steel Capacity, instantly and 
taking them to number 1 position in the Indian Steel Industry.  
2. Both the Vijaynagar and Salem Steel plants were in a landlocked region making expansion 
difficult and transportation expensive. ISPAT’s sea-based Dolvi plant was located on the 
Mumbai Coast Line and adjacent to the National highway.  
3. ISPAT had a substantial amount of vacant land at its disposal to set up a new Power Plant, 
Coke Plant, Pellet Plant, and expand its steel-making capacity from 3.4 Million to up to 
10 Million tonnes, thereby giving impetus to JSW Steel towards acquiring this plant 
without wasting any time.  
4. ISPAT Industries had world class Rolling Mills, which would allow JSW Steel to service 
their existing customers around Mumbai from ISPAT’s plant, giving them a better Profit 
Margin and Tax Benefits. 
Thus, the synergistic benefits of the merger were manifold for JSW as a potential key for 
expansion, and for ISPAT as a saviour from complete dilution. The synergies and strengths are 
summarized on Table 9. 
Table 9: JSW-ISPAT Merger - Synergies and Strengths 
 JSW Steel JSW Ispat Combination 
Production 
capacity 
11 tap 3.3 tap 
Global Scale of 14.3 tap 
1. Catapults JSW Steel to largest 
private Steel manufacturer 
2. Propels the merged company to 
top 25 Indian companies in terms of 
turnover 
3. Drives Economies of Scale 
Strategic 
location 
1. In the rich iron-
ore belt 
a. Shore-based 
with port 
De-risked business model 
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2. Freight advantage 
on sales in South India 
b. Logistically 
better placed for sea 
borne imports 
c. Freight 
advantage on sales in 
western/central India 
1. De-risks single location upstream 
profile 
2. Provides better access to bulk 
imports and finished steel exports 
3. Increased brownfield expansion 
capability 
4. PAN India presence 
Technology BF-BOF, Corex-BOF DRI/BF-Conarc 
Broad based technological study 
1. Flexible production processes 
2. Houses most modern steel making 
technologies under a single entity 
Financials Strong balance sheet Loss making 
Financial synergies 
1. Accelerates absorption of 
available tax losses 
2. Potential to reducing financing 
cost 
 
4.9 Merger Overview 
The discussion of the merger between the 2 companies started in September / October 2010, 
with JSW Steel acquiring shares of ISPAT Industries from the Stock Market and Small 
Institutional shareholders. On 21 Dec 2010, when JSW Steel acquired substantial share-holding 
of Ispat Industries, it became the major investor and largest shareholder in Mittal-owned debt 
laden ISPAT Industries by investing Rs. 2,157 crores. It was officially declared that JSW Steel 
will buy controlling interest in ISPAT Industries at an enterprise value of $3 billion, to emerge 
as India's largest private steel producer with an annual capacity of 14.3 million tonnes. The 
board of directors of both companies approved the merger with a swap ratio of 1:72, that is, one 
equity share of JSW Steel for every 72 shares of JSW ISPAT. The merger was subject to 
necessary approvals. After JSW Steel slowly acquired over 47% of shares in ISPAT Industries 
and infused over $1 billion into the company for its working capital, expansion .., they 
approached the shareholders of both companies, Stock Market, Competition Commission, other 
statutory organization and the High Court to obtain clearance / approval for ISPAT to merge 
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into JSW Steel. On 1st June 2013, ISPAT Industries officially merged into JSW Steel Limited 
after obtaining all clearances. 
While announcing the merger, JSW Steel Chairman and Managing Director Mr. Sajjan Jindal 
said, 
“Merger of JSW Ispat with JSW Steel is an important step in our ongoing growth journey 
towards creating a world-class global steel company. JSW Ispat brings several unique 
advantages and the merger will help in realization of integration benefits of the two 
companies,”  
In the post-merger equity share capital, the promoters of JSW Steel will own 35.12 percent, 
JFE Steel 14.92 percent and the balance will be owned by public with 49.96 percent. 
The pre-and post-merger shareholding structure is depicted on figures 14 and 15. 
 
 
Figure 14:  Pre-merger shareholding structure 
Mitthals 
Public 
Promoters 
JSW 
Ispat 
JSW 
Steel 
Kalmeshwar 
Dolvi 
Vijaynagar 
Salem 
Vasind 
Tarapur 
19.62% 
33.63% 
61.95% 
38.05% 
46.75% 
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Figure 15: Post-merger shareholding structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mitthals 
Public 
Promoter
s 
JSW 
Steel 
Vasind 
Tarapur 
Kalmes
hwar 
WOS 
Vijay
nagar 
Salem 
Dolvi 
35.12% 
14.92% 
49.96% 
100% 
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter establishes the methodology adopted for the present study and provides arguments 
regarding the suitability of those chosen. The seminal work of Edmondson and McManus is 
examined and found to help in the development of the research design. The study seeks to 
develop a design to understand mergers in an emerging economy like India. There are currently 
no theoretical models in this space and, thus, there is a need to establish theory through a 
qualitative study. Similarly, the case study logic and onion model are explored for adaptation 
for the study. Single case study methodology and its strengths are discussed in this chapter and 
how it can provide data and analysis for the research question.  
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5.1 Methodological Approach 
This study primarily/specifically focuses on mergers in India especially in relation to 
integration and alignment. Key literature and theory relating to this topic has been considered 
in the previous chapters. This research is based on a case study of a successful organization that 
has had many years of experience in steel manufacturing in India. Investigations do indicate 
that successful inter-organizational alignment of processes is possible. The researcher adopted 
“the single case study” strategy as developed by Yin (2003). This means that the questions that 
were chosen for the structure of the case material were “open” questions: what, who, how and 
why questions. The researcher had little control over the answers given as a result of this 
approach. The answers obtained were based on current and past experiences relating to 
organizational processes (Yin 2003).  
Yin argues that it is preferable to study more than one case to support a research proposition. 
Such studies are termed “multiple-case studies” (Yin 2003 p.53). However, examining this 
research problem as a single case study allows the researcher to derive more in depth evidence 
regarding the process of acquisition, motivations and how aligned the strategy and structure of 
the two organizations has to be in order to achieve higher levels of performance.   In addition, 
there is an absence of similar case studies for other types of organizations. The aim of this case 
study is to understand JSW’s experiences relating to mergers in India, and what approaches and 
actions it has taken (Yin 2003). Gill (1995) argues that there are differences between single 
case and multiple case studies. The advantages of a single case study include: 
“…(I) in-depth study of a single case versus the study of a number of cases; (ii) deep versus 
surface descriptions; and (iii) the telling of good stories versus the creation of good 
constructs”.  
This narrative will provide rich insights into the process that has occurred and the current state 
of the organization. The structure of the case will be seen as the “flexible case design” (Yin 
2003), because the flexible case design allows the questions to be adapted to the path of the 
interview. This will ensure that potential information that is likely to be included is not missed, 
and allow data that has hitherto not been documented to be obtained. The case organization that 
follows is a flexible design that will help the researcher to have a better insight of the processes 
involved.  
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Payne’s (1977) study provides a useful guide for this research as it examined the role of mergers 
in the Scottish Steel Industry from 1916-1936. The case study established how one firm, David 
Colville and Sons, established by David Colville at Motherwell, achieved a leadership position 
within 20 years. It traced the history of the Scottish Steel making industry in the context of the 
post-war boom period. Payne (1977) argued that the merger process is complex and requires a 
comprehensive study, taking into consideration the behavioural dimensions of the process.  The 
case study of the merger in the Scottish iron and steel industry, which is analogous to the present 
research, justifies the approach taken by the researcher. Several case study research books and 
related research works by different authors (Easton, 1992; Hamel et al., 1993; Yin, 1994; Perry, 
1998; Gomm, 2000; and Saunders et al., 2000) are examined to develop the needed framework 
for the case study process.  
Case studies as a research technique have been viewed with scepticism compared to other social 
research methods, due to their perceived lack of rigor (Rowley, 2002). Nevertheless, case 
studies are widely used as they provide insights which cannot be attained through other 
methods/approaches. This technique is often adopted for the initial, exploratory phase of 
research, and then further supplemented with more structured tools (Eisenhardt, 1989). This is 
the approach that was adopted in this study. It was specifically selected for an Indian merger. 
This is because the process a merger in India is a very specific one and not previously addressed 
in any literature. The study of mergers in India therefore requires an in-depth study of key 
features and this could be best provided by seeking the views of stakeholders in such a process. 
The qualitative approach can secure information on stakeholders perspective and how they 
constructed their epxperiences during the merger. This approach has a proven track record when 
it comes to providing insights into an area. Moreover this strategy can help to identify the 
particular and individual characteristics of this merger, and provide a rich set of data for the 
research question. Moreover it can help to contextualize the particular merger and this is 
important if the social and other processes involved in a merger are to be understood achieved 
(Rowley, 2002).  
The suitability of the case study method for the present study has been established for three key 
reasons: 
1. Answering the research questions. 
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2. To maintain a better degree of control over behavioural events. 
3. To maintain the focus on contemporary events as compared to historical events.  
The question of how and/or why is effectively answered by the case study approach. The 
question of who, what, how and to what extent is effectively answered by the survey and 
archival analysis. The degree of control over behavioural events is very low while there is a 
high focus on contemporary events. Thus, the Onion model (Figure 16) of Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill (2000) was found to be most appropriate.  
 
Source: the onion model of Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2000). 
Figure 16: Onion Model. 
5.2  Methodological Fit 
Why undertake qualitative research in M&A?  
The applicability of qualitative research methods to M&A and international business has been 
demonstrated in several publications (Marschan, Piekkari and Welch 2004; Welch, Welch and 
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Piekkari, 2005), which provide theoretical and methodological contributions within a cross-
disciplinary field through a range of methods such as discourse analysis, narratology, 
organization studies, and others. More specifically, Stahl, Mendenhall, and Weber (2005) noted 
that the majority of researchers in this area have utilized a fairly conventional post-acquisition 
integration perspective, and thus relied heavily on quantitative methodology. As such they were 
not able to capture the socio-cultural aspects of the complex and multi-faceted organizational 
change processes that occur in M&A. Björkman and Søderberg (2006) conducted an in-depth 
examination of a cross-border merger, which illustrated that the narrative approach, or 
qualitative research tools, can be used to elicit rich responses from organizational members. 
This generates insights into the social reality and demonstrates the significance of the managers’ 
and employees’ comprehension of the organizational reality that finds its reflection in 
descriptions of the acquisition-related events. Finally, the narrative approach enables the 
researchers to understand the interviewed managers’ and employees’ different sense of 
meanings in the specific context of the M&A deal. Although conducting interviews with key 
organizational actors cannot uncover objective facts about an organization (Czarniawska and 
Potter, 1998, Nguyen and Chen, 2010), they are a useful tool for a thorough examination of the 
ongoing and shifting construction and reproduction of organizational actors’ identifications, a 
corporate culture, a business unit, As Søderberg and Vaara (2003) and Tienari and Vaara and 
Björkma (2003) noted, no ultimate “truths” emerge from interview and transcripts discourse 
analyses, and researchers generally put forth their own interpretations of the accounts and 
meanings produced by their interviewees. 
Edmondson and McManus (2005) advocated the need for studies for methods to be suitable for 
the area being investigated.  This allows the researcher to fulfil the aims of the study. In order 
to ensure a methodological fit, an intermediate theory category needs to be considered, which 
is positioned between mature theory and nascent theory. The study of M&A, especially in India, 
draws to a large extent on existing theory from diverse areas such as finance, economics and 
organizational behaviour. This research proposes new constructs and models of inter-
organizational alignment which may precede the full integration of two different organizations. 
This is based on the premise that when two organizations merge to function as a unitary 
organization, this should be mediated by the process of inter-organizational alignment, which 
has its own distinct characteristic process. This study makes a further contribution by explaining 
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the behavioural changes that occur in employees and their relationship with different variables, 
which effects their contribution to the success or failure of the merger, this process is best 
described by “Variance theory”.  However, in order to establish a platform that explains 
variance theory, there is a need to understand the unique nature of the merger process specific 
to the organization. This is established through induction, eventually contributing to the process 
of M&A, which is temporally based on process theory.  
This research examined the advantages of the single, as well as multiple, case study approaches. 
In essence, the single case study approach is similar to a single scientific experiment, and the 
strengths and limitations of a single experiment can therefore be applied to the single case study 
approach.  
According to Eisenhardt, (1989) there are four justifications for adhering to a single case study, 
which are as follows: 
1. It is a research strategy which focuses on understanding the dynamics present within 
single settings. 
2. To provide description. 
3. To test a theory. 
4. To generate a theory. 
The theory of M and A has been well established and tested in the secondary literature. For 
example, Gross, Giacquinta and Bernstein (1971) used a single case study to explore how only 
one school implemented organizational innovations. Their theory questioned the barriers to the 
implementation of innovations, and emphasized the need for the study of the implementation 
process in adopting innovations. Until then theory on innovation focused on barriers to 
innovation.  The present research proposes inter-organizational alignment as a mediating 
process before undertaking the integration of large M&As.  The theories on M&As undertaken 
in different parts of the world as well as in India all have many similarities. This is to a large 
extent confirmed by the qualitative research which analyses the due diligence, synergy analysis 
and legal compliance issues which are typical of any M&A. However, human resource 
integration, which is also studied, has a unique characteristic, which is not to change the targeted 
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organization’s characteristics immediately, but to allow it to continue in the same form and 
structure with small changes.  
Another reason why the embedded case study design is undertaken is that it is likely to provide 
better inferences. Case studies allow for the more in depth understanding of the reasons behind 
different phenomena. Given that this study tries to understand whether differences between the 
structures and cultures of the two companies affected post-merger performance and in what 
ways, this question can only be answered by developing a deeper understanding of the merging 
process, the problems encountered and how those issues affected overall performance. 
Although some of those issues can be informed by the literature, as mentioned in the literature 
review part of the thesis, the literature is not clear in regards to whether and how the alignment 
between those dimensions affects performance and through which ways.      
The units of Human Resource analysis in this study consist of:  
1. Upper level management of JSW and ex ISPAT upper level managers who have become 
part of the M&A process. 
2. Middle managers of ISPAT who are still continuing in JSW and managers in JSW who 
are presently working in JSW. 
5.3 Research Philosophy and Approach  
The epistemological position taken by the researcher is an interpretive one, because this study 
tries to understand, describe and then analyse specific phenomena in depth. Thus, the inter-
organizational alignment process must be studied by using qualitative data and may be 
complemented with quantitative data (Bryman and Bell, 2003). Principles of induction are 
found to be most suitable to its design (Hoyningen-Huene, 2006). It will allow the researcher 
to draw general conclusion from the specific data in the case study. 
Although the study followed	 the	 interpretivist approach, a triangulation approach was 
effectively used by combining qualitative with quantitative.  An exploratory  method is adopted 
to establish a hypotheses to be generated and tested (Hoyningen-Huene, 2006). This is one that 
gathers data on a subject that has not been gathered before in order to answer a research question 
or test a hypothesis.  The data that was obtained was then used to confirm or to reject the 
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hypothesis.  The quantitative method necessitates a deductive approach to research design, 
which involves theory or hypothesis generation, followed by the selection of a suitable research 
strategy to test the hypothesis. The researcher nevertheless also tried to the extent possible to 
develop a theory based on observations from previous literature. The formulation of a case 
study based on qualitative research is codified by Miles and Huberman (1984) in the form of a 
codified series of procedures. Eisenhardt (1989) synthesized the work of Yin (1984) and Glaser 
and Strauss (1967) and provided an example of the required rigor to proceed with case study 
analysis.  
The study therefore followed the path below: 
1. Theory and secondary data.  
2. Data collection-qualitative research.  
3. Data collection-quantitative research.  
4. Design a set of hypotheses.  
5. Hypotheses accepted or rejected.  
6. Model specifications.  
7. Model testing.  
8. Contribution in the form of a case study.  
9. Conclusion. 
Further, this research design is the most appropriate to achieve the objectives of this research 
for the following reasons: 
1. Integration processes and alignment related to the structure of an organization can only be 
understood through an in-depth analysis, and a single case study approach allows for an in-
depth examination of a phenomenon. This is further validated by the existing literature, 
particularly Stake (1995), who argued that a single case study is suitable when the 
“opportunity to learn is of primary importance.”     
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2. The single case study is a very effective method of social science research when the 
objective is to investigate how people structure and solve problems (Barely, 1993). As the 
purpose of this research is to analyse how decisions are made to solve the problem of 
integration during M&A, the use of a single case study is justified. 
3. When there is inadequate theoretical knowledge about a certain phenomenon, inductive 
research is a better approach. Therefore, given that there is limited theoretical knowledge 
regarding the phenomenon being studied in this research and the purpose is to build the 
theory (Sigglekow, 2007).  
The integration of organizations is a complex phenomenon that involves the implementation of 
organizational change, a temporal phenomenon- it takes place over a period of time. Therefore 
this research involves analysing the phenomenon and understanding how this process develops 
over a time period. This research employs both qualitative and quantitative methods and uses 
both primary and secondary data analyses. Data was primarily collected through face-to-face 
semi-structured interviews (for the qualitative analysis) and a five-point Likert scale 
questionnaire (for the quantitative analysis). 
The researcher began by examining the publicly available data on the financial merger process 
of JSW and ISPAT and the history and milestones achieved by the organization. The views of 
upper level management were gathered and the study of the organizational cultures of both JSW 
and ISPAT was undertaken at different levels. A self-completion questionnaire was used for 
the middle manager’s study. A list of employees was obtained and around 1,300 employees 
from different departments were selected from each organization. After three to four rounds of 
reminders, data collection yielded 387 responses from ISPAT and 392 responses from JSW 
giving a total of 779 responses. The research therefore used triangulation to ensure the validity 
and reliability of its findings.  
5.4 Research Design 
5.4.1 Single case study Methodology for M&A 
Trompenaars and Asser (2010) posited after an examination of different organizations that 
a successful integration process requires four components: 
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1. Recognition. 
2. Respect. 
3. Alignment (of both business and cultural dilemmas) or inter-organizational alignment. 
4. Realization of the merger benefits. 
Higgins, 2005 shows that maximum value can be obtained when strategic, structural, 
systemic, human resource, supplier and client processes are synchronized. Indeed, alignment 
of divergent goals, values, structural, functional and cultural differences allows an 
organization to achieve maximum performance. However, with this process, human error is 
likely to affect the technical aspects of the process. This demonstrates the need for validated 
instruments and tools that provide qualitative and quantitative diagnoses of the decision-
making process. 
Quantitative research involves the study of data, especially numbers, facts and their 
relationships. Creswell	(1994)	defined	quantitative	research	as	the	type	of	research	that	uses	numerical	 data	which	 is	 analysed	using	 statistical	 techniques. Qualitative research, on the 
other hand, involves the collection and analysis of non-numerical data, such as videos, 
photos, and objects. (Andersen, 2006). This process assisted the researcher in developing a 
theory that describes the processes involved in alignment. These phases need to be studied 
separately. Furthermore, in order to relate the theory to reality, deductive and inductive 
approaches have been used. The inductive approach is a process of detailed exploration of 
the data collected, where the objective is to ultimately develop a theory from the data. This 
method aims to interpret and summarize the data, in order to generate a theory. The deductive 
approach focuses on testing and validating existing theories by developing hypotheses from 
current theories, and validating them in practice (Saunders 2007 p. 118). Although these are 
two very different research methods, it is still possible to combine them. In fact, this 
combination is an effective way to draw conclusions in research (Saunders 2007). The case 
study approach provides an opportunity to find answers to the different research questions 
in this study. This approach will involve testing key theories and established principles and 
if they are validated by appropriate study.  
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5.5 Case Selection 
This research proposes to study the M&A of JSW Steel and ISPAT Steel to understand the 
alignment process.  
5.5.1 Sample Strategy 
The sample strategy was developed to identify those who could contribute to the research. A 
number of managers from both JSW and Ex-ISPAT managers were approached to take part in 
the study. A number of inclusion and exclusion criteria were established to ensure that only 
those with knowledge of the merger and its outcomes were invited to participate in the study. 
These included having worked at one of the companies during the merger and being a manger. 
This ensure that a valid and representative sample was developed. The sample was developed 
by the researcher approaching a number of current and former mangers.  
5.5.2 Stratified Random Sampling 
4,000 middle managers from different functional areas are at present working with JSW. This 
consists of both JSW and Ex-ISPAT managers, who were responsible for significant numbers 
of employees. Using Randomizer (www.randomizer.org) 2,600 samples were selected with 
1,300 from each group, expecting a response of 40%. 
5.5.3 Sample size determination 
Two factors are to be considered when determining a researcher’s sample; the margin of error 
the researcher is willing to accept and the alpha level, that is, the level of risk acceptable to the 
researcher when the true margin of error exceeds the acceptable margin of error, also known as 
a type I error. The instrument designed consists of nominal variables such as gender, and ordinal 
variables such as those in a 5-point Likert scale, and categorical variables. The sample size 
formula is: 
                                             Sample size =!"∗$%&"  
                                              Sample size = (1.96)2 *(.5) (.5)/ (.05)2 =384.  
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Where t = value of selected alpha level of .025 in each tail = 1.96. Where (p) (q) = estimate of 
variance = .25 and d = acceptable margin of error for proportion being estimated = .05. 
5.6 Pilot study and Development of the Main Item Pool 
Ten questions per scale were developed to tap into each of the 17 dimensions of organizational 
climate. The time-tested general scale of organizational climate i.e. Organizational Climate 
Questionnaire (OCQ) by Litwin and Stringer (1968) was employed, consisting of 50 items that 
measure nine dimensions of an organisations climate. Sims and Lafollette (1975) and 
Muchinsky (1976) suggested six dimensions. Rogers, Miles, and Biggs (1980) reviewed these 
results, finding that most studies found six factors, and that there is a lack of consensus among 
researchers regarding the classification of items into different factors. The dimensions represent 
the culture of the company and are those associated with high volume manufacturers such as 
those in the steel industry. The nine dimensions are structure, responsibility, standards, conflict, 
identity, support, warmth, risk and reward. However, Liao (2004) identified other factors that 
impact M&As; organizational culture, including teamwork, warmth, support, innovative spirits 
and service quality; Employee working attitude consisting of job satisfaction, recognition, 
rational rewards system in addition to reward that is given under Litwin and Stringer’s (1968) 
OCQ; and organizational commitment, consisting of emotional commitment and continuous 
commitment.  There is a clear link between performance and employee job satisfaction. The 
morale of the employees is very important in a merger or else they will not adopt the changes 
and they can become a barrier to the creation of a single entity. The employees need to be 
motivated with the objectives of the merger and they will have to execute the orders of the 
management. They need to be committed if the merger is to be a success. Organizational 
commitment refers to an individual’s attitude and interest in an organization and helping it to 
accomplish its goals (Mowday, Steers, and Porter, 1979). Liao (2004) argues that the party 
initiating the merger needed to motivate the employees. This should be a key goal in every 
merger.  
Organizational commitment comprises affective commitment, normative commitment and 
continuous commitment (Allen and Mayer, 1990). It can be understood as the level of trust and 
loyalty an employee expresses and manifests in an organization (Currivan, 1999). However, for 
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the purposes of this study, the items designed by Liao (2004) were adapted for M&As rather 
than for a general study of organizational commitment.  
Some 95 items are presented in the OCQ, derived from Litwin and Stringer, (1968) and the 
instrument used by Liao (2004). There are three additional items were added by the researcher 
specifically with the focus on M&A. Three items designed to measure the success of a merger 
were also included.  The 5-point Likert scale was used with values of 1 to 5 representing totally 
disagree, disagree to a large extent, neither agree or disagree, disagree to a large extent and 
totally disagree. As the questionnaire has been designed for managers at different levels, the 
researcher was careful to use simple language. The questionnaire begins with instructions 
explaining the its purpose and outlines that it will take about thirty minutes to complete. 
5.7 Instrument Design 
5.7.1 Design of semi structured Interview Questions 
A number of questions relating to the following areas were developed based on the secondary 
data analysis. The questionnaire is structured as given in Annexure 1.  
1. Redefinition of vision and mission after the merger.  
2. Business challenges assessment through capturing business dilemmas. 
3. Assessing purpose and values. 
4. Choosing values and behaviour. 
5. Compelling reasons for merger. 
6. Validation of key drivers. 
7. Developing the implementation through objectives and key performance indicators. 
8. Systemic alignment. 
9. Culture and value awareness programs. 
10. Continuous monitoring and evaluation. 
11. Higgins 8Ss and Trompenaars and Asser. 
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The questions are open-ended and interviewees were expected to provide their own beliefs on 
the mergers and their opinions. Additional follow-up questions were also asked to build on 
interviewees’ responses. The length of the interviews ranged from forty-five minutes to two 
hours. Face to face interviews were conducted with ten top executives from JSW and former 
ISPAT executives now working with JSW. The online approach was chosen to obtain 
information from middle managers, this was selected because it was economical and did not take 
up too much time. A self-completion questionnaire was sent out to 2,600 respondents via an 
email, which provided a brief description and guideline for completing it. However, they were 
repeatedly sent to respondents to obtain prompt responses.  Exactly, 392 managers from JSW 
and 387 former ISPAT managers gave responses which were found to be complete in all respects. 
The response rate was approximately thirty percent.  
5.7.2 Limitations of Self-Completion Questionnaire 
There was a low response rate, which the researcher assumes was because: 
1. Respondents were busy with their work schedule. 
2. Respondents worried that the self-completion questionnaire may be misused. 
3. Respondents may have ignored the email.  
To overcome these limitations, the researcher sent a number of emails and followed through 
telephone calls.  
5.7.3 Design of Questionnaire for Middle Level Managers 
The instrument design for ascertaining the inter-organizational alignment of JSW and ISPAT 
for middle level managers is based on the following.  
Financial success is generally emphasized as an indication of the success of an M&A. However, 
this path of research leaves other important aspects of mergers unexplored (Nahavandi and 
Malekzadeh, 1987; 1988; Sales and Mirvis, 1984; Shrivastava, 1986). These include the impact 
of socio-cultural factors and the cultural integration processes involved in merging two 
organizations, and the fact that once the merger is completed, it is rarely explored to the extent 
needed. It has been argued that cultural dissimilarities can be a major cause of conflict, stress, 
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antagonism and lack of trust between the employees of merging organizations (Buono and 
Bowditch, 1989; Olie, 1990; Cartwright, 1997; Krug and Nigh, 2001), and it is often the main 
factor leading to the breakdown of the merger process and the organizations (Datta, Pinches 
&Narayanan, 1992; King, Dalton, Daily and Covin, 2004). Booz, Allen and Hamilton surveyed 
around 200 chief executives of organizations and argued that the capacity of an organization to 
achieve smooth cultural integration is more important to the success of a merger than the 
financial factors (Cartwright and Cooper, 1996, p. 28). However, despite evidence that cultural 
differences are likely to impede the merger success, (Schoenberg, 2000; Schweiger and Goulet, 
2000; Teerikangas and Very, 2003). Tienari, Vaara and Bjorkman’s (2003) study indicated that 
employees’ perceptions and state of mind are vital to the success of an M&A; however, they 
are not generally considered. These findings prompted the researcher to investigate this further 
by studying employee’s perspectives post-merger at JSW. An analysis of JSW’s financial 
statements indicated that the merger between the two organizations achieved its financial goals, 
at least in the short run. Culture is an important during M&A which needs to be considered 
during the strategic decision-making and implementation.  
This begs the question, what dimensions need to be considered when analysing culture in the 
case of M&A? Should culture or climate be studied when analysing inter-organizational 
alignment? Extensive studies by Denison (1996) have indicated that studying both culture and 
the climate of organizational phenomena is necessary, and his perspective is in detail in Table 
10. 
Table 10: Contrasting Organizational Culture and Organizational Climate Research 
Perspectives 
Differences Cultural Literature Climate Literature 
Epistemology Contextualized and idiographic Comparative and nomothetic 
Point of View Emic (native point of view) Etic (researcher's viewpoint) 
Methodology Qualitative field observation Quantitative survey data 
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Level of Analysis 
Underlying values and 
assumptions 
Surface-level manifestations 
Temporal Orientation Historical evolution Ahistorical snapshot 
Theoretical 
Foundations 
Social construction; critical 
theory 
Lewinian field theory 
Discipline Sociology and anthropology Psychology 
(Adopted from Denison, D. R. (1996), Academy of Management Review, 21(3), 619-654). 
Epistemology reflects the question of how phenomena are being measured. Denison (1996) 
shows that it can be difficult to measure the organization’s internal socio-psychological 
environment and its relationship with the individual, and his adaptation level to the 
organizational environment. The cultural aspects of an organization are usually researched 
using qualitative studies. (Hofstede, Niuean, Ohayv, and Sanders, 1990; Chatman, 1991; Calori 
and Sarnin, 1991; Chatman and Caldwell, 1991; Gordon and Di Tomaso, 1992; Denison and 
Mishra, 1995; Ravasi and Schultz, 2006). Survey methods have been widely used by 
researchers to study culture.  Table 11 presents a summary of the areas of convergence and 
Figure 17 present the firm’s mode of acculturation. 
Table 11: Areas of Convergence in the Culture and Climate Literature. 
Areas of Convergence Examples of Convergence 
Definition of the 
Phenomenon 
Both view the internal social psychological environment as a 
holistic, collectively defined social context 
Central Theoretical Issues 
Shared values are created by interaction, but context determines 
interaction 
 Definition of domain varies greatly by individual theorist 
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 Dynamics between the whole and the part 
 - Multiple layers of analysis 
 - Dimensions vs. holistic analysis 
 - Subcultures vs. unitary culture 
Content and Substance 
High overlap between the dimensions studied by quantitative 
culture researchers and earlier studies by climate researchers. 
Epistemology and Methods 
Recent quantitative culture studies and qualitative climate 
studies. 
Theoretical Foundations Roots of cultural research are in social constructionism. 
 
Roots of climate research are in Lewinian  
Field theory. 
  Many recent studies have combined these traditions. 
(Adopted from Denison, D. R. (1996), Academy of Management Review, 21(3), (p.619-654). 
 
Figure 17: Acquired Firm’s Mode of Acculturation. 
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Discussions with the senior managers revealed that the acquirer is likely to perceive the merger 
as attractive if the objectives of the merger are met. The willingness of the acquired firm to 
maintain or change its culture needs to be further explored. While the process is incremental in 
nature, it may be explored by studying the before after merger climates of both entities.   
5.8 Cultural Dimensions 
Given that JSW and ISPAT had a high degree of relatedness as they were in the same industry 
working for similar goals, each organization’s choice of acculturation style would have been an 
important aspect in the success of the integration process. The financial success of the merger 
in the short run. Consequently, the cultural and climate dimensions before and after the merger 
between JSW and ISPAT need to be studied. Organizational Climate (OC) is a primary 
construct that offers a comprehensive framework for understanding and exploring 
organizational behaviour at both individual and group levels (Ostroff, Kinicky, and Tamkins, 
2003; Asif, 2011) and relates to the perception of the internal work environment (Rousseau, 
1988). Organizational Climate is posited as a dominant variable mediating between the 
organization and its employees, and endeavours to analyse the experience of employees in the 
organization (Patterson et al., 2005). A number of studies have explored and established 
relationships between OC and variables related to behaviour and attitudes (Fleishman,1953) 
such as commitment (de Cotiis and Summers,1987), absenteeism (Steel, Shane, and Kennedy, 
1990), psycho-social risks (Vartia, 2008), psychological well-being (Cummings and de Cotiis , 
1973), violence at the workplace (Cole, Grubb Sauter, Swanson, and Lawless, 1997), job 
performance (Brown and Leigh, 1996; Pritchard and Karasick, 1973), leader behaviour, 
turnover intentions (Rousseau, 1988; Rentsch, 1990), individual and organizational 
performance (Lawler et al., 1974; Patterson, Warr and West,2004), and job satisfaction 
(Mathieu, Hoffman, and Farr, 1993; James and Tetrick, 1986; James and Jones, 1980). OC is 
often associated with increases in productivity, profitability, new product development and 
market share. Self-reporting is the generally the preferred method for obtaining information 
regarding organizational culture (Ekvall, 1996). However, there is little agreement on the 
factors that constitute organizational commitment (Patterson et al, 2005; Bermejo, Hidalgo, 
Parra, Más, and Gomis, 2011; Boada-Grau, Diego-Vallejo, Llanos-Serra, and Vigil-Colet, 
2011; Thumin and Thumin, 2011). Different instruments such as the Organizational Climate 
Questionnaire (Litwin and Stringer, 1966), Agency Climate Questionnaire (Schneider and 
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Bartlett, 1968, 1970), Organizational Climate Index (Stern, 1970), Organizational Climate 
Questionnaire (Lawler, Hall, and Oldhman, 1974), Psychological Climate Questionnaire (Jones 
and James, 1979), Perceived Work Environment (Newman, 1975, 1977), Organizational 
Climate Measure (Patterson et al., 2005), and the Survey of Organizational Characteristics 
(Thumin and Thumin, 2011) have been examined for suitability for the present study in the 
Indian context. Suárez et al.’s, (2013) study on OC was also examined for its content and 
methodology in the Spanish business environment. An examination of different OC measures 
should provide answers to the following questions: 
1. Which questionnaire will be most appropriate to measure the climate?  
2. Should the merger process undertaken by the organization be considered while selecting 
the measure of climate? 
Wilderom, Glunk, and Maslowski (2000) identified and reviewed ten studies concerning OC 
with a focus on organizational performance. Various studies have indicated that various facets 
of OC play a significant role in mergers. The results obtained are varied, pointing towards no 
clarity regarding different dimensions of climate.  
The second important question is, should a climate study be focused on an overall climate that 
is its sets of beliefs and the quality of its interactions or on a specific area of interest? Schneider 
(1975, 1990 and 2000) advised an issue-oriented approach where climate studies focus on a 
particular area for a specific purpose. Schneider suggests that the various dimensions of OC 
differ based on the objective and areas of focus. The general measures of organizational climate 
might not encompass dimensions that are appropriate for a specific area of focus. This reasoning 
has led to the development of other measures of several dimensions of climate such as 
innovation (West, 1990; Anderson and West, 1998) and service (Schneider, 1990). The 
researcher agrees with these arguments, and has endeavoured to conduct an M&A specific 
climate study. 
The operationalization of concepts are the factors that influence the organisation culture and 
they are the following:  
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1. Structure — the level of emphasis on procedures, rules, regulations and the level of 
informality in the organization and employees ‘perception” of the same. The relatedness of 
organization’s are important.  
2. Responsibility — the sense of authority and being one’s own boss; ownership and 
accountability for the job and not having to double-check all one’s decisions. This is the 
human dimension and the willingness of people to accept and manage change.  
3. Standards — a measurement of performance standards and expectations from the job; 
challenges presented in personal and organizational goals. This is very important with 
regard to integration and alignment. 
4. Conflict — the level of differences in opinion among employees and the importance given 
to solving the problems efficiently rather than blowing up or ignoring them. 
5. Identity — the sense of individuality and belonging to the organization; importance to the 
spirit of providing status, dignity and that one is a valuable member of the team. This is 
very important from a cultural viewpoint and it can help to facilitate or impede integration. 
6. Organizational culture — a unique set of values and beliefs followed by all employees that 
can differentiate one organization from another. The key dimensions of organizational 
culture are with regard to alignment and integration: 
a. Teamwork — the sense of togetherness and harmony in a workplace that has a 
synergetic impact on group efforts, resulting in higher performance.  
b. Warmth — the feeling of care and being well liked; importance of a friendly work 
environment and the presence of informal social groups. 
c. Support — a perceptible helpfulness from the supervisors and co-workers. 
d. Innovative and pro-active attitudes — an emphasis on novelty and renovation; 
trying out new tasks and techniques; putting extra effort into accomplishing 
organizational goals. 
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e. Risk — the risk-taking attitude and capacity; importance of taking calculated risks 
compared to playing it safe. 
f. Service quality — high quality standards and focus on customer needs and 
satisfaction. 
7. Employees' working attitudes —the feelings and outlook of the employees in the form of 
job satisfaction, appreciation, credit and commitment towards the accomplishment of the 
organizational goals. The factors that describe the concept of employees’ working attitude 
are:  
a. Job satisfaction — the level of content expressed by the employees with his or her 
job, stature, promotions and work culture. 
b. Self-actualization — the state of achievement and self-realization of employees 
driven by a sense of comfort, and emotional fulfilment; an awareness of the 
employee’s potential, opportunities for growth and development. 
c. Recognition — the level of respect and credit given to the employees for their 
contribution to the organization. 
d. Rational awards system — the appreciation provided to motivate the employees 
towards excellence at work and to work better to achieve goals. 
e. Reward —the feeling of being rewarded for a good job; a focus on positive rewards, 
integrity in compensation and promotion policies.  
8. Organizational commitment — the degree of employees' agreement and belief, in the 
organization's vision, brand image, goals and its future. The following factors describe the 
concept of organizational commitment.  
a. Emotional commitment— the level of dedication of the employees to the 
organizational well-being. 
 
 
[118] 
 
b. Continuous commitment— the level of desire and devotion of the employees to be 
attached to the organization; confidence and assurance of well-being and a rosy 
future. 
5.9 Data Sources and Data Collection 
The data was for two levels of organizational management, upper management and middle 
managers, to understand the integration process from a range of perspectives in JSW 
5.9.1 Sampling 
Data collection began with interviews with upper level management. The researcher faced 
four major constraints during this phase: 
1. Interviewees are busy establishing the organization’s new identity.  
2. Some of the organization’s M&A process is dealt with by external consultants.  
3. Different interviewees had different roles in the M&A project. 
4. The operations are dispersed across different geographical locations. 
Senior managers of the organization who were suitable for an interview were identified and 
contacted through email to set up the meeting. All participants expressed their desire to 
participate in the study. 
5.9.2 Data collection methodology adopted for the study  
This research involved the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods to analyse JSW 
and ISPAT’s upper and middle level management and employee’s perceptions of merger 
success. This is needed to test and refine the framework or conditions for success of an 
M&A. An important component of this research was the collection of an appropriate amount 
of data on the M&A process and its application to provide meaningful recommendations. 
Bonomi (1985) suggested that case studies should focus on (1) description, (2) classification 
(typology development), (3) theory development and (4) limited theory testing. He 
aggregated all his suggestions as “understanding” the problem or the phenomenon. This 
research adhered to the scholarly suggestion and endeavours to find conditions under which 
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a merger in emerging economy is likely to find success. Collis and Hussey (2003) and 
Burgess (1984) suggested that unstructured interviews, conversations and the collection 
documentary evidence are the most appropriate methods for this type of research.  
5.9.3 The principles of data collection  
Three principles of data collection proposed by Yin (1984) were used in this study.  
1. Triangulation, that is, the use of both qualitative and quantitative methods, can provide a 
study with greater empirical validity. The findings obtained from semi structured 
questions were used as an input to design a valid instrument to determine the merger’s 
success. A limitation of the single case study method is that it is not capable of providing 
results that are generalizable. This case study involved the use of a form of “replication 
logic” rather than “sampling logic”. Replication logic involves conducting multiple case 
studies to validate the results obtained. However, in the present case, the results obtained 
in three different stages were cross validated.  
2. Providing a chain of evidence involve principle of criminological investigations. Explicit 
links are established with the questions asked to that of data collected, and the conclusions 
drawn. The research need for study, problems and questions are given in the chapter 1 
followed by literature review in the second chapter. A structured process for recording, 
transcribing and analysing the data is elaborated here. Finally, the analysis is given in the 
final chapters.  
3. Creating a case study data base- this data base will be shared with business houses 
throughout the Gulf region.  
5.10 Designing the consultation protocols 
The JSW-ISPAT merger was the researcher’s preferred object of study to determine the 
conditions under which M&A’s will be successful. The research conducted a large number of 
consultation sessions with JSW-ISPAT upper level management. Managers who have 
experienced the M&A process or who have been part of the implementation process were 
selected. Face to face interviews were preferred to voice-to-voice or screen-to-screen 
interviews. The interviews were recorded and transcribed over three days.  The interviews were 
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semi structured, which allowed interviewees to talk freely and about the phenomena of interest 
(Saunders et al, 2003). The researcher met the interviewees multiple times to confirm the 
interview data (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1984).  
5.10.1 The early stage (Stage 1)  
This stage involved data collection from secondary sources and establishing contact with the 
upper level managers of JSW. It also involved visits to India to obtain resources from different 
libraries. Stage one helped the researcher to gain a better understanding of preliminary issues 
and allowed in-depth discussions and the sharing of insights on the issues to be addressed. The 
preliminary questions are identified from these interviews. These interviews lasted 30 minutes 
to more than 140 minutes in some cases. To find the roles of Bankers one of the bankers who 
is associated with the process is interviewed extensively, however his name is not revealed as 
he wished not to be identified. Some of the questions posed to respondents allowed them to 
describe events freely and allowed them to discuss relevant themes. Fowler and Mangione 
(1990) suggested that the discovery of relevant information is important than to conduct mere 
interview. Therefore, the researcher ensured that the interviews gave participants some 
flexibility to obtain as much relevant information as possible. The early stage of data collection 
took approximately 2 years to complete. 
5.10.2 Conducting interviews (Stage 2) 
These interviews are conducted to gather more focused information according to Trompenaar 
and Asser (2010). These sessions helped to understand the interconnections between different 
strategies and to ascertain the overall strategy adopted by the organization. These sessions are 
designed to verify the data given in the press and other data sources. The upper level managers 
are interviewed and synergies that lead to the success of M&A are ascertained.  
The organizational profile of a company provides us with the indication of its ability to deal 
with the challenges of an M&A. The researcher used the Organization Value Profiler (OVP) 
(Trompenaars and Asser, 2010) to examine JSW’s organizational values.  
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5.10.3 Quantitative analysis (Stage 3) 
The researcher developed a quantitative instrument based on key constructs identified from data 
collected in stage two such as structure, responsibility, standards, conflict, identity, 
organizational culture, job satisfaction, organizational commitment and merger success. This 
instrument is designed based on the inputs obtained from stage 2. The description of the 
instrument and its purpose is given. The upper level management and most of the studies did 
indicate that the merger is a success. However, middle level management employees of 
different departments need to confirm these themes. For this purpose of triangulation the 
information from different sources this study is undertaken.  
5.11 The process of analysis of the data 
The goal of data analysis is “to treat evidence fairly, to produce a compelling analytic 
conclusion, and to rule out any alternative interpretations” (Yin, 1984, p.99). Theories given 
by Miles and Huberman (1994) Ryan and Bernard (2000) are followed in this research. The 
research provides information staring from that of the idea conception to that of execution and 
its culmination in to financial terms. This unique advantage of this approach which is conceived 
by Trompenaar and Asser (2010) and is for the first time applied in a country in the emerging 
economy 
5.12 Data analysis-qualitative 
All interview data were digitally recorded in Microsoft Word and transcribed to ensure that the 
data were maintained for further analysis. Qualitative content analysis was developed with 
Nvivo software and Query Wizard to analyse interview transcripts and identify themes. The 
identified themes were verified, confirmed and qualified by searching through the data and 
iterating the process to further identify and list more themes. The relevant responses were 
further categorized, and the irrelevant were ignored. Nodes and sub nodes were also developed 
based on the themes. 
5.13 Data analysis-quantitative 
The characteristics of the employees are presented graphically to observe any initial differences 
between the JSW and ex-ISPAT employees. In order to understand whether the data has internal 
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consistency, reliability analysis was performed using Cronbach’s alpha. The next step was to 
compare the several dimensions before and after the merger. To assess the level of the 
differences, the dimensions are presented graphically and paired samples T-Tests are used for 
the comparisons. Linear regression models were built to evaluate the effect of the dimension 
on the merger success. A collinearity analysis was also developed for merger success and 
different dimensions. It was also of interest to understand whether there is a difference in the 
departments within each dimension. These comparisons were performed using ANOVA. All 
the analysis was performed using SPSS. 
5.14 Role of speed on merger process 
It appears to be crucial that restructuring should be done early, fast, and once. This minimizes 
the uncertainty of ‘waiting for the other shoe to drop.’ Historically, there has been a tendency 
to restructure organisations slowly and an overreliance on people rather than structures and 
processes. A lesson learned by the employees at GE Capital (Ashkenas, DeMonaco, and 
Francis, 2000) that can greatly aid successful integration is: 
Decisions about management structure, key roles, reporting relationships, layoffs, restructuring, 
and other career-related factors in integration should be made, announced, and implemented as 
soon as the deal has been signed — within days, if possible. Creeping changes, uncertainty, and 
anxiety that last for months are debilitating and immediately start to drain value from an 
acquisition (Ashkenas, DeMonaco, and Francis, 2000). While the qualitative analysis provided 
evidence that the organizational structural elements have been addressed, other important areas 
have yet to be tackled. 
5.15 What should be the measure of acquisition performance? 
The prime success for any M&A may be measured according to different parameters. Should it 
be confined to the financial measure of profit or loss, or shareholder’s wealth, or strategic fit or 
organizational fit? While all of these are valid parameters for measuring performance, strategic 
fit and organizational fit have received less validation, even less when post-merger issues 
considered. Datta, Pinches and Narayanan (1992) measured acquisition performance was 
through a meta-analysis. They used the event-study methodology from the perspective of gains 
accruing to the acquirer and acquired, and different announcements made during and prior to 
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acquisition. The results of this analysis were interesting, particularly their findings on the 
market for corporate control, its competitiveness and shareholder gains (Jarrell, Brickley, and 
Netter, 1988); Jensen and Ruback (1983). However, their research did not focus on either 
strategic fit or organizational fit. Salter and Weinhold (1979) and Lubatkin (1983) argued that 
related acquisitions should exhibit better performance compared to unrelated acquisitions. They 
argued that synergistic benefits should arise out of economies of scale and scope due to 
relatedness. This would allow companies to easily transfer core skills across both the firms. 
Research by Chatterjee (1986), Lubatkin (1987), Seth (1990), Shelton (1988), and Singh and 
Montgomery (1987) examined the relationship between 'strategic fit' and positive outcomes. 
However, Lubatkin (1987) observed that horizontal acquisitions are less effective than vertical 
or conglomerate acquisitions. Furthermore, Seth (1990) found that there were no significant 
differences in overall value creation between related and unrelated acquisitions. The diversity 
of findings in the literature indicates that strategic fit is important, but may not be a sufficient 
condition for measuring acquisition performance (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). Re-stating the 
issue of strategic fit indicates that potential synergistic benefits may be present, but they will 
result in superior acquisition performance only if synergies can eventually be realized through 
effective post-acquisition integration. The post integration process relating to different 
dimensions of strategic and organizational fit needs further analysis.   
The need for an integration of operations during an acquisition is dependent on the acquiring 
company’s objectives. The most important objective in post-acquisition integration of 
operations is to make more efficient and effective use of existing capabilities. Merging firms 
can reduce production and inventory costs and marketing and logistical synergy by integrating 
similar functions (Howell, 1970; Rappaport, 1987).  Integration should result in profits; 
roadblocks associated with the integration of operations may not help the combined 
organization (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1987). Potential roadblocks include reward and 
evaluation systems, organizational structures, or organizational cultures and attitudes towards 
innovation and conflict (Lubatkin, 1983; Marks, 1982). 
Merger success is meant to create synergy which makes the value of the combined companies 
greater than the sum of the two separate companies especially during tough economic times. 
The success of merger will depend on whether this synergy is achieved or not. 
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The following steps are important to achieve synergy success: 
1. Planning: to map out the process. 
2. Preparation and analysis: during the M&A due diligence process to make sure that these 
synergies are real and how to achieve them. 
3. Execution: upon completion of the transaction, critical decisions have to be made such as 
which operations will be kept or closed? How will the new company encourage key 
employees to stay? Who will be accountable to see that these synergies are realized?  
Synergy of M&A is expected to increase revenue and reduce cost of the new business. By 
merging, the companies hope to benefit from the following: 
1. Staff in duplicate positions being made redundant should result in money savings. 
2. Economies of scale yields improved purchasing power which in turn reduces prices with 
suppliers. 
3. Acquiring new technology which helps in developing competitive edge. 
5.16 Transcribing raw data into notes 
The data collection and analysis were conducted simultaneously. The qualitative data was 
analysed and the findings used as an input for the quantitative analysis. In addition, the 
researcher followed an iterative process, moving from the literature review to data collection 
and analysis. This process was suggested by Leedy (1997). The completed data collected is 
stored both as voice files as well as word transcribed files.  
Thematic Analysis 
The analysis of the data was conducted by using thematic analysis. This is a recognized data 
analysis method for qualitative research. It was selected because it allowed for the data to be 
evaluated and to considered in relation to the research question. The data from the interviews 
was evaluated in order to identify the main themes. This involved reading and re-reading the 
interviews and labelling the initial themes. These initial themes were given a separate color 
code. This coding process allowed for a number of preliminary themes to be established. Then 
these themes were further analysed and evaluated and this led to the development of a number 
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of final themes. These were further investigated so that a number of sub-themes were also 
identified.  
Table 12: Table of Themes and Constructs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Themes   Constructs/theoretical basis 
Motivation of mergers  Motivations/ synergy 
Vision and goal: Motivations       Motivations/ synergy/relatedness/culture 
Synergy evaluation  Synergy/ relatedness    
Outcomes   Synergy/ Organizational integration 
Merger and acquisition team Role of speed on merger process 
Due diligence   Measure of acquisition performance/ Organizational integration 
Integration project planning       Alignment models  
Organizational values  Integration of organizational values/ Organizational integration 
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CHAPTER 6 – DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION-
QUALITATIVE 
This Chapter describes how the researcher collected and analysed qualitative data collected 
from the upper level managers of the merging entities i.e. JSW and ISPAT. 
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6. Irument design 
6.1 Instrument Design 
An interview consisting of 37 questions on various aspects relating to the process of integration 
was used, which comprised a combination of both closed and open-ended questions. The 
interview template is provided in Annexure 1.  
6.2 Data collection 
Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 10 members of the upper level management of 
JSW and ex-executives from ISPAT who were part of the strategic alignment and 
organizational decision-making process during the merger. Each interview lasted from around 
45 to 120 minutes. Participants’ responses were written down by the researcher during the 
interviews. 
6.3 Data analysis 
Transcription - The data was arranged and recorded in a digital format in Microsoft 
Word so that it could be used for further analysis. A sample of the transcribed data is 
given below: 
“Question 5 
Interviewer – What is the main goal of this merger? Would it be to try to save the plant, 
to expand the footprint of JSW, is it to support the national industry to prevent any 
foreign investor to come in and acquire ISPAT? What would you believe is the main 
goal? 
Interviewee – The main goal is to serve the country by becoming 40 M tones by 2025 
and this JSW is doing by both ground field expansion, green field expansion, Merger 
and Acquisitions. In that context, ISPAT industry was very right choice for this goal. 
For 40 M, one company has to be spread across the country. Vijaynagar is in the southern 
part, Dolvi is in western part. 
Interviewer – To establish geographical footprint! 
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Interviewee – Yes, they are compatible (aligned) geographically, technologically. 
Additionally, JSW's primary Steel making facility is in Vijaynagar, but their 
downstream facilities are in Maharashtra (Tarapur, Vasind) where we have cold rolling, 
colour coating, further processing of steel. The strategic input is that Dolvi feeds these 
plants instead of Vijaynagar. So, there is big savings in terms of transportation 
(economies of scale).” 
6.4 Analytical Approach 
The inductive approach was adopted in the data analysis which involves little or no pre-defined 
theories, structure or framework. It uses the actual collected data to develop theories and 
analysis. The inductive approach is comprehensive and time consuming and, therefore, it is the 
most suitable method to use when very little is known about the research topic. 
6.5 Method of analysis 
Is the researcher employing a thematic content analysis, which involves carefully analysing 
transcripts, identifying themes, coding and gathering various texts and examples related to those 
themes? However, these themes are identified using secondary data. Thematic Content Analysis 
- This process involves discovering themes in the interview transcripts and attempting to verify, 
confirm and qualify them by searching through the data and iterating the process to further 
identify and list more themes. In the second stage, all responses that are relevant are identified 
and categorized, while responses that are irrelevant are ignored.  Nvivo software the Query 
Wizard were used to assist the researcher in uncovering key quotes and information. They 
allowed the researcher to record and differentiate important themes and their corresponding 
nodes.  
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Table 13 presents the word frequencies and Table 14 presents the themes, nodes, sub-nodes 
and the equivalent examples. 
Table 13: A Word Frequency Output from Query in Nvivo software 
Word Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
Advantage 126 0.68 
Acquired 31 0.17 
Acquisition 24 0.13 
Acquiring 15 0.08 
Accountability 13 0.07 
Budget 11 0.06 
Behaviour 10 0.05 
Brand 6 0.03 
Bottlenecks 3 0.02 
Budgetary 4 0.02 
Culture 80 0.43 
Cost 49 0.27 
Customers 49 0.27 
Compensation 12 0.06 
Consultants 11 0.06 
Communicability 10 0.05 
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Table 14: Sample list of themes, nodes and examples. 
 
Themes Nodes Sub-Nodes Examples
One of the most important parts in the financials is that we have VAT benefit here.
This plant also had fiscal/VAT benefit, if you sell within Maharashtra, then you get a tax credit.
If we are selling the entire produce within Maharashtra, then the entire tax is saved and is profit for the seller. 
If we are investing in another state, then this income will not be part of the EBITA or profitability.
Because of those tax benefits today per tonne profitability of this unit is higher.
We analyze the changes in profitability after implementing power plant, It has improved a very small part.
Rolling mill facilities, blast furnace and sponge iron plant from Japan are very good technology.
He says that I know that no blast furnace in the world can perform this.
Corex technology A world class plant with three processes of steel making with a blast furnace, corex and DRI
We could imbibe and adopt it in other places. We are having one SAP solution across the JSW group.
They were masters in SAP, but still they were operating in silos. 
A budgetary control system was introduced using SAP, not manual.
You talk about six sigmas, SAP from 2000 onwards. He believed in processes. 
Freight cost
Transportation cost Major Steel sales are near this area only. Biggest advantage is freight cost, transportation cost.
Distribution and vicinity Market advantage in terms of distribution and vicinity, you give them as 5.
Cheaper material I am not able to deliver the cheaper material to the end-user.
Jetty We have a jetty. Sea shore is very near to us.
The cost of the sea-route is much cheaper than road or rail.
A sea based plant. If the Indian supplier cannot supply, then we can get it from abroad.
Because there was not a production stop and all expansion is going on in Dolvi only.
As it was a running plant, just add it into the system and go.
To expand capacities and become a major role player in Steel industry.
Our ambition of becoming 40 M tonnes producer by 2025.
Production and expansion and target of 40 M over ten years.
Our vision is to be 40 M producer of steel.
Synergize and use the exposure and experience to gain cost-effectiveness and profitability.
To make it as good and big as the Vijaynagar plants.
Second, can we make this Dolvi plant as good as the Vijaynagar plant to achieve our goal of 10 M tonnes?
Time Line 
Advantage
Vision
Major role player in Steel industry
Synergize
To make ISPAT plant at par with JSW
Table 10 -  List of themes, nodes and examples
Idea of 
merger
Financial 
Advantage
VAT benefit 
Profitability
Technical 
Advantage
Blast furnace
SAP
Marketing 
Advantage
Logistical 
Advantage Sea- route 
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6.6 Interpretation 
Frequency Analysis is an analytical tool that a researcher can use to convert qualitative 
data into a quantitative output. It involves counting the number of times a particular 
answer or concept has been repeated in all of the interviews. The frequency of a 
particular theme can help the researcher to gauge the importance of that factor. 
The percentage of respondents focusing on a particular aspect or agreeing on a concept 
or idea can also be used to determine a theme’s significance. This provides the 
researcher with a means of measuring the consistency or agreement among interviewees 
on key and emerging themes.   
Based on the interpretation of the qualitative data, a detailed case study on various 
dimensions and the alignment of organizational processes during merger can be 
constructed. 
6.7 Validation 
The validation process allows the researcher to reduce bias and make their analysis more 
rigorous. Two important methods of validation were utilised; 1) Respondent validation 
i.e. returning to the participant and asking them to validate the final content, and 2) Peer 
Review, where another qualitative researcher analyses the data and verifies the results. 
6.8 Qualitative data analysis output 
6.8.1 Themes of Merger 
To understand the entire process of the merger, along with the sequence of activities and 
organizational alignment issues, a detailed qualitative analysis was completed and its 
interpretation and findings have been discussed in detail below. 
6.8.2 Motivation of mergers 
The senior executives who were interviewed were the main pillars of strategic decision making 
during the merger. The main objective was to evaluate the advantages across various 
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dimensions that could be obtained from the merger and their motivations. Based on the 
responses of these executives, it is clear that the main reason for the merger was marketing and 
a logistical advantage, followed by the technical advantage, with the least important being the 
financial advantage. 
 
Figure 188: Advantages Ranked across Different Aspects that drove the Idea of Merger. 
Marketing was ranked highly mainly due to ISPAT’s Dolvi plant, which is located close to the 
Mumbai market and therefore facilitates better distribution and cheaper delivery of products to 
the end-users within Maharashtra (Figure 18). The logistical advantage as also relates to the 
Dolvi plant as it is sea-shore based and has its own jetty, which means lower sea transportation 
costs and more options for importing raw materials from both Indian suppliers and abroad. The 
ISPAT plant had a huge technical advantage with its world class technology including a blast 
furnace, corex technology and a DRI. It was mainly this technical advantage which drove JSW 
to acquire the company. In addition, the employees of ISPAT were very competent with 
superior technical know-how and management skills. There was a great advantage as there was 
non-stop production during the merger process, and the expansion was in progress 
simultaneously. As ISPAT was in huge debt and was about to sink, there was no financial 
benefit to this merger for JSW. However, the Dolvi plant did have the VAT benefit i.e. the plant 
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is located in Maharashtra, and if a product was sold within Maharashtra, then the entire tax 
would be saved, thus increasing profitability. 
6.8.3 Vision and goal: Motivations 
It is very important for any company to have a vision and clear goals for a merger. JSW Steel 
had a clear focus and Mr. Sajjan Jindal had a clear vision during the takeover of ISPAT. He 
was aware of all of the advantages and disadvantages of the take-over.  
 
Figure 19: Vision of the merger. 
Forty percent of the upper level managers said that their motivation was to expand their 
organization’s capacity and to become a major Steel firm (Figure 19). All of the respondents 
stated that their vision for the JSW Group was to make it India’s largest Steel manufacturer in 
the future. Their primary focus is on expansion through acquisition and JSW is very aggressive 
i.e. if there is any opportunity. They will surely go ahead and expand. 
An excerpt from an interview with R8 reflects the main goal of this merger – 
“The main goal is to serve the country by becoming 40 M tonnes by 2025 and this JSW is doing 
by ground field expansion, green field expansion, merger and acquisitions. In that context, 
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To expand production capacities and become major role player in Steel industry
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ISPAT industry was very right fed for this goal. For 40 M, one company has to be spread across 
the country.” 
And R10 shared his own view about the goal of this merger - 
“There were many objectives - 1. Pre-empt competition because we want to grow big, didn’t 
want anyone else to acquire it and 2. It gave new location for growth.” 
6.8.4 Synergy evaluation 
Synergy is the interaction or co-operation between two or more organizations, substances, or 
other agents to produce a combined effect greater than the sum of their parts. Synergy is an 
important concept because it emphasizes the importance of working together in a co-operative 
manner for full exploitation of any benefits. The primary role of upper level management is to 
identify and leverage the firm’s competitive advantage resources across closely fitting business 
processes to create new sources of value that form the basis for building synergy. 
Synergy evaluation was performed in-house by JSW as it is a well-entrenched player in the 
Steel business and this was familiar territory, that is, they knew all the processes involved. The 
JSW team compared the way they were conducting business with ISPAT’s approach and they 
could see some striking differences. JSW is the market leader in that industry and has the 
technical know-how, eliminated the need for an external consultant. It was the vision of Mr. 
Sajjan Jindal and the board of directors, along with the heads of all departments, to identify the 
various gaps and opportunities where synergy could be achieved to create greater impact. 
When asked to rank the areas based on the synergy impact of the two entities, most of the 
executives rated marketing synergy as the highest compared to the others. The major aspects 
that gave maximum synergy effects in marketing are as follows: 
1. Market availability – the Dolvi plant is close to the Mumbai Steel market. 
2. Expansion: - both companies having different set-ups of marketing which were over-
lapping was brought under one control. For the merged entity, the cost of distribution and 
marketing was reduced and they could better serve the customers either from Vijaynagar or 
Dolvi. 
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3. JSW has two cold rolling plants at Vasind and Tarapur, which used to be fed from the 
Vijaynagar plant, but now they are fed from Dolvi. This resulted in a saving of 20-25$ on 
transportation and that is a significant amount, almost equal to their EBITA before. The 
above synergies achieved could result in cost reduction and, along with the VAT benefit 
obtained by selling produce within Maharashtra, lead up to the advantage of financial 
synergy. This is ranked second highest by the participants as per Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20: Synergy levels across various aspects. 
Technical synergy is another aspect that played a crucial role in the synchronization of different 
technologies that facilitated the exchange of in-house knowledge and the learning between the 
two units of Vijaynagar and Dolvi.  There were some common technologies that give added 
competitive advantages to the new entity. This is a key motivation for any M&A.  
Other areas of synergy that were achieved were the procurement and backward integration of 
the Dolvi plant. 
i. Procurement - today, JSW Steel’s production capacity is 14 M tonnes and it is buying 40 
M tonnes of raw materials of different kinds, which gives it enormous leverage in terms 
of buying. After the merger, the organization had the advantage of bulk buying. The 
purchase activity has been brought together at one location, centralized and has achieved 
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optimization of allocation of raw materials.  This was selected to best suit the end user, 
giving them maximum benefit. Thus, economies of scale have been achieved. 
ii. Backward Integration – the Dolvi plant had some shortcomings. It was not a completely 
integrated plant. They did not have pallet plant, coke oven, sufficient lime producing 
capacity, and were not using waste gasses. Hence, backward integration was planned and 
achieved to remedy this. This was known to earlier management and was well 
documented, but they could not bring it to reality. The first focus was to improve the plant 
by setting up a power (Mar 2013), Lime (Aug 2013), coke oven (Feb 2013) pallet plant, 
and also a railway siding to facilitate alternative transportation via rail route. These have 
helped JSW reduce the cost of production at Dolvi. 
iii. Dolvi being a sea-shore based plant, with its own jetty and access to a national highway, 
has better connectivity and served as the best option to de-risk the business model of JSW. 
It has its primary Steel plant at Vijaynagar which is land-locked and less feasible for 
expansion without using expensive transportation. 
6.8.5 Outcomes  
The upper level managers have rated the following areas of synergy between the two 
organizations. 
a) From the perspective of both merging companies – the buyer and seller the expected 
positive outcome was the main motivating factor. Almost all respondents agreed that 
maximum synergy was achieved in terms of obtaining future benefit, improvement in 
the combined financial structure and corporate culture for the following reasons: 
Obtaining future benefit – after merger, JSW Steel had a combined production capacity 
of 14.3 metric tonnes ranking it the third largest steel producer in India. The merger has 
led to the exchange and synergizing of technologies, expertise and resources to achieve 
cost-effectiveness and maximum benefit. The expected cost savings was important in 
motivating the M&A process.  
b) Combined financial structure improved – ISPAT was in huge financial debt, despite 
being one of the best Steel plants with the latest technology and a talented work force. 
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This was mainly due to a lack of vision from upper level management and an inefficient 
cash management system. After the merger, JSW was able to exploit the sea-based 
transportation and VAT benefits to increase profitability. In addition, the depreciation 
in ISPAT’s balance sheets helped to decrease tax costs, which were a major expense. 
c) Corporate culture improved – The merged entity is now following JSW’s corporate 
culture and ideology which is more target oriented and focused i.e. perform or perish. 
The transition from ISPAT to JSW-ISPAT was smooth and friendly. Mr. Mittal and Mr. 
Jindal together made a joint announcement to all ISPAT employees and gave their 
assurance of complete staff retention. This changed the staff’s mind-set and struck a 
positive chord right after the merger during their first Dolvi meeting. Now, all ISPAT 
employees have secure jobs and due to their financial stability, which was previously 
lower, they are happier and more committed. This is reflected in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 20: Synergy Evaluation from Buyer/Seller Perspectives. 
i. Other areas that contributed but had lesser effect on organizational synergy are briefly 
described below: 
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ii. Obtaining superior technology – JSW Steel has benefited from the acquisition of 
ISPAT’s Dolvi plant, which has world class steel manufacturing technology along with 
an efficient work force with superior technical know-how. 
iii. Applying Superior Know-How to the Business – JSW has been a pioneer in a similar 
industry and was therefore able to find the weakness in the ISPAT plant. They were able 
to use their experience and superior know-how, to make Dolvi an integrated plant that 
is now as self-sufficient and cost-effective as their Vijaynagar plant. 
iv. Maximum synergy in the procurement of raw materials was achieved. As the raw 
materials were mostly similar for both firms, the purchase activity was brought together 
and centralized, giving the advantage of bulk buying. JSW optimized the allocation of 
raw materials to best suit the location and end user, giving it maximum benefit and 
economies of scale. 
v. Most respondents agreed that a competitor is acquired so that an organization can 
eliminate competition and gain a larger market share. 
 
Figure 21: Synergy Evaluation from Suppliers and Competitors’ Perspectives. 
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Figure 23 shows the data from the perspective of the customers and markets. The following 
areas were rated to provide a competitive advantage for the new entity: 
i. New distributors/distribution channels for existing products – after the merger, there has 
been an expansion in the geographical footprint. The Dolvi plant mainly serves 
Maharashtra due to the tax benefits, while the Vijaynagar plant in Karnataka caters to 
Southern India. 
ii. The company’s brand and image in the eyes of customers has improved since the 
merger. 
iii. Creating one stop shopping for customers – since the merger, customers from 
Maharashtra and the Southern part of India have been given the luxury of purchasing 
products from JSW. 
iv. Their image with mutual customers has improved and JSW is now attracting new 
customers for its existing products. 
 
Figure 223: Synergy evaluation from Customers/Markets perspectives. 
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As far as the regulatory environment is concerned, all of the respondents agreed that the image 
of the company with the regulators has improved, especially levels of trust with bankers and 
lenders. After JSW was successfully able to resuscitate ISPAT from financial crisis when they 
were planning to dilute it (Figure 24). 
 
Figure 234: Synergy Evaluation from Financial Markets and Regulators’ Perspectives. 
i. Similarly, the JSW’s image among market analysts has improved as the merged 
company was able to achieve a stronger financial critical mass. 
ii. Finally, from the perspective of acquiring the target to prevent others from acquiring it, 
the respondents were neutral. This was not the main motivation, and there were other 
firms before JSW who were very keen to acquire ISPAT.  
The synergies impact values of all the respondents across all the areas have been summarized 
in the radial chart as shown in Figure 24. Each colour shows the set of values under each area. 
For instance, the green colour indicates the synergy values of all sub-areas under the area - 
Customer and Market perspective. 
 -  1  2  3  4  5
A Target Is Acquired to Prevent Someone Else
From Acquiring It
Image With Market Analysts Is Improved
Financial Critical Mass Is Achieved
Image With Regulators Is Improved
O
th
er
Fi
na
nc
ia
l M
ar
ke
ts
R
eg
ul
at
o
ry
En
vi
ro
n.
3.75 
5.00 
4.75 
5.00 
 
 
[141] 
 
 
Figure 245: Summary of Synergy Impact Ranking across all Areas. 
6.8.6 Merger and acquisition team 
Once a synergy evaluation has been conducted, the next step an organization must take is to 
select the right M&A team to make important decisions regarding due diligence and the 
integration planning process. The respondents have uniformly agreed that the M&A team 
should consist of legal and financial experts as these areas need to be thoroughly scrutinized. 
JSW hired external legal and financial experts including Kotak Mahindra Security during the 
initial days when the due-diligence was done and the deal was finalized during Dec 2010 
(Figure 26 shows the main focus areas of the M&A team). 
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A company’s legal status during M&A’s is critical in the Indian context. If the company is 
entangled in legal issues such as regulatory requirements, litigation, outstanding loans, land and 
property cases, then it is not suitable for acquisition. Another important issue that must be 
carefully analysed is the financial status of the company. ISPAT had poor cash flow 
management with poor check and balances, and it appeared as though the company was 
bleeding despite having a good functioning plant with superior technology and an efficient 
work-force. These nuances in financial management have to be diligently monitored and 
assessed to determine whether a deal is viable and to calculate the total value of the merger. 
 
Figure 256: Main Focus Areas scored by Importance during M&A Team Selection. 
The marketing/commercial and technical/production fields were the next step that needed to be 
focused upon while forming an M&A team. The experts in these fields were available in-house 
at JSW. There was little effort or assessment needed from a technical or production perspective, 
as the JSW plant was already technically superior. Furthermore, JSW’s personnel policy 
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involved retaining the entire Dolvi workforce with some re-structuring. Whatever the strengths 
or weaknesses, it planned to change the workforce rather than cut jobs. As the major work 
started only after the merger, the M&A team had little to contribute. 
6.8.7 Due diligence 
The due-diligence process was conducted over a very short span of around 10 days, at the end 
of which, the deal was finalized on 21st Dec 2010. It was performed by an M&A team 
comprising 10-12 members from JSW’s upper management and a few external advisors. 
ISPAT’s upper management participated in the due diligence and provided the information to 
JSW and other companies competing for the acquisition.  
This was clearly explained by R2 in his interview –  
“From ISPAT side, I was there in due diligence working, providing the various information 
inputs to the JSW team and helping them analyse various things. We gave at most true and 
factual things so that they were not misguided about the facts of the company. I was also part 
of that. From their side, whatever information asked was given, analysed and explained 
thoroughly and supported with documents so that nobody can say that it is not correct.” 
Important aspects focused on during due diligence 
Due diligence is crucial to decision making during a merger deal and has to be approached with 
caution. It is crucial to scrutinize all possible aspects of due diligence to check the synergy and 
profitability of a potential merger.   
The chart below summarizes the level of importance assigned by the due diligence team to 
various factors. The average score of all respondents is presented on a scale of 1 to 9 with 9 
being the highest.  
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Figure 267: Due diligence – Focus Areas Scored based on Importance. 
According to the upper management, the legal status of the target company is the most 
important aspect that needs to be inspected, as a legally entangled company with regulatory, 
land, property complications, legal cases or outstanding loans might become a liability for the 
acquirer (Figure 27). The second most important aspect was the strategic location of ISPAT, 
which was of great benefit to JSW as it is a sea-shore based plant in Maharashtra. This was 
close to the largest steel market in Mumbai, with an associated VAT advantage for sales within 
that state that enhanced its profitability. Assets such as the land and steel plant of ISPAT were 
rated equally highly as it is one of the most technically advanced steel plants in this part of the 
world. The aspect of market presence was considered important as ISPAT is one of the major 
steel players and through acquisition, JSW would gain huge market share and dominate the 
steel market. Following an analysis of the above aspects, the ISPAT deal was deemed to be 
both feasible and viable. Other less important issues included ISPAT’s turnover, products and 
human resources. Human resources are an important aspect but it was dealt with in the post-
merger phase, and was not an issue during the due-diligence process as JSW invariably decided 
to retain the entire workforce. 
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6.8.8 Integration project planning 
Integration planning can be described as the process of framing a plan of action for the 
alignment of all organizational activities such as marketing, production, logistics, finance, and 
HR. These plans were formulated by the heads of the respective departments of JSW and 
ISPAT.  
Leading the integration planning effort – Based on the responses from the upper managers, the 
researcher surmised that integration planning was divided into two phases – a deal/merger phase 
and a post-merger phase. The deal phase, when the merger deal was finalized during December 
2010, was short and lasted for 10 days. This was primarily led by the JSW M&A team, 
consisting of around 10-15 members who visited the ISPAT Dolvi plant, performed a swift due-
diligence, settled the deal and then transferred the integration process to operations, after which 
the M&A team was no longer required. 
This is an excerpt from an interview with R5; 
“We didn’t use an M&A team afterwards. It was only JSW. The M&A team acquired and 
handed it over. Even external consultants or in-house experts were not used. In 3 months, it 
was transferred to Operations. The M&A team was not in picture.” 
In the post-merger phase, decisions were predominantly taken by JSW, but were implemented 
by employees of both organizations. 
Business dilemmas 
The integration process of these two big businesses was not simple and the senior management 
had to deal with quite a few business dilemmas to align these companies’ operations and 
processes. Some of these dilemmas have been analysed in detail based on discussions with the 
respondents. 
i. Centralized vs. de-centralized excellence 
Almost 90% of respondents from both JSW and ISPAT believed that the functioning of JSW 
was centralized, as compared to the organization of ISPAT. After the merger, JSW planned and 
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centralized many processes to increase cost-effectiveness and control. This is an excerpt from 
the interview with R1 in which he states; 
“ISPAT was more de-centralized. For Example, there were 3 plants and they did not know what 
happened in the other plants. If they had to, then both were buying and there was an inventory 
build-up. That centralization process also makes sense sometimes.” 
A budgetary control system, procurement and stores system were the major processes which 
were later centralized by JSW, as shown in the interview with R1; 
“ISPAT were masters in SAP, but still they were operating in silos. So, JSW brought in a 
centralized budgetary control system. Another was a centralized stores system which was 
brought in. Blast furnaces, SIP, all were having different stores. Though they were in financial 
crisis, they were maintaining huge inventory. If a SIP fellow needs the same instrument or 
spare, then why should it be kept at three places? Then, we introduced combined allocation and 
did inventory reduction.” 
 
Figure 278: Scatter Plot with Responses (data points) indicating Centralization in JSW and 
ISPAT. 
The respondent’s views have been represented as data points in the scatter-plot, in which each 
data-point depicts the degree of centralization in JSW and ISPAT (on X and Y axes 
respectively) (Figure 28). Most of the graph’s data points are on the bottom right, indicating 
that JSW was more centralized than ISPAT. 
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(Note: The qualitative answers from the respondents have been converted to a scale of 1 to 10 
denoting the degree of centralization in firms). 
Another aspect of centralization outside of operations and processes is the decision-making part 
of an organization, which was highly centralized in JSW, especially compared to ISPAT. This 
was explained by R3;  
“In ISPAT, the Chairman used to call all the management, like 50 people, but JSW’s Chairman 
calls only his directors. So, in ISPAT, there used to be lots of meetings, Presentations, 
compliance, follow-ups, and Memos. So, I used to be busy with these meetings. But in JSW, no 
unnecessary meetings with the Chairman.” 
This signifies that the upper management, comprising of the Chairman and the Board of 
Directors, are the primary decision makers in the company and the necessary instructions and 
work are communicated to all stakeholders. They believe in assigning the job to their employees 
and trust that they will get it done without extra meetings and formalities. 
To summarize the respondents’ opinion, JSW has centralized processes and decision making at 
an average score of 8.1 while ISPAT has a score of 3.4 (Figure 29). 
 
Figure 289: Average Score depicting the Level of Centralization in JSW and ISPAT before 
Merger. 
There was no real dilemma around centralization as JSW was clear about its integration plan, 
and wanted all major processes like budget, procurement, storage, and marketing. To be 
centralized after the merger to ensure that the merged organization achieved optimal 
performance and maximum output. 
 
 
[148] 
 
ii. JSW culture vs. ISPAT culture – resolving cultural issues 
. JSW has its own culture that have made it one of the most successful business models, and 
better than ISPAT. Figure 30 shows a comprehensive comparison of JSW and ISPATs’ cultural 
aspects.  
 
Figure 30: Cultural Dilemmas – Level of Differences between JSW and ISPAT. 
(Note: The ISPAT data here denotes the culture of ISPAT prior to merger until December 2010. 
Presently, ex-ISPAT is sequential to JSW culture). 
JSW had a very professional working style, while ISPAT’s activities often involved more 
emotional decision-making. According to comments by R6 and R7;  
“JSW culture is 100% professional and ISPAT is emotional”. 
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JSW was mainly personality driven and is a long-term player, while ISPAT was more process 
driven and a short-term player in the steel market, as expressed by R9;  
“ISPAT was more process driven (six sigma’, SAP) and it was more structured; JSW is more 
personality driven. Every process tries to replicate the Chairman’s model; you cannot avoid 
that kind of emulation. When he pushes us, then we realize what we can do. Hence, he is 
visionary and we are ordinary. Hence, all of top management looks up to him and tries to 
emulate him. JSW needs to have a proper structure of processes”. 
The disadvantages of ISPAT’s highly process driven approach have been highlighted by R3; 
“In ISPAT, there used to be lot of meetings, presentations, compliance, follow-ups, and Memo. 
So, I used to be busy with these meetings and used to go mad. But in JSW, there are no 
unnecessary meetings with the Chairman. I have not met the Chairman. If there is any need, 
they will definitely call. If not, just work. There is only monthly presentation. In that 
presentation also, my boss will interact. Whatever inputs he receives, he will go to Directors 
and then they will communicate it to us. So, management and employees are empowered, full 
faith and please work.” 
This reveals that JSW’s decision making was more centralized and there was a clearer 
delegation of work to middle and lower management.  That all key decisions were taken at one 
level with little input from other stakeholders. Senior management trusted their employees and 
insisted that they focus on their work rather than on following additional processes that are 
time-consuming and mostly unproductive, unlike ISPAT. 
From a training stance, ISPAT focused more on human resource development and improving 
individual personalities, managerial skills and technical knowledge. JSW was less involved in 
training and more action driven, which motivated employees and exposed them to more real 
world situations, allowing them to learn from experience. In addition, JSW had a different 
culture with more emphasis on employee relationships.  
This excerpt from R2 demonstrates the concept related above; 
“Earlier management was always thinking of the growth and development of human resource. 
Now, their focus is less on human development. The current mgmt. focus on the same part is 
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making relationships stronger. There is a difference. In ISPAT, the focus was on developing 
your individual personality, but the current management believes in developing relationships 
with employees. Human development means training, nurturing, skill development, so you can 
become an independent part and take decisions. But relationships are a different culture with 
an emotional touch. You will be associated with me.” 
In terms of support and safety, JSW has a better track record in terms of supporting family and 
financial stability. During the financial crisis, ISPAT employees were financially insecure as 
they had no job stability and dwindling salaries. Hence, when JSW took over and assured them 
that there would be no staff reductions or transfers, they were content. JSW had a unique policy 
of maintaining employee relationships and, which resulted in employee commitment and 
loyalty. This cultural aspect was most effectively captured by R1;  
“Even if employees are not performing, then they will be transferred, but never sacked. Even if 
market/business goes up or down, they always give increments, bonus, perks. At JSW, 
employees are our strength. My employees should be given preference, I take care of their 
families with a township and facilities like schools, hospitals, scholarships for children. Hence, 
loyalty will be high. “Furthermore, JSW has been very pro-active, action and goal oriented, 
aiming to achieve targets by any means, while ISPAT had a more stable, structured working 
style that focused on processes and procedures. This is reflected in a quote by R7; 
“JSW is more of taking flight and ISPAT was stable”. 
JSW also emphasized transparency, where believing that employee relationships can be 
strengthened through delegation of authority, responsibility and trust. This can be built only 
through an open and transparent work culture, and not within closed walls. By contrast, most 
respondents agreed that ISPAT had a less transparent culture which is evident from the 
responses of R10 and R3 provided below;  
“Lot of difference. We were transparent, they were not.” 
“Management and employees are empowered, full faith and please work. Entire JSW is full 
glass house, no walls as JSW believes in 100% transparency. If there is any high-level meeting 
going on, then people outside know who are there, what is going on?” 
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To summarize, JSW’s culture was less process driven, but more professional, target oriented, 
transparent, innovative, risk taking and had a greater focus on employee and family 
relationships, which proved to be an ideal mix that symbolizes the culture of market leaders. 
JSW has been dominant and in the case of any cultural dilemmas, it has been very particular 
that its culture be followed by acquired firms. There were a few difficulties in the early stages 
of the merger, but eventually it went along willingly. 
An examination of the literature regarding different questionnaires is summarized on Table 15. 
Table 13: Dimensions of Culture Identified by Different Authors 
S.No. Authors Dimensions Identified 
1 
Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler, and 
Weick (1970) 
Job autonomy; structure; reward system; 
consideration, warmth and support. 
2 
James and James (1989) ; James 
and McIntyre (1996) ; James and 
Sells (1981) 
Role pressure and lack of harmony; leadership 
and support; job challenge and autonomy; co-
operation, friendliness and warmth. 
3 James and Jones (1974) Holistic perception of work environment. 
4 Payne and Mansfield (1978) 
Leader’s psychological 
distance, open-mindedness. 
5 Gavin and Howe (1975) Managerial trust and consideration. 
6 
Lawler, Hall, and Oldham (1974); 
Niehoff and Enz (1988) 
Risk orientation. 
7 
Schneider, Parkington, and Buxton 
(1980) 
Service quality. 
8 Joyce &Slocum (1979) Centrality. 
9 
Payne and Pheysey (1971) revised 
by Payne, Brown, 
and Gaston (1992) 
Concern for customer service, the impact of 
information quality, and ability to manage 
culture. 
10 Patterson et al. (2004) 
Human Relations-autonomy, supervisory 
support, involvement, Integration, Welfare, 
training, and effort; 
Internal Process- Tradition and Formalization; 
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Open Systems-Responsiveness, innovation and 
Flexibility, and Outward Focus; 
Rational Goal-Clarity of Organizational Goals, 
Pressure to Produce, Quality, Performance 
Feedback, and Efficiency. 
 
6.8.9 Organizational values 
As indicated in the research methodology, the researcher used the Organization Value Profiler 
(Trompenaars and Asser, 2010) to examine JSW’s organizational values.  
Participants’ responses showed that JSW had high scores across all aspects of the following 
four profile types. The variables for this re qualitative and descriptive 
1. Incubator (Person oriented) – allow people to grow.  
2. Family (Power oriented) – father figure “family head”. 
3. Eiffel tower (Role oriented)–it is built on trust and is role oriented. 
4. Guided missile (Task oriented) – focused work. 
The table below provides a summary of the scores given by respondents on the importance of 
various values to JSW. Table 16 demonstrates the scores for organizational characteristics.  
Table 14: Summary of Scores for Different Organizational Profiles and Characteristics. 
Profile type Segments Score Total Score 
Incubator 
Change/Flexibility 4.71 
4.48 Learning 4.29 
Customer Focus 4.43 
Family 
Relationships 4.71 
4.62 
Loyalty/Commitment 4.86 
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Teamwork 4.29 
Eiffel tower 
Corporate efficiency 4.71 
4.38 Structure 4.29 
Professional development 4.14 
Guided missile 
Shareholder value 4.86 
4.86 Task orientation 4.88 
Strategic alignment 4.86 
 
However, most respondents agreed that JSW is extremely focused which is the most dominant 
with the highest score, followed by Family profile and the other profiles. This indicates that 
JSW is highly task oriented and that all of its processes are aligned to corporate strategies. The 
company’s core ideology is to perform or perish, which is JSW’s business model. JSW’s 
attitude during the merger demonstrates its task oriented culture as it was very focused and 
aggressive, implementing an integration plan in three phases:  
1. Backward integration – Establishing coke, pallet and power plants to make the 
bottom-line healthy.  
2. Phase 1 expansion – Target of 5 M tonnes by Aug 2016. 
3. Phase 2 expansion – Target of 10 M tonnes by 2017-18. 
It also values relationships and teamwork among its employees. For instance, the Vijaynagar 
plant is associated with a township which is a fully-fledged city on its own, with 
accommodation for employees and family and all of the necessary facilities such as schools, 
hospitals, and recreation centres. JSW recognizes the value of its employees and believes that 
if their needs are taken care of, they will be highly committed and loyal to the organization. 
Further attributes of the organisation include change/flexibility and corporate efficiency. Most 
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respondents agreed that JSW is very dynamic and capable of making swift change because it is 
less process driven. As an excerpt from R10’s interview suggests; 
“Up to decision making, there is debate. Once the decision has been taken, there is no debate”. 
JSW has exhibited a high level of corporate efficiency with excellent performance standards in 
terms of corporate decision making and operational efficiency. It has also been successful in 
improving cost effectiveness and profitability through its resourceful synergy evaluation, 
expertise and optimization of processes. 
A graphical view of all the value profiles, with segments’ areas representing their scores, is 
represented as four quadrants shown in Figure 31. 
 
Figure 291: Organization Value Profile Assessment. 
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Thus, JSW has a mix of all values making them the ‘Market Leaders’ according to Trompenaars 
(2010). This suggests that JSW is a balanced organization that well suited to M&A’s and has 
the ability to address any associated challenges. 
6.8.10 Internal and external communication 
The nature of communication in the organization during the merger is examined with the help 
of interviews of the upper level managers.  
Communication to the employees about the merger 
The deal was finalized in 10 days in December 2010 and the decision was made at the corporate 
level, using an M&A team consisting of around 10 members. The team visited ISPAT’s Dolvi 
plant when ISPAT invited all interested firms to perform due-diligence for a potential 
acquisition. Only a select few members of upper management were aware of the deal. The rest 
were informed post-acquisition i.e. 21st December 2010. Up until this point, JSW was simply 
one of the firms competing for acquisition and the deal had not been finalized, hence there was 
no communication to the middle and front level management.  
However, transparency was maintained after the decision was made. According to R10; 
“No, we were very transparent. We called a joint press, we had called various analysts, and it 
was disclosed to the market. And we did a very detailed disclosure.” 
Shareholders / employees in favour or against the M&A 
During an acquisition, there are two distinct parties with different mind-sets – one is the 
acquiring firm. This had the upper hand and makes the majority of the key decisions, and the 
other is the acquired firm, which is usually apprehensive, dispirited and uncertain about its 
future.  From the company shareholder’s point of view, JSW was initially unsure but due to the 
Chairman’s vision, it went ahead with the deal. In ISPAT’s case, the shareholders had no option 
other than to agree to the deal as it was in huge debt.  JSW’s employees had mixed feelings 
about the deal, but they did not have any major issues. An excerpt from interview with R1 
revealed; 
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“JSW was very happy acquiring. If you need to go to Himachal/Shimla to a new plant, we will 
go happily. There will be new challenges and learning new things. Nobody resisted strongly 
about changing work places. In India, the family factor is the biggest fear. If we take care of 
these silly things, then it will be ok.” 
ISPAT’s employees were relieved as they were facing the uncertainty of unemployment due to 
their company’s financial crisis. Especially after the Chairman’s joint address of the companies 
at ISPAT’s Dolvi plant right after the merger. The JSW Chairman said he appreciated and 
trusted the talent and technological superiority of the company and its employees, and gave 
assurance that they will retain the entire workforce with the same salaries. This generated an 
increase in motivation and trust among ISPAT employees. 
This was clearly expressed in the interviews of R1, R2 and R3; 
“Most ISPAT employees and shareholders are in favour, as they will be financially secured 
with job security.” 
“100% because they knew it was sick. Salary was not even produced. So, they knew a better 
firm should acquire it. They were looking for Job security.” 
“100% in favour in ISPAT”. 
6.8.11 Human resources integration process at JSW merger 
HR integration is important in any merger or acquisition, as it is the human resource that is the 
most important asset in running the business and its mismanagement can result in failure of the 
M&A. A successful HR merger integration involves detailed planning and execution when 
assessing the employees, designing the new organizational structure, retaining the right people, 
aligning cultures and communicating effectively and more. The JSW and ISPAT integration 
had its own set of complications.  
Based on the responses of the upper managers, the entire HR integration process can be divided 
into three phases: 
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1. Assessment – A phase in which a complete assessment is carried out to gain a deeper 
understanding of the similarities and differences between the two companies in the 
following areas: 
a. Psychological issues of employees. 
b. Organizational structure. 
c. Staffing and selection. 
d. Talent management. 
e. Communication. 
f. HR policies and practices. 
g. Compensation and benefits practices. 
h. Union issues. 
2. Planning – After a complete assessment, an integration plan is developed, detailing the 
following: 
a. Challenges faced in the above areas. 
b. Corresponding solutions with an action plan. 
3. Execution –Some unexpected hiccups may crop up during execution and they will need to 
be addressed within a particular time frame. 
A complete picture of the effect of each of these phases in the case of the JSW and ISPAT 
merger has been elucidated based on the inputs from the upper level managers.  
Assessment 
From HR standpoint, the JSW management hired an external consultant who performed an 
overall assessment of both organizations, mapping out job grades, role titles, compensation and 
policies. In September 2011, this agency presented a report to the JSW senior management. 
Simultaneously, an assessment was carried out in-house by JSW this was conducted by a HR 
top executive from JSW Steel who was transferred to the ISPAT Dolvi plant for a year. An 
excerpt from the interview with the HR executive himself is given below:  
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“I spent 1 year at Dolvi from Dec 2012 to Nov 2013 and that was the time integration happened. 
I was sent there because I was involved in this process at the corporate level and I like dealing 
with people.” 
There were a few positive points associated with ISPAT practices and culture identified during 
the assessment that eased the HR integration. The first being continuity in production i.e. within 
15-20 days of the take-over in Dec 2010, the ISPAT plant started functioning with high (90%) 
productivity levels. Thus, the take-over did not hamper the morale of the ISPAT employees 
much, as highlighted by R8 in his interview; 
“The good thing that happened was I think within 15-20 days of acquisition, the plant started 
running. The production happened within 15 days. That’s a very good thing, gave positive vibes 
among employees and built confidence. That’s very true and one thing which made this possible 
was the quality of people at Dolvi.” 
Another advantage was the people management skills of the ISPAT workforce, which meant 
that the HR team did not have to focus much on talent management issues. 
Planning and execution challenges and solutions proposed by JSW upper level HR 
managers 
The planning phase had two major goals as discussed earlier;  
1)  the evaluation of key challenges identified during the assessment stage, and 
2)  Solutions to these challenges are determined and action plans are developed and 
executed.  
HR senior executives discussed the various challenges involved and proposed potential 
solutions, as detailed below. 
Challenge #1 – Employees’ Psychological issues  
This was an issue of primary concern for JSW as even a slight mismanagement of employees’ 
feelings during a takeover could be blown out of proportion and cause major problems. The 
JSW executives rightly judged this challenge and expressed upfront in the interview that;  
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“There are two companies; one is the one which is acquiring and the other one getting 
acquired. The mind-set of the employees of both companies is significantly different. Being in 
JSW Steel, I will be safe and if I am on the other side, I don’t know what will happen to me. 
That’s the biggest challenge.” 
From the JSW employees’ point of view, there was not much difference except a couple of 
concerns i.e. one was to get along with the new set of employees, the second being the 
possibility that a few of them might be transferred to the new plant. ISPAT employees, on the 
other hand, worried about their future when the deal was announced. They were doubtful of 
retention by JSW and even if retained, there was a concern about their status i.e. job title and 
salaries. 
Solution #1a – Improved communication by upper level management and the golden 
policy of complete retention of entire ISPAT workforce 
To overcome this challenge, the Chairmen of both JSW and ISPAT held a meeting right after 
the deal was finalized at the Dolvi plant and they jointly addressed the ISPAT employees. The 
JSW Chairman started the meeting by congratulating the team at Dolvi, appreciating that it had 
been in the steel industry for more than 25 years, and that no other plant in the world boasted 
such technology or levels of performance. Technology differences was also a challenge and this 
was a major obstacle to achieving the necessary synergies. A plant being closed for 2 months 
was up and running in ten days with 90% production and no other blast furnace could replicate 
this level of production. He gave credit to ISPAT’s employees, stating that the company’s 
success could not have been possible without their efforts. That helped to improve relationships 
with ISPAT employees, through appreciation and assurance of job and financial stability. He 
then pointed out the advantages at the Dolvi plant’s disposal such as its port based strategic 
location, and its three processes of steel making i.e. blast furnace, corex and DRI technology. 
Mr. Jindal then presented his vision and strategies for the future, including backward 
integration, addressing leakages and improving profitability. All of the senior executives 
interviewed in this study that this first meeting was the main driving force in the human resource 
integration of JSW and ISPAT. Here are a few excerpts; 
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“I think Mr. Jindal himself went and made a public announcement there about what is his vision 
and he gave an assurance that nobody needs to be worried. Nothing is going to happen to 
anybody. So that is a very big statement in that situation of acquisition.” 
“The mind-set of the employees of both companies is significantly different. Being in JSW Steel, 
I will be safe and if I am on the other side, I don’t know what will happen to me. That’s the 
biggest challenge. We could overcome this very easily through communication through top 
management.” 
Following the JSW Chairman’s speech, the ISPAT Chairman also addressed his employees, 
stating that JSW and ISPAT must reach for greater heights together and that “we are now 
joining hands with our big brother to go to a higher level”. He stressed that the plant and its 
people, which he has seen grow over the years, will go even further through the efforts of both 
companies. Crucially, he added that he was not departing but would contact communicating 
with all stakeholders. In the researcher’s opinion, this was essential as the ISPAT employees 
naturally gravitated towards their Chairman, and it would have been a difficult task to force 
them to switch their allegiance to JSW. 
These addresses played a key role in winning over the ISPAT employees and align them with 
the JSW mind-set, culture and operations.  
Solution #1b – HR upper level managers spending time with ISPAT employees 
Apart from the senior management assuring the ISPAT employees, it was very important that 
they understand people personally. Including, their culture, working style, conditions, 
expectations and opinions which is possible only through interactions and relationship building 
over a long time. As a result, a HR senior executive from JSW stayed in the ISPAT Dolvi plant 
for one year and worked with HR there, interacting with employees and establishing stronger 
bonds. The executive said; 
“When I went there, in the initial 15 days there was resistance from many employees there 
saying why has this person come, what is he going to do out here? I was put in the rest house 
here. But after 15 days, most of the senior people called and started talking to me, what is 
happening as far as our salaries are concerned, what is happening as far as our grades are 
concerned? So that was another thing which was good for our integration. But we didn’t do it 
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intentionally and it came naturally to most of the people, let’s treat them as part of the family 
itself so that there is no difference.” 
The key to success is that they went to the site, worked with employees in an enthusiastic and 
friendly manner, and genuinely listened to their opinions and concerns. This exercise allowed 
the HR executives to develop a rapport with the ISPAT employees. To facilitate this they 
decided to integrate the management of the two firms.   They transferred three ex-ISPAT HR 
members to the JSW plant.  
Challenge #2 – Obsession with job titles 
Interviews with staff revealed that Indian staff are generally most concerned about changes to 
their job title as a result of acquisitions. For example, if somebody is assigned to another 
person’s position or title, the individual and wider society will perceive this as a demotion. Job 
titles appear to be a status symbol in Indian society. Hence, the staffing and integration of teams 
and their roles was a big challenge in satisfying the expectations of all employees. 
Solution #2 – Build an indigenous HR model for integration of employees after thorough 
Analysis 
Following a detailed assessment, JSW’s HR executives created a model outlining different 
scenarios, what JSW could afford to change, what the business needed and what aspects of 
ISPAT could remain the same. There were issues such as the duplication of roles, mismatches 
in hierarchy and some new job titles that did not fit in the JSW organization structure. A 
duplication of roles occurred. For example, when there was a president of finance in both 
ISPAT and JSW; they could not have two presidents. The way JSW handled this issue depended 
on whether it deemed it necessary to retain him, or to let him go.  
The following scenario demonstrates how the model worked in practice. A problem arises at 
JSW which does not affect 90% of the employees, but affects the remaining 10%. The question 
becomes, how to identify these 10% of employees. One solution is that JSW would consider 
which people were important for the company in a timeframe of 3-5 years. The analysis 
indicated that most of the people were young and JSW decided to not change anything for them, 
especially their job titles. Thus, this approach enabled the company to satisfy around 90% of its 
employees, with only 10% needed to be tackled. For example, up to the level of General 
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Manager, there were no changes in job titles. In this way, JSW appeased the majority of its new 
employees. In essence, these employees would be coming to the same plant that they had been 
working at for 10 years, to the same job and salary, but under the new acquiring company. They 
maintained the benefit of job security and stable salary payments. The HR executives only had 
to deal on an individual basis   with the remaining 10%, this involved assigning job titles, roles 
and salaries for the remaining 10%.  
Challenge #3 – Attrition during takeover 
When the ISPAT steel plant closed down for two months, it faced suffered from attrition. The 
steel Industry in India had been booming, especially from 2010-11, so arresting attrition in 
ISPAT was one of the greatest challenges for JSW. 
Solution #3 – Strategy of complete retention of young employees with same compensation 
and benefits; few negotiations with senior management 
The attrition problem was also solved by the model solution proposed above. The policy 
involved retaining young graduate engineers with 2-3 years’ experience at any cost. It was a 
mammoth task to revive operations, for which many staff are needed, and to recruit new 
personnel from the market and to make them usable would require the expense of extensive 
training and is a time-consuming process. So, when people with the requisite skills were already 
available at ISPAT, JSW retained them under their current job titles and salaries. Only the 
senior employee’s job titles were affected and JSW managed this in an efficient manner. 
Challenge #4 – union issues in ISPAT 
ISPAT had a union for employees, while JSW did not.  
Solution #4 - No differentiation across different levels of employees – importance of equal 
treatment and employee satisfaction 
Unions were formed in India because the needs of the workers were not being met by the 
employer. JSW was not unionized and it maintained that there was no differentiation between 
employees and that they were treated equally within the company. JSW firmly believed that 
everybody’s needs had to be taken care of by JSW and did not trust in unionism. However, JSW 
allowed ISPAT to continue with their union. Currently around 45-50% of employees at ISPAT 
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belong to this union. They are authorized and have the rights to make their demands known, 
and conduct strikes. But that situation is yet to arise and JSW is confident that its primary 
responsibility to treat all its employees fairly will promote good industrial relations. This was 
clearly expressed by R8 who is the HR’s most senior executive;  
“Dealing with the union was not difficult. Today also, we have that union at Dolvi. 45-50% of 
people belong to that union. Till now, we have not seen any kind of resistance from the union. 
They are authorized because rights are given, but that situation is yet to arise. We as an 
organization believe in taking care of the people. We don’t allow individual needs to come up 
as an obstacle in our business. That’s how we managed the union also.” 
Challenge #5 – Law-suits, senior managers claiming constructive dismissals, unfair 
treatment during integration 
During a takeover, there are certain issues that some employees will cause while leaving the 
company. It is important to deal with these issues so that the reputation of the company is not 
diluted. 
Solution #5 – Fool proof system with competence and skill driven selection of employees 
JSW created an environment where employees were given the opportunity to prove their worth. 
If a person is capable, then the company would never ask anyone to go and there is no question 
of getting into legal litigation. But if somebody did not fit in the job profile, then the person 
would usually choose to leave. JSW’s philosophy is that it never asks anyone to leave. But there 
are certain criteria for which there is very high intolerance. For example, talking negatively 
about the company is unethical conduct. JSW is very stringent on issues of allegiance and 
loyalty. Otherwise, based on their competence or professional expertise, an individual is 
assigned particular line of work. Usually he/she is re-assigned to match their level of skill and 
competence. 
Table 17 presents a summary of the major challenges faced by JSW during the merger and the 
strategies used to ensure a smooth integration. 
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Table 15: HR Integration – Overview of Major Challenges and Strategies. 
No. Challenges Strategies adopted 
1 Psychological issues of 
employees 
Improved communication and assurances from 
senior management right after the takeover and 
retained the entire ISPAT workforce. 
HR senior executives spent a significant amount 
of time with ISPAT employees. 
2 Obsession with job titles 
Built an HR model for consolidation of employees 
after thorough analysis. 
3 Attrition during takeover 
Complete retention strategy for young employees 
with the same compensation and benefits; few 
negotiations with top management. 
4 Union issues in ISPAT 
No differentiation across different levels of 
employees – Equal treatment and employee 
satisfaction, so that no issues are raised by the 
union. 
5 
Lawsuits, senior managers 
claiming constructive 
dismissals, unfair treatment 
during integration 
A fool proof system with competence and skill 
driven selection of employees. 
Other standard procedures in the integration process 
1. Standardization of HR policies and practices – This is common practice during takeovers 
where the HR policies and patterns need to be adjusted to match the mother company. JSW 
diligently performed the same, and one of the strategies taken to alleviate the process was 
the transfer of employees, which helped to a large extent in terms of integration. As this 
extract from the interview with R8 reveals; “Some HR policies and practices were there at 
ISPAT which were employee friendly definitely, but we thought it was not a fair thing to do 
as per Indian laws. We said we will adopt only one approach; whatever is applicable to 
JSW Steel will be applicable to you. So, people said I do not want to lose out on my monthly 
money, we said we will take care of that. But we will not allow you to do something which 
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is not as per law. We said this is the standard practice across JSW for all grades, titles and 
all employees. We will apply this to you as well.” 
2. Standardization of compensation and benefits – Some of the standard compensation 
procedures at ISPAT relating to allowances and tax benefits were different. JSW retained 
the company’s employees, assuring them that they would receive the same salaries, but that 
it would have to standardize certain aspects in the compensation structure across all roles 
and job titles to avoid disparities across the new merged entity. R8 expressed some views 
on this issue; “Compensation and benefits practices - variable pay is related to the 
performance of the individual and performance of the company. In our pay-scale, the 
company’s performance has more weightage than the individual’s performance. In our 
scenario, we have given more weightage to the company’s performance. It is not a stated 
philosophy, but we believe that if we are capable of paying people, we will pay, irrespective 
of how the market is doing, how the industry is doing, what the individual is looking for. 
Ultimately, our goal is if the company has the capability to pay, we will pay but the quantum 
of payment will depend on the performance of company and individual.” HR integration is 
one of the most crucial aspects of a takeover and can go horribly wrong if new strategies 
and plans are not accepted by the employees. Only when everyone is satisfied can this work 
efficiently and ensure that the deal is a success. JSW did exactly the right things to appease 
employees and integration went smoothly. It was the attitude and task orientation of the 
JSW HR executives that made them confident of success. When asked how difficult this 
process was, one interviewee confidently stated- “This was not that difficult. The moment 
you decide - this has to be done, it has to be done. And if you are very clear and convinced 
that you are not doing something unfair, everything looks simple and easy.” 
6.8.12 Competitors for the deal 
The other companies competing with JSW to acquire include TATA Steel, Essar Steel, and 
Arcelor Mittal. They had been interested in a merger with ISPAT and they had even taken who 
part in the due-diligence before JSW. This process was lasted for around 6 months and teams 
from all of the top Indian steel companies were visiting the ISPAT plant for due-diligence. 
When the others failed to strike a deal, JSW finally entered the fray and finalized the deal in 
December 2010. 
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6.8.13  Timeline of the merger 
The ISPAT takeover was announced by JSW on 21st December 2010. The merging process 
started soon after this and it took 6 months to align the attitudes of the workers. It took around 
two years to integrate the operations of both companies during which time ISPAT functioned 
separately. In April 2013, the complete merger of JSW Steel and JSW ISPAT Steel was 
completed and was effective from June 2013. 
6.9 Role of Speed 
The importance of the speed of implementation on M&A requires certainly warrants further 
exploration. For example, is speed always good or are there only certain conditions under which 
it should be attempted? The complete integration process was completed within 12 days in late 
December, 2010. This was the first time in the history of M&A in India that integration was 
completed in such a short time. This gives rise to many issues. Is it prudent to have such a short 
time? If we carefully examine the process of trying to get ISPAT started long before by Jindal 
group and all the strengths and weaknesses are well studied. Since both ISPAT and JSW were 
operating as competitors, serving similar markets, the information is available with JSW. It is 
therefore appropriate to examine the literature on the speed of the post integration process. 
6.10 Evaluation of the success of the JSW-ISPAT merger 
The JSW and ISPAT merger was one of a kind in the Indian steel industry, and the speed and 
efficiency with which the entire process was planned and executed is commendable. This was 
unanimously expressed by all the senior executives from JSW and ex-ISPAT who were actively 
involved in the process. Figure 32 shows the score given by the upper managers for the quality 
of integration and the success of the merger. 
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Figure 30: Success and Quality of Merger – Overall Scores. 
In terms of the overall integration, it was quickly able to achieving financial, technical and 
marketing integration due to the pure expertise and work excellence of JSW. HR integration, 
which is obviously a long-term process that I still ongoing, has been managed very well. JSW 
had a clear vision of expansion and improving profitability, and accurately identified the gaps 
in ISPAT which have been one of the motivations for the merger. Whatever were the synergy 
opportunities, JSW has been able to convert them to reality with profitability. They were 
successful in achieving backward integration and raising ISPAT’s Dolvi plant to the quality of 
JSW’s plant, and with its associated tax and market benefits, the EBITA of the ISPAT plant is 
now higher than JSW’s. However, a few executives noted that there was some delay in 
achieving the defined objectives due to certain unexpected issues, such as banks increasing their 
interest rates which reduced the profit margins, unfavourable government regulations in 
Karnataka that made it difficult to harness iron-ore, and delays in achieving backward 
integration. Ultimately, it is clear to the researcher that the merger’s objectives were 
successfully achieved, with a huge expansion in the new entity’s capabilities.   
6.11 Critical reasons for the positive outcome 
Certain factors were driving forces in the success of this merger, and the upper level managers 
interviewed highlighted a few of them: – 
a) Clear vision and planning – JSW implemented a philosophy of perform or perish, and 
this was possible only because of the visionary attitude of the JSW Chairman. It was he 
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who identified ISPAT as a potential option, converted the deal, and framed an 
aggressive strategy with an integration plan. Finally, the execution of the plan was 
efficient and this made ensured that the merger process was relatively smooth. 
b) The strategic location of the ISPAT plant - located in Dolvi, Maharashtra, which is based 
by the sea-shore with its own private port, adjacent to the national highway. This plant 
provided tax benefits for selling in Maharashtra and was close to India’s largest steel 
market, Mumbai. 
c) Marketing and logistic strategy – Integrating the marketing divisions of both plants 
helped to eliminate any marketing overlaps, expanding the geographical footprint of the 
combined JSW-ISPAT, reducing the logistics and distribution costs. This all had the 
aims of serving more customers more efficiently with higher profitability. 
d) Transforming ISPAT’s Dolvi plant and making it as good as the Vijaynagar plant – The 
backward integration plan included setting up a power plant, coke oven plant, pallet 
plant and railway siding for cheaper, uninterrupted transportation converted Dolvi into 
an integrated plant with its own captive power plant, minimal wastage. The impact of 
this was an improvement in EBITA and per tonne profitability, even higher than that of 
the Vijaynagar plant. 
e) Future expansion plans– JSW aspires to be one of India’s largest steel producers and 
has accordingly set up plans to expand its production capacity in two phases. 
Phase 1: Target of 5 M tonnes by August 2016.MPhase 2: Target of 10 M tonnes by 2017-18. 
6.12 Areas that required more focus 
When asked if there was room for improvement or greater focus, the upper managers made the 
following observations: 
a) Accommodation of employees; JSW has a township associated with its Vijaynagar plant 
for its employees. Here staff members and their families have schools, hospitals, and 
recreation centres. Which is one of the main factors that develops bonding and loyalty. 
JSW also intends to build a similar township for the Dolvi plant. 
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b) Negotiation with the lenders could have been handled better. 
c) Human resources integration – There was no focus on HR during the deal and it was 
considered only post-merger. 
d) Dolvi is a very compact plant. JSW’s vision is to enlarge its production capacity from 
3.3 M to 15 M tonnes, but land for expansion was is a problem. During the deal, there 
should have been an assessment of the expansion area in Dolvi. Now, JSW is struggling 
with that aspect and more focus could have been placed on land availability and 
acquisition. 
e) There were problems in port development at the Dolvi. The port is not sufficient for 
expanded plant capacities which, was another challenge. 
JSW is currently addressing these issues and has recently taken over Welspun, which is a DRI 
plant located about 40 km from the Dolvi plant. Wels pun has a land mass of about 1000 acres 
with an associated port. To solve the port size constraints, JSW has planned to use its own 
Jaigad port which is 125 miles from the Dolvi plant, where huge barges landing will be 
transported as smaller barges to the Dolvi port.  
Thus, it is clear that JSW has evaluated all of the synergies involved and can expect future 
synergy arising from port, gas, and land availability (i.e. Jaigad port, the acquisition of Welspun 
land and backward integration). JSW now has the sufficiency and is hopeful to achieve its target 
of 15 M tonnes of production capacity and become the largest steel producer in the country.  
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  CHAPTER 7 – DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION-
QUANTITATIVE 
The outcome of the qualitative research forms the foundation for conducting study of 
employee’s perception of merger success. This data is supplemented by some quantitative data 
and analysis in order to understand the motivations for a merger and its successful execution. 
Quantitative data and analysis on the following are provided. What factors in the perception of 
employees have given rise to success in the form of organizational fit? What are the factors that 
lead to merger success? These are the questions addressed in this chapter.  
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This part of the research consists of showing a financial analysis and then analysing the 
questionnaire responses obtained from front-line managers. The data collected comprises 
personal information (qualitative attributes) and quantitative data in the form of scores from 1 
– 5 on a Likert scale. 
7.1 Financial analysis 
JSW Steel Ltd. has been one of the fastest growing entities in the Indian Steel sector, becoming 
India’s largest private sector steel company in a decade. This growth is clearly reflected in its 
financials. 
Operating Profit - Operating Profit provides an indication of the current operational 
profitability of the business, but once expenses have been removed, the company’s performance 
can be skewed. The OP in 2014 (post-merger) increased by 39%, indicating that the merged 
entity has been performing well (Figure 33).  
 
Figure 31: Operating profit trend of JSW Steel 
Net Sales - Sales i.e. the total number of products or services sold by the company have been 
increasing with an average annual growth of 27% over the past five years (Figure 34). 
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Figure 324: Net Sales trend of JSW Steel 
Total Assets and Asset Turnover Ratio - Total Assets is the sum of all assets, current and fixed. 
JSW Steel had a 60% increase in Total assets post-merger compared to 2012. JSW ISPAT Steel 
has been incorporated into JSW Steel post-merger leading to this huge increases in total assets. 
The asset turnover ratio measures the ability of a company to use its assets to efficiently 
generate sales. A higher ratio indicates that the company is utilizing all of its assets efficiently 
to generate sales. The asset turnover ratio has seen a hike since 2012 at around 1.06 (Figure 35). 
 
Figure 335: Assets and Asset turnover ratio trends of JSW Steel 
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Net Worth - Net worth is the difference between a company's total assets and its total liabilities. 
It is also known as the shareholder`s equity, which has been steadily increasing over the years 
with a huge jump of 77% in 2011. The Net worth of ISPAT Steel has been stagnant over the 
years due to its declining total assets over the past five years (Figure 36). 
 
Figure 346: Comparison of Net Worth trends of JSW and ISPAT Steel 
7.2 Exploratory data analysis of the Quantitative Attributes 
The questionnaire data obtained from the employees consists of an outline of their profile that 
includes the date they joined the firm, their department, monthly income and educational 
background. These variables have been briefly explained below; 
a) Years of service – This has been calculated using the date the employee joined the 
organisation. It ensured that only employees who had enough experience (joined before 
2010) were administered the questionnaire. The service tenures of both JSW and ISPAT 
employees are summarized in the graphs below: 
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Figure 37 shows that 86.5% of the employees who participated in the survey had 4-9 years of 
experience. 
 
Figure 357: Frequency chart of Years of Service of JSW Middle Managers. 
The date of joining for the ex-ISPAT employees (who are now part of the JSW group) is related 
to their years of experience with ISPAT. Almost 90% of the employees taking part in the survey 
had an experience ranging from 4-9 years (Figure 38). 
 
Figure 368: Frequency chart of Years of Service of ex-ISPAT Middle Managers. 
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b) Department – Approximately 58% of the employees taking part in the survey belonged to 
the production, R&D and sales departments (Figure 39). 
 
Figure 379: Frequency chart of the Department of JSW Middle Managers.  
      
Figure 40: Frequency chart of Department of ex-ISPAT Middle Managers. 
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c) Educational background – Almost 90% of the middle managers were graduates while the 
rest were post-graduates. All of the ex-ISPAT employees were surveyed who are now part 
of JSW were graduates. 
d) Monthly income – From figures 41 and 42, the salary structure of both JSW and ISPAT 
were almost identical with nearly 90% of the employees falling in the range of Rs. 30,000-
60,000. Only 8% of the employees earned more than Rs. 60,000.  
 
Figure 381: Frequency chart of Monthly Salary of JSW Middle Managers. 
 
 
Figure 392: Frequency chart of Monthly Salary of ex-ISPAT Middle Managers. 
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Thus, the basic profiling of the qualitative attributes measured shows that the surveyed middle 
managers were mostly graduates with service tenures ranging from 4-9 years and monthly 
incomes ranging from Rs. 30,000 to 60,000. 
The research includes an assessment of the attitude and behaviour of the middle and front level 
management after the change in the structure, culture, policies and procedures, post-merger. It 
is vital that the senior management creates an atmosphere that minimizes trouble, apprehension 
and mental stress in the employees. Employees are regarded as critical assets by both JSW and 
ISPAT and one of the objectives of this study is to evaluate the change in employees’ attitude 
and level of satisfaction after the merger.  
This chapter presents an analysis of the data collected from middle and front level employees 
through a questionnaire. The chapter provides a reliability analysis followed by an empirical 
analysis that includes descriptive statistics, correlations and t-tests.  
Strategic fit and organizational fit and their relationship with Inter-organizational alignment. 
1. Strategic fit of the organization was analysed using qualitative interviews with the upper 
level management of JSW (consisting of both ISPAT and JSW employees).  
2. In order to investigate issues relating to organizational fit, front-line managers were studied 
using quantitative questionnaires. 
The 5 constructs liable for change that need to be addressed in the context of M&A are the 
following: 
• Structure  
• Responsibility  
• Standards 
• Conflicts 
• Identity 
They further impact: 
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• Organizational culture 
• Job satisfaction 
• Organizational commitment 
Organizational culture, job satisfaction and organizational commitment have further sub 
constructs, which also play a significant role in alignment. Discussion on organizational fit is 
necessary to develop hypotheses.  
JSW and ISPAT were from the same industry but with different levels of technology and 
management style. Should JSW have allowed ISPAT to continue with its own management 
style and still be part of the merged entity, or should it have opted for total integration? If there 
are excessive conflicts, this may lead to less than optimum performance. Hayes (1979) argued 
that organizations with very different management styles can work effectively together after an 
acquisition if the interaction is limited, as in situations of low post-acquisition integration.  
The researcher developed the following hypotheses: 
1. The alignment between the business dimensions at ISPAT has increased after merger. 
2. The alignment between the business dimensions at JSW has improved after merger. 
3. The alignment between the business dimensions for ISPAT and JSW after merger should 
be ideally identical if not almost equal. 
7.3 Reliability analysis 
The reliability analysis is devised specifically to ensure that all the items are indicators of the 
same property. It tests the internal consistency of a data set and how closely the items are related 
to each other. The Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient ranges between 0 and 1 where values 
close to 1 show a greater internal consistency. As a general rule of thumb, a value above 0.70 
is considered a high level of consistency. Tables 18 and 19 summarize the Cronbach’s alpha 
reliability coefficients JSW employees.  
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Table 168: A Summary of Cronbach’s Reliability Coefficients of JSW Employee data 
  Factors Before Merger After Merger 
    Structure 0.87 0.86 
   Responsibility 0.86 0.84 
   Standards 0.86 0.84 
   Conflict 0.67 0.62 
    Identity 0.79 0.79 
Organizational Culture 
Before Merger - 0.96 
After Merger - 0.97 
Teamwork 0.69 0.65 
Warmth 0.69 0.69 
Support 0.83 0.82 
Innovative Spirits 0.84 0.86 
Risk 0.80 0.81 
Service Quality 0.87 0.89 
Employee 
Working 
Attitudes 
Before 
Merger - 
0.94 
After 
Merger - 
0.95 
Job satisfaction 
Before Merger - 
0.91 
After Merger - 
0.93 
Self-actualization 0.71 0.79 
Recognition 0.72 0.80 
Rational Awards system 0.72 0.69 
Reward 0.72 0.74 
Organizational 
Commitment 
Before Merger - 
0.87 
After Merger - 
0.88 
   
Emotional Commitment 0.69 0.79 
Continuous Commitment 0.83 0.80 
  Merger Success  0.68 
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Table 17: A Summary of Cronbach’s Reliability Coefficients of ex-ISPAT employee data 
 
  Factors Before Merger After Merger 
    Structure 0.81 0.87 
   Responsibility 0.77 0.85 
   Standards 0.88 0.82 
   Conflict 0.80 0.61 
    Identity 0.62 0.82 
Organizational Culture 
Before Merger – 0.98 
After Merger - 0.98 
Teamwork 0.67 0.79 
Warmth 0.82 0.66 
Support 0.67 0.82 
Innovative Spirits 0.86 0.83 
Risk 0.71 0.84 
Service Quality 0.88 0.89 
Employee 
Working 
Attitudes 
Before 
Merger - 
0.98 
After 
Merger - 
0.98 
Job 
satisfaction 
Before Merger 
- 0.97 
After Merger - 
0.97 
Self-actualization 0.85 0.81 
Recognition 0.73 0.80 
Rational Awards system 0.75 0.70 
Reward 
0.74 0.72 
Organizational 
Commitment 
Before Merger 
- 0.95 
After Merger - 
0.93 
 
  
Emotional Commitment 0.68 0.68 
Continuous Commitment 
0.71 0.85 
  Merger Success 
 
0.68 
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The above reliability analysis highlights that the surveyed individuals of the two entities may 
not always be senior enough to respond reliably to all the questions in the instrument. This was 
evident in certain factors (i.e. teamwork) alpha scores are low and marginally acceptable. As 
such, the study used a robustness analysis across more experienced employees (i.e. 6 years and 
above) and higher salaries (i.e. 40,000 and above) to improve reliability scores and increase 
confidence in the results.  
Furthermore, drilling down the data with respect to higher salary and longer service increased 
the Cronbach alpha to .98 before merger and .91 after merger. Table 20 and 21 represents it   
Table 18: Cronbach Alpha calculation for respondents with greater than 6 years’ service and 
salary more than 40000 per month before merger 
ANOVA 
      
Source of 
Variation 
SS df MS F P-
value 
F crit 
Rows 3960.121 121 32.72827 58.95993 0 1.221978 
Columns 1833.188 94 19.502 35.13282 0 1.252809 
Error 6313.633 11374 0.555093 
   
Total 12106.94 11589         
The Cronbach 
Alpha  
0.983039 
     
 
Table 19: Cronbach Alpha calculation for respondents with greater than 6 years’ service and 
salary more than 40000 per month after merger 
ANOVA 
      
Source of 
Variation 
SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Rows 612.5805 121 5.062649 12.17735 7.3E-
163 
1.229395 
Columns 491.4744 16 30.71715 73.88495 7.9E-
187 
1.648736 
Error 804.8785 1936 0.415743 
   
Total 1908.933 2073          
Cronbach 
Alpha  
 
 1-(.415743/5.062649) 
 
   
0.91788 
   
The results demonstrate the reliability of data has increased when taking the higher salary at 
more than 40,000 per month with greater than 6 years of service as evident from the increase in 
the reliability coefficients.   
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7.4 Empirical analysis 
The questionnaire consists of both positive and negative statements, all of which have been 
rated on a Likert scale of 1 to 5. In order to group the data for the statistical analysis, the 
responses for statements of a negative character have been negated and converted to (6 - i), 
where i is the response for the negative statement. 
Descriptive	statistics	
This analysis focuses on the simple comparison between the means of the factors before and 
after the merger i.e. to check if there is any change in these factors after the merger as stated by 
JSW and ex-ISPAT employees currently in JSW. Higher values indicate more positive 
responses. Then the differences are tested using paired samples T-test, where the null 
hypothesis is that the difference between means before and after the merger is zero. 
 
Figure 403: Mean values of Variables across Organizational and Attitudinal Dimensions 
(JSW). 
Figure 43 showed that the JSW employees felt that there was a considerable increase in the 
working standards, which might be due to collaboration and with work becoming highly process 
and standards driven. One such example of improvement in standards was the effective use of 
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SAP technology from ISPAT to centralize budgetary control and inventory systems, which 
improved cost-effectiveness and efficiency. Other cultural dimensions which increased 
significantly after the merger were innovative spirit and risk taking. The service quality 
provided to customers certainly improved due to the increased geographical footprint following 
expansion, which helped JSW to cater to customers’ needs at a lower cost. JSW employees felt 
that there was a boost in recognition and self-actualization, leading to higher levels of 
commitment as employees were proud to be part of one of the largest steel companies in India. 
 
Figure 414: Mean Values of Variables across Organizational and Attitudinal Dimensions (ex-
ISPAT). 
Figure 44 shows that from the ex-ISPAT employees’ perspective, the integration process has 
been very rewarding and satisfying as they were assured by the JSW senior management for 
complete retention and the same compensation. This alleviated any sense of apprehension and 
this, combined with effective HR integration, meant that employees were given greater 
responsibility, better recognition and improved or at least maintained their sense of identity. 
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Table 20: Differences after and before merger for ISPAT 
 
Table 22 shows that there were improvements in the perception of before and after the merger 
in every measure except standards. The JSW strategy of low cost and market leadership has led 
to a slight reduction in standards. It is perceived that there were higher standards at ISPAT. 
Figure 44 provides a visual illustration of the information provided in Table 22.  
 
Figure 42: Dimensions that influenced Success before and after Merger (ISPAT) 
 
After Merger Before Merger Difference
Structure 3.69 2.68 1.01
Responsibility 3.72 2.16 1.56
Standards 3.71 3.82 -0.11
Conflict 3.11 2.61 0.5
Identity 4.1 2.65 1.45
Organizational culture 3.72 2.99 0.72
Job satisfaction 3.25 2.92 0.33
Organizational commitment 3.47 2.66 0.81
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Table 213: Paired Samples T-Test for Dimensions that Contribute to Merger Success of 
ISPAT Employees. 
  
A paired samples t-test was conducted on ISPAT employees which indicated that there is a 
statistically significant difference of ISPAT employees after merger of the two entities due to 
the merger (P<0.001 for all of the differences) (Table 23). Since these factors have been 
established as statistically significant at 5% significance level, it is important to examine the 
relationship between these variables and the merger success.  
7.5 Regression analysis of merger success with different variables  
A linear regression model was constructed where merger success was the dependent variable 
and the variables that reached statistical significance on table 24 namely structure, 
responsibility, standards, identity, conflict, organizational culture, job satisfaction and 
organizational commitment were the independent ones. Merger success, based on several 
questions including efficiency, synergies, common organizational culture and a smooth 
transition to a unified organisation. 
Lower	 Upper	
Structure	 1.01	 0.562	 0.028	 -1.0632	 -0.95	 35.28	 386	 0	
Responsibility	 1.56	 0.55	 0.03	 -1.6153	 -1.50	 55.03	 386	 0	
Standards	 -0.11	 0.59	 0.03	 0.0505	 0.17	 -3.628	 386	 0	
Conflict	 0.5	 0.68	 0.03	 -0.57	 -0.43	 -14.37	 386	 0	
Organizational 	
Culture	 0.72	 0.44	 0.02	 -0.76	 -0.68	 -32.17	 386	 0	
 Job satisfaction	 0.33	 0.40	 0.021	 -0.37	 -0.30	 -16.23	 386	 0	
Organizational 	
Commitment	 0.81	 0.43	 0.022	 -0.86	 -0.76	 -36.55	 386	 0	
Paired Differences	
T	 df	 Sig. (2-	tailed)	Dimensions  	 Mean	 Std. 	Deviation	 Std. Error 	Mean	
95% Confidence 	
Interval of the 	
Difference	
 
 
[186] 
 
Model Summary 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 
.822a .676 .67 .46 .67 98.76 8 378 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Organizational commitment, Conflict, Identity, Responsibility, 
Standards, Structure, Job satisfaction, Organizational Culture. 
The R square value indicates that 67.6% of the variance is explained by different variables.  
ANOVAb 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 168.73 8 21.09 98.76 .000a 
Residual 80.72 378 .214   
Total 249.47 386    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Organizational commitment, Conflict, Identity, Responsibility, 
Standards, Structure, Job satisfaction, Organizational Culture 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
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Table 22: Coefficients of Regression Equation of Merger Success with respect to Different 
Dimensions of ISPAT Employees After Merger.    
 
Thus, merger success may be given in the following equation where Y(MS) ISPAT represents 
the merger as perceived by the employees of ISPAT.    
Structure, organizational culture and organizational commitment were the only statistically 
significant at 5% level. The significance of the variables is justified by the fact that the 
interviews with the upper level management of JSW-ISPAT regarding their management 
strategy, followed a more centralized structure, influencing different dimensions of 
organizational culture. The impact of organizational commitment on merger success is 
considerable as ISPAT was experiencing accumulated losses. The commitment shown by JSW 
employees was higher that it was expected. Both organizational culture and organizational 
commitment contained sub variables requiring further analysis. Organizational culture consists 
of six dimensions. A comparison of the dimensions of the organizational culture before and 
after the merger for ISPAT Employees is presented on Table 25 and Figure 45. 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -0.19 0.405 -0.47 0.639
Structure 0.241 0.084 0.213 2.86 0.004
Responsibility 0.022 0.077 0.019 0.283 0.777
Standards 0.055 0.076 0.049 0.727 0.468
Conflict -0.024 0.066 -0.017 -0.37 0.711
Identity 0.033 0.074 0.026 0.448 0.654
Organizational 
Culture 0.35 0.153 0.259 2.288 0.023
Job satisfaction 0.18 0.13 0.126 1.38 0.168
Organizational 
commitment 0.233 0.114 0.156 2.048 0.041
Model
Unstandardized Coefficients
t Sig.
1
 Dependent Variable: Merger Success
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Table 235: Dimensions of Organizational Culture (ISPAT) after and before Merger  
Dimensions of Organizational 
Culture 
After Before 
Difference 
Teamwork 3.673 2.671 1.003 
Warmth 2.869 3.411 -0.54 
Support 3.689 2.625 1.064 
Innovative Spirits 3.676 3.379 0.298 
Risk 4.0837 2.162 1.922 
Service Quality 4.086 3.389 0.697 
 
 
Figure 436: Organizational Culture Dimensions for ISPAT Employees after Merger 
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Table 25: Paired Samples T-Test for Dimensions of Organization Culture (ISPAT) 
 
Different dimensions of organizational culture have shown improvement since the merger. The 
risk-taking dimension increased for the employees during the merger compared to the time prior 
to the M&A. Team work and support showed improvement, while customer service quality was 
also perceived to have increased. However, participants felt that there was less warmth in the 
new organization which might be attributed to the change of environment and to change in the 
way that the company operates but also due to the stress that change can cause to employees. 
Table 25 showed that all of the differences were statistically significant at 5% significance level.  Organizational	commitment	has	two	dimensions,	emotional	and	continuous,	both	of	them	improved	to	a	statistically	significant	level.	However,	continuous	commitment	increased	more	than	the	emotional	commitment	after	the	merger	because	the	level	of	desire	and	devotion	 of	 ISPAT	 employees	 have	 increased	 dramatically	 due	 to	 confidence	 and	assurance	of	sustainable	future	and	this	result	was	supported	by	the	t-test	outcome.	The	results	 shown	below	 indicate	 significant	 changes	 in	 continuous	 commitment	 after	 the	merger.	
Lower Upper
Teamwork 1 0.60532 0.03077 -1.064 -0.943 -32.6 386 0
Warmth -0.54 0.67583 0.03435 0.4746 0.61 15.78 386 0
Support 1.06 0.62274 0.03166 -1.126 -1 -33.615 386 0
Innovative 
Sprits 0.3 0.63816 0.03244 -0.361 -0.234 -9.174 386 0
Risk 1.92 0.55887 0.02841 -1.978 -1.867 -67.653 386 0
Service Quality 0.7 0.57078 0.02901 -0.755 -0.641 -24.046 386 0
Paired Differences
T df Sig. (2-tailed)Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
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Table 26 and Figure 46 show the dimension of commitment. It illustrates the means of 
emotional and continuous commitment. There is then a comparison between the means for 
continuous and emotional commitment in ISPAT on Table 28.  
Table 24: Dimensions of Commitment (ISPAT) after and before Merger 
Dimensions of Commitment After Merger Before Merger 
Emotional Commitment 2.87 2.67 
Continuous Commitment 4.07 2.65 
 
Figure 447: Dimensions of Commitment (ISPAT) 
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Table 25: Paired Samples T-Test for Dimensions of Emotional Commitment (ISPAT) 
 
Job satisfaction has four dimensions, self-actualization, recognition, rational award system and 
reward. Self-actualization improved by 0.13 (Table 28). The job dimensions are also presented 
graphically on Figure 48. However, the other three dimensions were reduced after the merger 
because the ISPAT employees felt inferior to the JSW reward systems and that was indicated 
by the T-Test results on Table 29. 
Table 28: Dimensions of Job satisfaction (ISPAT)  after and before Merger 
 
After Merger  Before Merger  
Self-actualization 3.83 3.7 
Recognition 2.63 3.69 
Rational Awards system  2.66 2.88 
Reward 2.65 2.87 
  Paired Differences 
t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
  
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
  Lower Upper 
Emotional 
Commitment  
-0.22 0.52 0.03 -0.27 -0.17 -8.3 386.00 0.00 
Continuous 
Commitment  
-1.40 0.56 0.03 -1.46 -1.35 
-
49.0 
386.00 0.00 
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Figure 458: Dimensions of Job Satisfaction (ISPAT) 
 
Table 26: Paired Samples T-Test for Dimensions of Job Satisfaction (ISPAT) 
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Lower Upper
Self-actualization 0.132 0.597 0.03 0.072 0.191 4.345 386 0
Recognition -1.058 0.62 0.032 -1.12 -0.996 -33.598 386 0
Rational Awards system -0.221 0.48 0.024 -0.269 -0.173 -9.076 386 0
Reward -0.22 0.518 0.026 -0.272 -0.169 -8.374 386 0
Paired Differences
t df
Sig. (2-
tailed)
Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
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Table 27: Differences After and Before Merger for JSW 
 
Before 
Merger  
After 
Merger  
Difference  
Structure 3.71 3.87 0.16 
Responsibility 3.71 3.85 0.14 
Standards 3.70 4.22 0.52 
Conflict 3.59 3.54 -0.05 
Identity 3.71 4.21 0.50 
Organizational Culture  3.47 3.83 0.36 
Job satisfaction  2.89 3.38 0.49 
Organizational Commitment  3.31 4.03 0.72 
 
From table 30 we can discern that for the JSW employees, all the dimensions (except conflict) 
have improved after merger.   This can be explained in part by the fact that prior to the merger 
there was a degree of uncertainty. This could have impacted on issues such as identify, job 
satisfaction etc. After the successful merger there was greater certainty and clarity, and this 
could have had a material impact on the findings.  Organizational commitment showed the 
highest change, because employees were feeling better after the merger, as they theoretically 
were in the case of a successful merger. Once the new entity has been established there was less 
fear and uncertainty. The information provided in Table 30 is also shown graphical in Figure 
49. 
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Figure 469: Dimensions that influenced Success before and after Merger (JSW)  
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Table 31: Paired Samples T-Test for Dimensions that Contribute to Merger Success of JSW 
Employees. 
 
All of the dimensions were statistically significant (as the value of the 2-tailed test is less than 
.05) expect for conflict which was borderline significant at 5% significance level (P=0.057) 
(Table 31).  
In order to assess whether the factors collectively affect the merger success, linear regression 
was used. A regression model was built where the perception of merger success was the 
Lower Upper
 Structure -0.163 0.576 0.029 -0.221 -0.11 -5.601 391 0
Responsibility  -0.134 0.571 0.029 -0.191 -0.08 -4.66 391 0
 Standards -0.514 0.629 0.032 -0.577 -0.45 -16.19 391 0
Conflict 0.053 0.548 0.028 -0.002 0.107 1.91 391 0.057
Identity -0.492 0.68 0.034 -0.56 -0.43 -14.32 391 0
Organizational Culture  -0.36 0.444 0.022 -0.404 -0.32 -16.03 391 0
 Job satisfaction -0.483 0.382 0.019 -0.521 -0.45 -25.01 391 0
Organizational 
Commitment -0.267 0.444 0.022 -0.311 -0.22 -11.88 391 0
Paired Differences
t df
Sig. (2-
tailed)
Mean
Std. 
Deviation
Std. 
Error 
Mean
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
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dependent variable and all the other variables were considered independent variables. The 
results from the model are presented on Table 30. 
Regression equation of different dimensions contributing to merger success model of JSW 
Model Summary 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .842a .693 .687 .3879532 .693 108.037 8 383 .000 1.937 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Organizational commitment, Conflict, Identity, Responsibility, 
Standards, Structure, Job satisfaction, Organizational culture 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger success 
The R square value indicates that 68.7% of the variation in the data is explained by the variables 
given as predictors.  
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 130.083 8 16.260 108.037 .000a 
Residual 57.644 383 .151   
Total 187.728 391    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Organizational commitment, Conflict, Identity, Responsibility, 
Standards, Structure, Job satisfaction, Organizational culture. 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success. 
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Table 282: Coefficients of Regression Equation of Merger Success   with respect to Different 
Dimensions of JSW Employees.   
 
The regression equation may be expressed in the following form. YMS (JSW) represents the 
equation relating to the merger success as perceived by employees of JSW.   
YMS (JSW) = (constant).296+ (structure).083x1+ (responsibility).053x2+ (standards).105x3+ 
(conflict) (-1.03) x (indemnity) 4+.034x5+ (organizational culture).463x6+ (organizational 
culture).162x7+ (job satisfaction), 144x8 
Table 32 shows that organizational culture was the only variable that was found to be 
statistically significant showing that if its score increases, the merger success will also increase 
holding the rest of the variables constant (P=0.003). Conflict was found to be borderline 
significant (P=0.053). The evidence indicates that organizational culture is an important 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 0.296 0.369 0.802 0.423
Structure 0.083 0.072 0.081 1.152 0.25
Responsibility 0.053 0.067 0.053 0.794 0.428
Standards 0.105 0.082 0.082 1.285 0.199
Conflict -0.103 0.054 -0.08 -1.92 0.053
Identity 0.034 0.071 0.028 0.479 0.632
Organizational Culture 0.463 0.155 0.323 2.985 0.003
Job satisfaction 0.162 0.101 0.128 1.597 0.111
Organizational commitment 0.144 0.09 0.119 1.597 0.111
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
1
Dependent Variable: Merger Success
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variable that needs to be managed if a merger is to succeed. Differences in culture can act as a 
barrier to the creation of a new organisation and even prevent the achievement of synergies.  
Organizational culture consists of six dimensions. They are presented in Table 33, a 
Comparison of Dimensions of Organizational Culture before and after the merger for JSW 
Employees. 
Table 293: Dimensions of Organizational Culture (JSW) after and before Merger 
 
 
Figure 50: Organizational Culture Dimensions for JSW Employees after Merger 
All dimensions of organizational culture have shown improvement since the merger (Table 33). 
Before Merger After Merger 
Teamwork 2.89 3
Warmth 2.88 2.94
Support 3.71 4.22
Innovative Spirits 3.72 4.19
Risk 3.71 4.18
Service Quality 3.73 4.18
2.892.88
3.713.72
3.713.73
3.002.94
4.224.19
4.184.18
0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50Teamwork
WarmthSupport
Innovative	SpiritsRisk
Service	Quality
Differenct	Dimensions	of	Cuture	Before	and	After	Merger	(JSW)
After	Merger Before	Merger
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7.6 Independent sample t-tests 
This analysis focuses on examining the differences between the JSW and ex-ISPAT employees 
regarding the various dimensions that affected the merger’s success. The differences are tested 
using Independent sample t-test where the null hypothesis is that there is no difference in the 
factors between the JSW and ISPAT. Although both sets of employees were almost aligned on 
this issue with lower absolute mean differences, Table 34 shows these differences were 
statistically significant at 0.05 level.  
Table 30: Comparison of Factors using t-test - JSW vs. ISPAT after Merger 
Factors with significant difference t values Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Structure 3.61 <0.001*** 0.18 
Responsibility 2.63 .009** 0.13 
Standards 11.09 <0.001*** 0.50 
Conflict 10.84 <0.001*** 0.42 
Identity 2.51 .012** 0.11 
Organizational Culture 3.04 .002** 0.12 
Job Satisfaction 3.21 .001** 0.13 
Organizational Commitment 13.92 <0.001 *** 0.56 
Merger Success 3.81 <0.001*** 0.20 
Note: The symbols *, ** and *** indicate that the differences are statistically significant at 
levels of 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 respectively. 
 
 
[200] 
 
7.7 Differences in evaluation system  
The performance of the company will be negatively impacted by the differences in reward and 
evaluation systems particularly if high degree of integration is required between the two merged 
entities. The negative impact is due to lower morale amongst managers and employees for 
adopting a system that is inferior to their own. The management of the merged entity needs to 
address this by removing any differences and to bring consistency in the reward and evaluations 
system. This may require the company to spend more money, but ultimately, the company needs 
to achieve a high degree of alignment and integration. However, companies may choose to keep 
their own reward and evaluation systems if the acquisition does not require a high level of 
alignment and integration therefore allowing the acquired firm to remain autonomous. 
The performance of the company will be negatively impacted by the differences in reward and 
evaluation systems particularly if high degree of integration is required between the two merged 
entities (Table 35). 
Table 315: T- Test of ISPAT and JSW Before and After Merger  
 
Description of the analysis: 
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A linear regression model was built for ISPAT, JSW and the combined entity against 8 
constructs that have an impact on merger success. The results showed that organization culture, 
structure and organization commitment were statistically significant (P<0.05). The null 
hypothesis that all eight constructs have no effect on merger success was rejected. Three of the 
constructs have statistically significant impacts on merger success.  
Monthly salary and years of service are likely to be mediating and/or moderating variables. 
Considering the data across the eight departments in both entities on organizational culture, 
organizational commitment and structure may provide further insights. Monthly salary and 
number of years are considered as mediating variables for all departments individually for 
ISPAT and JSW (for all the eight variables). However, the inclusion of these variables did not 
materially impact on the findings. The full summary of these models is in Appendix 3. 
ISPAT  
Role of moderation: The attitude of employees of ISPAT (after merger) with respect to different 
dimensions of eight variables are tested for moderation by salary and years of service on 
organizational culture, organizational commitment and structure. Salary and years of service in 
Sales Department impacted merger success with organizational culture and structure (for more 
information see Appendix 3). This aspect is proved by the fact that JSW has started JSW 
SHOPPE, the only one of its kind in the world, where steel is directly sold to the customer. 
Salary and years of service in Production Department impacted merger success with 
organisational commitment. This may be explained by the fact that both of them are having 
different technologies. While ISPAT had Corex; JSW utilized a different technology.  
JSW  
Role of moderation: Regression analysis was used for JSW after merger. Salary and years of 
service were the moderating variables on organizational culture, organizational commitment 
and structure. Only years of service in the Service Department impacted merger success with 
organizational culture (for more information see Appendix 3). This could be attributed to the 
fact that the more the years of service, the better imbibing of organizational culture and service 
department in the organization.  
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ISPAT-JSW combined entity 
Role of moderation: Regression analysis was performed for JSW (combined) after merger. 
Salary and years of service were the moderating variables on organizational culture, 
organizational commitment and structure (for more information see Appendix 3).  
Years of service in the Service Department impacted merger success with organizational culture 
and structure.  
Salary in the Production and Sales Departments impacted merger success with organizational 
commitment. 
Sales and Production are the largest departments in both of the organizations. JSW opened 
SHOIPPEs which is one of the world’s first initiative to take the steel products to the customer. 
Production departments of both companies have addressed the technological differences 
effectively as ISPAT is having Corex technology and JSW has a different technology. The key 
departments that contributed to the merger success are sales, production and services. The 
organisational distance between the two steel plants was measured by identifying the means of 
all 8 constructs i.e. structure, responsibility, standards, conflict, identity, org culture, job 
satisfaction and org commitment based on all 8 departments i.e. Accounting, Others, 
Outsources, Production, Quality Assurance, R&D, Sales, and Service for each steel plant before 
merger and the same thing for both plants combined after merger. The results are presented in 
the tables 36-38 and clearly show that the organisational distance was larger prior to the merger. 
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Table 326: Department wise scores of different variables (JSW-before merger) 
 
Table 37: Department wise scores of different variables (ISPAT-before merger) 
 
JSW Departments Structure Responsibility Standards Conflict Identity Organization Culture
Job 
Satisfaction
Organizational 
Commitment
Accounting 3.78 3.73 3.76 3.55 3.78 3.54 2.92 3.4
Others 4.11 4.18 4.26 3.25 4.07 3.82 3.18 3.74
Outsources 3.81 3.83 3.78 3.52 3.88 3.58 2.95 3.4
Production 3.66 3.65 3.72 3.59 3.65 3.48 2.88 3.28
Quality Assurance 3.69 3.69 3.68 3.64 3.8 3.45 2.9 3.32
R&D 3.69 3.76 3.74 3.57 3.71 3.47 2.93 3.34
Sales 3.69 3.7 3.61 3.62 3.62 3.42 2.84 3.24
Service 3.57 3.52 3.44 3.78 3.55 3.28 2.76 3.13
Average 3.75 3.76 3.75 3.56 3.76 3.5 2.92 3.36
ISPAT Departments Structure Responsibility Standards Conflict Identity Organization culture
Job 
Satisfaction
Organizational 
Commitment
Accounting 2.73 2.25 3.95 2.53 2.75 3.07 3.02 2.75
Others 2.73 2.09 4.03 2.54 2.54 3.07 3.01 2.6
Outsources 2.68 2.13 3.76 2.8 2.6 2.92 2.84 2.58
Production 2.65 2.12 3.77 2.66 2.59 2.95 2.88 2.62
Quality Assurance 2.67 2.15 3.86 2.49 2.76 3.06 2.95 2.74
R&D 2.78 2.24 3.87 2.56 2.68 3.06 2.98 2.7
Sales 2.53 2.1 3.68 2.69 2.57 2.89 2.81 2.59
Service 2.77 2.15 3.87 2.55 2.73 3 2.92 2.73
Average 2.69 2.15 3.85 2.6 2.65 3 2.92 2.66
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Table 33: The Distance between different variables across departments before merger  
Distance between 
ISPAT & JSW 
before merger
Structure Responsibility Standards Conflict Identity
Organization 
culture
Job 
Satisfaction
Organizational 
Commitment
Accounting -1.05 -1.49 0.19 -1.02 -1.03 -0.47 0.1 -0.65
Others -1.38 -2.1 -0.24 -0.71 -1.53 -0.75 -0.17 -1.15
Outsources -1.13 -1.71 -0.02 -0.71 -1.28 -0.66 -0.11 -0.81
Production -1.01 -1.53 0.05 -0.93 -1.06 -0.53 0.01 -0.67
Quality Assurance -1.02 -1.54 0.18 -1.15 -1.05 -0.39 0.05 -0.58
R&D -0.91 -1.52 0.13 -1.01 -1.03 -0.41 0.05 -0.64
Sales -1.16 -1.6 0.08 -0.93 -1.05 -0.53 -0.03 -0.66
Service -0.8 -1.37 0.43 -1.23 -0.83 -0.28 0.16 -0.4
Average -1.06 -1.61 0.1 -0.96 -1.11 -0.5 0.01 -0.69
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In order to see the effect of the proximity between the two companies prior to merger, to the 
success after merger, the means for all 8 constructs by department were calculated, and the 
difference between the two companies for the same construct by department were analysed and 
ran the regression on company success after the merger. The analysis was performed in the 
following steps and respective observations are noted. 
Step (1 and 2) 
The means of the 8 constructs within the departments for ISPAT and JSW before merger were 
calculated, and in order to compare them ANOVA test was used. The results for both ISPAT 
and JSW are shown in tables 39 and 40. There are no differences between the various 
departments within any of the eight constructs (P-value>0.05 in all of the cases) (tables 39 and 
40). It can be concluded that there was uniformity among all the employees in their perception 
before the merger within departments. 
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Table 39: ANOVA table for ISPAT and JSW with respect to all departments 
 
 
 
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
Between Groups 2.448 7 0.35 1.163 0.323
Within Groups 113.96 379 0.301
Total 116.408 386
Between Groups 1.257 7 0.18 0.617 0.742
Within Groups 110.226 379 0.291
Total 111.483 386
Between Groups 3.281 7 0.469 1.028 0.411
Within Groups 172.882 379 0.456
Total 176.163 386
Between Groups 3.117 7 0.445 0.686 0.684
Within Groups 245.993 379 0.649
Total 249.11 386
Between Groups 2.271 7 0.324 1.026 0.412
Within Groups 119.855 379 0.316
Total 122.126 386
Between Groups 1.727 7 0.247 0.67 0.697
Within Groups 139.491 379 0.368
Total 141.218 386
Between Groups 1.921 7 0.274 0.965 0.456
Within Groups 107.726 379 0.284
Total 109.646 386
Between Groups 1.68 7 0.24 0.919 0.492
Within Groups 99.001 379 0.261
Total 100.681 386
Organizational 
commitment before 
and after merger 
Responsibility before 
and after merger 
Standards before 
and after merger 
Conflict before and 
after merger 
Identity before and 
after merger 
Organizational 
commitment before 
and after merger 
Job satisfaction 
before and after 
merger
ANOVA
Structure before and 
after merger 
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Table 34: ANOVA table for JSW before merger (Groups are defined as the 8 departments) 
 		
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
Between Groups 2.542 7 0.363 0.69 0.681
Within Groups 202.163 384 0.526
Total 204.705 391
Between Groups 3.697 7 0.528 0.979 0.446
Within Groups 207.119 384 0.539
Total 210.816 391
Between Groups 5.098 7 0.728 1.239 0.28
Within Groups 225.743 384 0.588
Total 230.841 391
Between Groups 2.211 7 0.316 0.923 0.488
Within Groups 131.375 384 0.342
Total 133.585 391
Between Groups 4.278 7 0.611 1.027 0.411
Within Groups 228.436 384 0.595
Total 232.714 391
Between Groups 2.73 7 0.39 0.988 0.439
Within Groups 151.548 384 0.395
Total 154.278 391
Between Groups 1.569 7 0.224 0.93 0.483
Within Groups 92.591 384 0.241
Total 94.161 391
Between Groups 3.194 7 0.456 1.182 0.312
Within Groups 148.245 384 0.386
Total 151.438 391
Identity
Organizational 
culture 
Job satisfaction 
Organizational 
commitment 
ANOVA of JSW
Structure
Responsibility
Standards
Conflicts
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Step (3) 
The means and the absolute differences between all eight constructs for all 8 departments for 
the two entities are presented in Table 41. 
Table 35: Levels and differences between IPSAT and JSW by department  
 
 
Thereafter the differences are tested to find whether they are significant using a two-way 
ANOVA test.  
 
JSW (before Merger) Structure Responsibility Standards Conflict Identity Organization Culture
Job 
Satisfaction
Organizational 
Commitment
Accounting 3.784 3.732 3.758 3.55 3.775 3.543 2.919 3.395
Others 4.107 4.183 4.261 3.25 4.071 3.815 3.175 3.742
Outsources 3.811 3.833 3.779 3.517 3.877 3.582 2.951 3.397
Production 3.659 3.647 3.72 3.593 3.648 3.48 2.877 3.28
Quality Assurance 3.692 3.693 3.677 3.64 3.802 3.449 2.897 3.322
R&D 3.694 3.76 3.74 3.57 3.712 3.469 2.933 3.339
Sales 3.694 3.695 3.606 3.619 3.615 3.417 2.835 3.244
Service 3.57 3.52 3.44 3.78 3.55 3.277 2.756 3.128
Average 3.751375 3.757875 3.747625 3.564875 3.75625 3.504 2.917875 3.355875
ISPAT (before Merger) Structure Responsibility Standards Conflict Identity Organization culture
Job 
Satisfaction
Organizational 
Commitment
Accounting 2.7309 2.2453 3.945 2.527 2.75 3.069 3.019 2.75
Others 2.731 2.085 4.025 2.537 2.537 3.069 3.006 2.595
Outsources 2.681 2.1255 3.757 2.803 2.598 2.919 2.838 2.584
Production 2.645 2.121 3.767 2.664 2.585 2.949 2.884 2.615
Quality Assurance 2.673 2.149 3.857 2.487 2.756 3.058 2.946 2.743
R&D 2.784 2.241 3.873 2.564 2.681 3.056 2.981 2.704
Sales 2.531 2.098 3.684 2.686 2.568 2.892 2.806 2.589
Service 2.774 2.152 3.87 2.548 2.725 3.001 2.919 2.729
Average 2.693738 2.1521 3.84725 2.602 2.65 3.001625 2.924875 2.663625
Difference ISPAT JVS. 
JSW Structure Responsibility Standards Conflict Identity
Organization 
culture
Job 
Satisfaction
Organizational 
Commitment
Accounting -1.0531 -1.4867 0.187 -1.023 -1.025 -0.474 0.1 -0.645
Others -1.376 -2.098 -0.236 -0.713 -1.534 -0.746 -0.169 -1.147
Outsources -1.13 -1.7075 -0.022 -0.714 -1.279 -0.663 -0.113 -0.813
Production -1.014 -1.526 0.047 -0.929 -1.063 -0.531 0.007 -0.665
Quality Assurance -1.019 -1.544 0.18 -1.153 -1.046 -0.391 0.049 -0.579
R&D -0.91 -1.519 0.133 -1.006 -1.031 -0.413 0.048 -0.635
Sales -1.163 -1.597 0.078 -0.933 -1.047 -0.525 -0.029 -0.655
Service -0.796 -1.368 0.43 -1.232 -0.825 -0.276 0.163 -0.399
Average -1.05764 -1.60578 0.099625 -0.96288 -1.10625 -0.50238 0.007 -0.69225
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Step (4) 
In order to determine the impact of different departments on merger success within each 
construct, linear regression models were constructed for after the merger. In the first model the 
“Merger Success” was the dependent variable and the departments was the independent variable 
in the first model. The primary five constructs (Structure, Responsibility, Standards, Conflict, 
and Identity) were added as independent variables to the second model. The third model 
contained departments, primary constructs, and secondary constructs (Organizational Culture, 
Job Satisfaction and Organizational Commitment). The models are summarized on Table 42. 
For more information about the models see Appendix 2. 
The results indicate that department classification has no impact on merger success. 
Table 36: Model comparisons 
 
The five primary constructs are found to be most important in capturing the variation in the 
merger success. It was observed that they are significant on their own. However, when the other 
Model Summaryd 
Mo
del 
R R 
Squar
e 
Adjuste
d R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics Durbin-
Watson R 
Square 
Chang
e 
F 
Change 
df
1 
df2 Sig. F 
Change 
1 .039a .002 .000 .7565197 .002 1.177 1 777 .278  
2 .817b .668 .665 .4377144 .666 309.805 5 772 .000  
3 .830c .688 .684 .4249866 .020 16.644 3 769 .000 2.028 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Recoded Dept 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Recoded Dept, Identity, Conflict, Standards, Responsibility, 
Structure 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Recoded Dept, Identity, Conflict, Standards, Responsibility, 
Structure, Organizational commitment, Job satisfaction, Organizational Culture 
d. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 	
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three variables were added (organizational culture, job satisfaction and organizational 
commitment) there was a significant improvement in prediction, but the significance of 
individual coefficients changed.  In the third model, the organizational culture, job satisfaction 
and organizational commitment are significant and only structure from the primary variable 
remains significant. This indicates that organizational culture, job satisfaction and 
organizational commitment are the factors most likely to play a mediating role. 
Step (5) 
The absolute differences from the t-test results were used to run a regression of 5 constructs, 
namely structure, responsibility, standards, conflict and identity against the dependent variable 
of merger success, none of which were significant.	This analysis allows to determine whether 
a person seeing change in the company, as opposed to observing a certain level of quality, 
influences their view of the merger’s success. 
Step (6) 
The absolute differences from Table 38 were used to run a regression of the 3 constructs, namely 
organizational culture, job satisfaction and organizational commitment, against the dependent 
variable of merger success. Organisational culture was the only variable that had a significant 
effect. 
Step (7 – 9) 
The absolute differences from Table 38 were used to run a regression of the 5 constructs. These 
include structure, responsibility, standards, conflict and identity with the following different 
dependent variables: 
Organizational culture as the dependent variable, none of which were significant. 
Job satisfaction as the dependent variable, out of which only standards was significant. 
Organizational commitment as the dependent variable, none of which were significant. 
7.8 Correlation analysis 
The correlation analysis shows how closely different factors relate to each other, however, it 
does not guarantee any kind of causal relationship. Correlation coefficient values closer to 1 or 
-1 indicate a perfect correlation and 0 indicates no correlation. Table 43 presents the results from 
the Pearson correlation. 
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Table 373: Paired Pearson Correlation Coefficients (r) – JSW and ISPAT after Merger 
r Values 
M
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O
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C
om
m
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Merger Success 1 .780** .752** .735** -.530** .717
** .813** .789** .750** 
Structure  1 .857** .795** -.601** .781
** .895** .889** .818** 
Responsibility   1 .776** -.590** .779
** .882** .875** .789** 
Standards    1 -.440** .760
** .860** .809** .848** 
Conflict     1 -.534** 
-
.615** 
-
.637** 
-
.421** 
Identity      1 .863** .797** .761** 
Org Culture       1 .915** .850** 
Job Satisfaction        1 .839** 
Org Commitment         1 
Note: The symbol ** denotes that the correlation coefficient is statistically significant at the 
0.01 level (2-tailed) 
As shown in the table, there is a strong positive correlation between merger success and other 
variables with the exception of conflict. This indicates that the lack of significance for 
coefficients on some of the constructs in regression is a result of controlling for the other 
constructs. When each construct is considered separately, the relationship is significant. When 
they are all considered together, some are not. This point’s, broadly, to an underlying belief that 
the company is doing well, which shows up in both the belief about the merger success and in 
many of the constructs. 
The merger success of JSW may be expressed from a financial perspective as the financial 
results did indicate a short-term profit due to economies of scale and tax concessions. The 
researcher was also able to confirm merger success by asking a question to the employees on 
merger success and to rate its success on a Likert scale of 1-5.  
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There was documentation of success by different academic institutions, including that of Ivey 
League case studies published on JSW Steel Ltd: A Logistics Dilemma by Amol S. Dhaigude, 
Debmallya Chatterjee, Vishnu Kumar and JSW Steel: Shared Value at Vijayanagar Steel Plant 
by Sandeep Goyal, Amit Kapoor, Wilfried Aulbur published by Harvard Business Review 
which reinforces the argument of the researcher that the merger was a success. The organization 
is also open to academic studies and published work on its technology as given by different 
researchers such as Kumar, Gupta & Ranjan (2008), Uma Devi, Karthik, Mahapatra, Prabhu, 
& Ranjan, (2012) Uma Devi, Brahmacharyulu, Mahapatra, & Prabhu, (2014) and  Hubmer, 
Weiss, & Desai (2017). These studies made employees aware about the merger and its success. 
These evidences indicate that employees have grasped the intricacies of merger success and 
may be safely hypothesized to indicate their attitude in a single variable. However, it is still a 
limitation of the study and should be addressed in future research.  
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   CHAPTER 8 – DESCRIPTION OF THE STEPS 
This chapter provides a summary of the case study with a detailed discussion of the process of 
integration and organizational alignment between the two organizations. This is followed by 
the development of a theoretical model based on the case analysis. The chapter also presents 
concluding remarks with recommendations for improving inter-organizational integration 
during M&A. 
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8.1 Merger integration process 
The integration process during a merger involves a complex set of activities to achieve 
organizational alignment of both firms. This section highlights the sequence of activities during 
integration along with the various challenges faced and solutions employed to overcome them. 
Based on the extensive qualitative and quantitative analysis of this single case study of the JSW-
ISPAT merger, a comprehensive framework for the M&A Integration process has been outlined 
with a comprehensive outline of the sequence of activities in the merger process. 
8.1.1 Tracking the acquiring/target company for sufficient time period 
It is the groundwork you do that matters the most. The top management needs to have a 
thorough knowledge of the industry and the target company it is planning to merge with or 
acquire. The company ought to have in-house experts that are knowledgeable about the target 
firm and industry to make trusted decisions. A lack of familiarity and information can 
compromise an organisation’s ability to make the correct decision with regards to mergers. JSW 
Steel had been following ISPAT Industries for years and was aware of their financial situation. 
Being in the same business was a huge advantage, as it was easy for JSW Steel to compare its 
own efficient integrated Steel making processes with ISPAT's to identify the gaps and potential 
areas for improvement in ISPAT. 
8.1.2 Strike when the iron is hot 
As famously quoted by Andy S. Grove, "There is at least one point in the history of any 
company when you have to change dramatically to rise to the next level of performance. Miss 
that moment - and you start to decline" (Grove 1996). Like choosing the right target is critical, 
it is even trivial to choose the right time to make the deal; else it is likely that there is 
misjudgement in the estimation of the valuation and future benefits. A very stable target can 
cost you more while a loss making company on the verge of extinction can be an easy catch, 
but there is also a lot of competition to acquire such companies. 
In this case study, ISPAT Industries was debt laden and would get diluted if it does not find a 
way out. At this point, all of the top Steel companies were invited for due-diligence. JSW Steel 
finally came in after ISPAT's failed transactions with a few other companies. Thus, JSW Steel 
chose the right time and target, which allowed it to effectively negotiate and strike a deal. 
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8.1.3 Choose your best men to seal the deal - M&A team 
This is the team that makes all of the important decisions that are related to due-diligence, 
negotiations, setting merger goals and strategy and finalizing the deal. Hence, it is imperative 
to choose the best and trustworthy resources for the main business and to provide them to the 
merger team. This selection criterion is very adaptive and can vary depending on the scale, 
region, industry and needs of the situation. However, on a general note across all types of 
business, it is wise to select these resources characterized by enormous experience in the same 
industry and preferably in M&A, closer and in good sink with the top management, excellent 
communication and negotiation skills and have some legal and financial background.  
In the case of the JSW-ISPAT merger, the M&A team comprised around 10-12 members of the 
JSW’s upper management from the Vijaynagar plant, who were the best in-house experts in the 
Steel business. In addition JSW hired some legal and financial advisors for the initial stages as 
the legal aspect is the most vital of all and a legally entangled company with regulatory issues, 
litigations, outstanding loans, and land and property cases. Is not preferable. Hence, JSW felt 
the legal and financial aspects of the merger were the most important, followed by marketing, 
technical and then HR. 
The post-merger phase begins with the formation of an integrated steering team, which is the 
highest managerial level responsible for the integration process. This team generally consists 
of upper managers from both companies along with experts and operative heads from all 
departments. In order to effectively handle key tasks, the team should be small, flexible and 
adaptable. Based on the company’s vision and long-term goals, this team creates objectives, 
both short-term and long-term to achieve organizational targets subjected to the timeline. It is 
also responsible for the delegation of authority and targets to middle management and providing 
guidance, motivation, support and resources to employees to perform their designated tasks. 
Finally, it follows up on the company’s progress, revising plans and setting deadlines where 
necessary.  
JSW had a small Integration team that acted as a mediator between the upper management level 
and middle management. This team received directions from the top and formulated an action 
plan for middle managers to accomplish the company’s goals. They were also tasked with the 
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involve alignment of operations across all departments like marketing, finance, production, 
logistics, and HR. 
8.1.4 Due-diligence 
This formal investigation or audit of the target company was the most important step in M&A. 
It is the responsibility of the acquirer to perform a thorough check of the target company which 
includes evaluating its legal status, finances and liabilities, valuation, assets, market presence, 
location, and human resources. Likewise, it is the duty of the target company to disclose all 
necessary details to the acquirer during this process. Apart from the evaluation of the existing 
essentials, it is important to evaluate the synergistic impact of the merged entity. This means 
that the combination of both organizations across all departments should result in a more 
effective organization than the previous individual organizations. The key is to prepare a 
comprehensive due-diligence report covering all of the pre-requisites: 
1. Company history 
2. Legal and financial status 
3. Location and assets - land, buildings, plant, ports and other properties 
4. Market valuation and brand 
5. Production/technical processes and capacity 
6. Product profiles 
7. Marketing, logistics and supply chain 
8. Procurement and delivery 
9. Research, innovation and developments 
10. Human resources 
11. Customer details 
12. Synergy evaluation on how well the two firms complement across all above aspects  
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13. Estimated synergistic impact and future benefits 
Producing a proper due-diligence report is one way to prevent unnecessary dilemmas, conflicts 
or harm to either parties involved in the transaction. It is generally worthwhile to go ahead with 
the deal if there is considerable payoff and cost savings due to the alliance. 
JSW's M&A team carried out due-diligence in ISPAT's Dolvi plant in Dec 2010 for around ten 
days, after which the deal was finalized. Its prior background knowledge about ISPAT helped 
JSW to speedily seal the deal. The issues that JSW was most interested in investigating were 
the legal status, assets and location of ISPAT. The other key parameters were market presence, 
financial aspects like valuation, turnover and liabilities. Human resources were viewed as the 
least important and it was decided that the HR integration be dealt with in the post-merger phase 
because JSW was aware of its technical superiority and managerial excellence of the ISPAT 
workforce and had decided to completely retain them without any change. Despite a decent job 
in due-diligence part, few in JSW management believe that it could have been better if they had 
gotten more time for better negotiations and avoiding over-estimation of ISPAT's enterprise 
value. 
8.1.5 Definition of new corporate strategy for the new entity 
Once the due-diligence has been completed, the acquirer must study all of the key details about 
its target such as its strengths, weaknesses, gaps, opportunities and synergistic impact. Hence, 
the next step is to set up a new corporate strategy for the merged entity that provides direction 
to achieve success in the long term. This involves establishing a vision and goals for the new 
organization. The corporate strategy is pivotal and is developed by the top chiefs, who take a 
big picture view of the organization and its position in the market and the environment. It is 
considered best practice now a days to have flexible strategies to adapt to volatile market 
changes. It is important to set up the vision and goals of the merged enterprise allocate its budget 
and resources along with a timeline to track the progress. The vision is a desirable future that 
an organization aspires to achieve over time. Goals are strategic or performance objectives 
established by the management to outline expected outcomes and provide guidance, facilitate 
planning, motivate and inspire employees and help organizations evaluate and control 
performance. Organizations only need to have one clear vision with goals, varying at all levels 
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and across hierarchies and departments. A good strategy helps a company to make decisions 
that look at the "big picture". 
JSW Steel followed a similar path by setting up a clear vision and goals for the merger. For 
JSW, it was Mr. Sajjan Jindal, who led from the front visualizing JSW as the leading Steel 
manufacturer in India and the World. In line with his vision, clear goals were set up soon after 
due-diligence which included three phase expansion plans. The first phase involved backward 
integration in ISPAT's Dolvi plant to make it an integrated Steel plant as well as the Vijaynagar 
plant. The next phases included plans to expand and achieve a production capacity of 5 M 
tonnes by Aug 2016 and 10 M tonnes by 2017-18.  
"Good business leaders, create a vision, articulate the vision, passionately own the vision, and 
relentlessly drive it to completion."- A statement written on the walls of JSW.  
JSW had a spark in the form of Mr. Sajjan Jindal, who has been a true leader and extremely 
target oriented, which ISPAT clearly lacked. 
8.1.6 Communication 
Every merger involves a high degree of communication and co-operation between the 
management and employees of both organizations. After due-diligence and the development of 
the vision and goals, the next step is to share the full details of the deal. There are two levels of 
communication - external and internal. External communication consists of formal press 
releases and public announcements to the market, shareholders, investors, government bodies 
and the general public, disclosing the deal and merger details. Internal communication is 
equally important, i.e. the way you communicate to the employees of both companies. 
Employees are the most critical resources any organization possess and therefore need to be 
handled diligently. It is natural for merger syndrome to creep in i.e. an emotional state of fear 
and apprehension about the future among the employees’ due to changes as a result of the 
merger. Effective and open communication is the key to avoiding issues arising out of fear and 
lack of trust. A message should be conveyed across all levels and departments to maintain 
uniformity. It is also advisable to carry out internal communication prior to or at the same time 
as the external so that the entire organization has been kept informed before news gets out. 
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JSW too followed a systematic communication in both organizations, especially in ISPAT was 
the Chairmen of both the companies. He conducted a joint meeting for all the ISPAT employees 
and gave them assurance that there will be complete retention and no changes which allayed 
their fears and paved way for a smooth transition. In addition, JSW issued a press release and 
made a public announcement right after the merger deal in December 2010 and made a complete 
disclosure. JSW always believed in openness and communicability, which has is one of the 
catalysts to accelerating the merger progress and avoiding miscommunication, spreading bad 
news, subjective assessments and gossip which damages employees’ spirit and morale. 
8.1.7 Integration planning process and execution 
This consists of two different processes: 
1. HR integration and culture alignment - Organizational fit 
2. Organization operations alignment - Strategic fit 
8.1.7.1  Organizational re-structuring, HR and cultural alignment 
This process presents a major test for the organizational and cultural fit of the merged 
organization. It involves the following tasks: 
Human resource integration: The employees are the bloodline of any organization and their 
satisfaction is the driving force behind any M&A. Most M&As fail due to poor handling of 
human resources. The HR integration process consists of a spectrum of activities and its 
unreliability and non-measurability due to the involvement of human assets makes it a 
challenging task. The process involves dealing with the psychological issues of employees, 
organizational re-structuring, staffing and selection, attrition problems, talent management, 
aligning HR policies and practices, and union issues. In general, there is no single solution or 
technique to manage HR integration during M&As. It is highly dependent on an organization’s 
industry type, size, scale, and location. However, one of the keys JSW’s success is that it gave 
ISPAT employees complete assurance that there would be a complete retention of employees 
and no change in their compensation which satisfied them, allayed their fears and helped to kick 
start production in full swing.  
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Handling merger syndrome i.e. employees’ psychological issues - Effective communication 
and assurance by top management right after the deal. The joint meeting of both JSW and 
ISPAT Chairmen at Dolvi plant with its employees sent the message of brotherhood and the 
JSW's golden policy of complete retention of ISPAT workforce with complete trust and pride 
was the ultimate strategy. Also, the JSW HR top executives pulled up their socks and got into 
the groundwork by spending almost a year with ISPAT employees in 2011. There were some 
initial hiccups and resistance, but ultimately employees realized that JSW was sincere in its 
attempts to preserve goodwill. 
Forming a new organization structure and staffing for the merged entity: Based on the type and 
scale of an M&A, this can be achieved either by dissolving the existing structure, forming a 
new one or by assuming the existing structure with modifications that accommodate the target 
company. JSW retained its previous structure and hierarchy, but also incorporated the top 
managers and employees from ISPAT, placing them in suitable positions. For the first two 
years, JSW did not change its middle and top-level employees as this would directly affect their 
morale and productivity. But, there were changes ought to be made at higher level due to issues 
like, duplication of roles, mismatch in top hierarchy, positions and job titles. JSW hired a 
consultant who analysed the entire HR scenario in JSW, ISPAT and provided their inputs. JSW 
too built an indigenous model to deal with the various scenarios and make the right decision 
whether to retain or let go, if retain then which job title. 
Union issues – Unlike JSW, ISPAT had a union containing almost 45% of its workforce. 
However, JSW did not change its union culture as it felt that this was a form of differentiation 
between employees, which could lead to unequal treatment of employees based on their place 
in the company hierarchy. JSW believes that this is the most egalitarian approach policy and 
hence there have been no union issues till date after merger. 
Organization culture alignment: An organization’s culture is a fundamental part of its identity, 
particularly its unique set of shared values, attitudes, beliefs and customs. The collaboration of 
two different cultures is the most critical aspect of the integration process during an M&A. 
Employees experience a culture shock which can cause minor issues and differences to be 
blown out of proportion, leading to conflict and high levels of stress. Such an environment is 
not conducive to progress and, thus, it is crucial that a company identifies and handles cultural 
clashes by gaining a greater understanding of individual cultures and value profiles. 
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JSW and ISPAT had different cultures before merger and as we have culture is an important 
issue in M&A. JSW’s culture can be described as more professional, highly target oriented, 
committed and innovative with a focus on employee and family relationships. ISPAT, on the 
other hand was more process driven and highly structured with less of an emphasis on, 
flexibility and risk taking, and a greater focus on employee development. Thus, ISPAT 
organizational culture is the predominant one Based on the Eiffel tower value profile with high 
degree of formalization, inflexibility, employees' professional development, and control 
through rules, procedures and respect for authority. By contrast, JSW had a mix of all four 
cultures i.e. task, person, power and role with task culture. It has adopted the Guided missile, 
approach being the most pre-dominant and the role culture i.e. Eiffel tower being the least. 
Certain traits from each culture have been observed such as:  
Task and projected oriented - Task culture (Guided Missile) 
Leaning, customer focus, flexibility - Person culture (Incubator) 
Centralized, commitment, relationships - Power culture (Family) 
Corporate efficiency - Role culture (Eiffel tower) 
JSW, being the acquiring firm and invests in ISPAT was influential and particularly about its 
home culture being pursued unconditionally. And, this interest in maintaining the original 
culture worked out for JSW because it came as a saviour for ISPAT and hence ISPAT 
employees were satisfied and compromising on this aspect. Another reason for the low cultural 
friction between these organizations was the complete retention of the ISPAT workforce at the 
Dolvi plant, with only a few changes at the top level. JSW avoided cultural conflicts by 
choosing not to relocate or mix up both firms’ employees. It let everything sink in the minds 
and give them the time and space to accept JSW as dominant partner for the well-being of 
themselves and of ISPAT.  
8.1.7.2  Organization operations alignment 
This process involves testing the strategic fit of the merged organization and deals with framing 
department wise objectives and timeline to facilitate the stated overall goals and strategies. JSW 
is one of the market leaders and experts in the Steel industry were able to identify the gaps and 
areas of potential synergy in different operational departments like marketing, finance, logistics, 
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production, and technical areas. To maximize the merger impact. The alignment process of 
major departments has been briefed. 
Production: ISPAT's Dolvi plant had major gaps and JSW aimed to make it just as efficient as 
the Vijaynagar plant. In order to achieve this, it adopted a strategy of backward integration and 
designed a corresponding plan. Consequently, it was accomplished by setting up coke oven 
(Feb'13), captive power plant using waste gas generated from blast furnace (Mar'13), lime plant 
(Aug'13) and pallet plant. These facilities have transformed Dolvi into an integrated plant, 
reducing its production costs and substantially improving its profitability.  
Marketing: The Dolvi plant is located in Maharashtra, which is very close to India’s largest 
Steel market i.e. Mumbai. Thus, the merger has expanded the geographical footprint. JSW 
created a new marketing plan where the Vijaynagar plant catered to customers from South 
India, while the Dolvi plant took care of the Western zone as it could receive tax-exemptions 
for selling products within Maharashtra. This not only improved the company’s brand image 
among existing, mutual customers but also helped in acquiring new customers. 
Finance: Despite having technologies like SAP at its disposal, ISPAT was de-centralized, had 
difficulties managing its cash flow and was operating in a financial crisis. JSW established a 
centralized budgetary control system by harnessing the SAP technology. The synergy of 
technology from ISPAT and expertise from JSW was achieved and utilized. 
Purchasing and Storage: The merger gave both organisations the opportunity to bulk buy 
because purchase activity was centralized, which optimized the allocation of raw materials to 
different locations. In addition, the inventory system which was located in silos in the Dolvi 
plant, was also centralized. Thus, improved cost-effectiveness and economies of scale has been 
achieved. 
Logistics and Supply chain: The Dolvi plant being sea-based with port and along the National 
Highway has extremely strategic location. JSW further synergized the logistic impact of the 
plant by building a railway siding as an alternate transport route. Also, JSW changed the supply 
to downstream units (Vasind, Tarapur) from Vijaynagar to Dolvi. This helped in vast savings 
in transportation cost. Hence, the EBITA and profitability of the Dolvi plant increased 
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multifold. Thus, JSW identified potential alternatives for transportation from the Dolvi plant 
after the merger and successfully increased its synergistic impact. 
8.1.8 Tracking the progress on integration  
Once the integration process has begun, a company needs to continuously monitor its progress 
overall and at the department level against previously set standards and deadlines. Regular 
updates, reports and meetings with top management are essential. It is highly likely that there 
will be delays and conflicts, which can be summarized as integration problems or errors, which 
can be either explicit or implicit. Explicit problems are clearly evident and it is easy to track 
their source and potential solutions. Implicit problems are more difficult to identify until 
performance gradually decreases. Some of the techniques used to identify such problems are 
employee and management interviews, customer surveys, employee turnover statistics, 
employee management and exit interviews, and analysts’ views. 
8.1.9  Merger review and planning for sudden changes  
Based on the progress, the merger integration results assessment needs to be completed over 
time, new issues could surface which require changes to plans, deadlines, and resource 
allocation. The steering team must cognizant of the changing internal and external needs of the 
organization. Furthermore, there may be many areas that were neglected during the due-
diligence and the finalization of the deal that required more attention. In JSW’s case, there were 
certain issues that were not prioritized in the beginning, but became an issue later in the merger.   
For example, the land availability in Dolvi where there is no further room for expansion. Hence, 
in 2014, it acquired Welspun around 40 km near Dolvi at an enterprise value of Rs.1000 crore 
which provides JSW with a vast land bank and a captive jetty. Thus, this 'value accretive' 
acquisition is a credible solution for land constraint in Dolvi. Another advantage of the Dolvi 
plant is the township facility for employees, which is similar to Vijaynagar’s. This will help to 
secure the long-term commitment and relationships with employees. Such reviews and repairs 
are critical to enhancing the impact of the merger. 
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8.2 M&A integration model 
Table 38: Summary of M&A Integration Process  
Leadership values  High task orientation and guided missile  
Well-thought out goals and objectives Clear goals and objectives  
Due diligence on hard and soft issues Due diligence on both hard and soft issues 
completed  
Well-managed M&A team M&A team constitution and its efforts are 
visible  
Successful learning from previous experiences Quick responses to any issues  
Early Planning for combination and 
solidification  
Yes. Completed to a large extent.  
Key talent retained Negligible number of employees left the 
organization  
Extensive and timely communications to all 
stakeholders 
Yes. The communication process was 
undertaken at all levels.  
Schuler, R., and Jackson, S. (2001). HR issues and activities in mergers and 
Acquisitions. European Management Journal, 19(3), 239-253. 
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Table 39: Key conditions for success of M&A  
Develop a more realistic time scale, which 
allows for the time required to prepare effective 
due diligence. 
The merger process was conceived over a 
lengthy period of three years. The due 
diligence process was completed in twelve 
days. The plants started running with 
almost no disruptions.  
Start the planning of integration processes 
sooner and get HR involved earlier 
Human resources managers were involved 
from day one and person who had 
extensive experience from TATA group of 
organizations was made in-charge of the 
human resources intervention.  
Work to align expectations in the acquirer and 
acquired businesses 
The expectations of employees in the 
Indian context were taken into account by 
the M&A team.  
Make difficult decisions, especially regarding 
employee and human resource issues, early in 
the process 
The human resources process was 
prioritised and Unions demands were 
addressed in the early stages.   
Change managers quickly if they fail to 
effectively adapt during the M&A process.  
This was not adopted as managers are 
explained how success may be achieved.  
 
The Integration process during the organizational alignment of two firms during an M&A with 
sequence of activities has been incorporated in the comprehensive model framework given in 
the following diagram.  
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Figure 471: Merger Integration Model 
Quah, P., and Young, S. (2005). Post-acquisition Management: A Phases Approach for Cross-
border M&As. European Management Journal, 23(1), 65-75. This was the path taken during 
the JSW-ISPAT merger. The process was completed in a record time of twelve days.  
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION 
This chapter summarizes the contribution of this thesis, whilst also highlighting its limitations 
and the need for further research. 
9.1 Overview of the Research 
This thesis addressed gaps in the literature by offering a contextual understanding of the 
succession of events that unfolded during M&As with specific reference to factors that impact 
on merger success. The M&A process is sequential and temporal and needs to take place in 
stages. How these activities are undertaken in the case of successful mergers is not documented. 
The need for organizational autonomy and interdependence is not adequately addressed. 
According to the secondary data, the financial performance of merged organisations is usually 
strong in the short run. However, employee cultural change is not articulated. While cultural 
change and integration is emphasized, factors contributing to organizational culture are not 
clear. The distinction between culture and climate, which needs to be addressed in the process 
of M&A, is not clearly established. How organizational fit and strategic fit are achieved is not 
explored. While some motives are clear the complex motivation, including that of hubris 
motivation, is not documented. Companies pursue M&A due to perceived value creation, 
managerial self-interest, and environmental factors. However, studies do not address the 
process through which integration is achieved. 
M&A’s have not been able to achieve the desired synergy to justify the valuation, and studies 
do not address integration of other organizational dimensions. There is insufficient research on 
the need for cultural integration to achieve effective M&A outcomes as more factors than just 
economic and organizational factors impact performance. Decision-making involves a series of 
stages that are interlinked and different factors play a critical role of facilitation/hindrance 
during different stages. This needs to be explored. M&A studies have traditionally focused on 
the role of discrete elements in facilitating integration (Giessner, Ullrich and Dick, 2011; Bohlin 
and Daley, 2000; and Spangler and Tikhomirov, 2010). Few studies provide a holistic 
perspective (alignment between various components of the organization) and while the 
significance of alignment is increasingly being recognized in strategy execution (Higgins, 2005; 
 
 
[228] 
 
Kotter, 1980; Nadler and Tushman, 1982; and Burke and Litwin 1992) it has not been 
adequately explored, particularly within the context of M&As.  
The thesis addresses the following research questions: 
RQ-1: What are the strategic fit dimensions using a qualitative study of the upper level 
management of the combined firms.    
RQ-2: What are the organizational fit dimensions using a quantitative study of the front-
line managers that formed part of the M&A before and after merger.   
RQ-3: How the process of integration is achieved between the two organizations to achieve 
success, the output being in the form of actions in the pre-merger, merger and post-
merger phases 
RQ-4: What are the conditions under which success can be achieved that will help other 
organizations to choose the appropriate path forward to achieve inter-organizational 
alignment. 
This research was conducted over three stages: The first stage was to find any publicly available 
evidence of financial success in the merger of JSW and ISPAT. The second stage examined 
strategic fit as well as the underlying values and behaviour of the leaders and managers during 
the development of a new organization. The third stage explored the organizational fit, which 
relates to issues around merger success and its relationship with organizational culture, job 
satisfaction and organizational commitment among frontline managers.  
9.2 Research contributions  
This thesis contributed to M&A scholarship in the following ways. First, it highlights the 
sequence and processes of alignment for various organizational elements during integration. 
Second, it focuses on the role the speed of a merger has on performance. Third, it systematizes 
a variety of alternative conceptions of strategic alignment, by improving economic synergy and 
customer service. Fourth, it highlights the conditions under which a merger between related 
organizations will find success. Further contributions were attributed to practice. The first 
contribution of this thesis is presented in the advantages expected of mergers, both financial 
and otherwise, and how are they realized. It discusses the areas of synergy that are envisaged 
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and achieved. The second contribution of this research is that it details the formulation and 
function of the M&A team that leads the process of achieving the mission and goals of the 
merged organization by making this technique available to practitioners. The third contribution 
is the identification of key priorities such as due diligence, integration planning, and challenges 
faced during decision-making and the business dilemmas arising during a merger. 
JSW Steel and ISPAT Industries have both been at the top of the Indian Steel Industry and built 
their credibility and brand over the years through hard work, perseverance and expertise. 
However, it was JSW’s vision, corporate culture and leadership that made the difference as it 
was more aggressive and task oriented than most Indian companies. The JSW-ISPAT union has 
been both unique and enormous due to the sheer scale of production, industry type and stakes 
involved. Hence, this detailed case study provides significant insights into the steps and 
sequence of activities during organizational integration, along with the various challenges 
involved and strategies adopted. This study has been a stepping-stone for the pursuit of 
excellence in one of the most challenging businesses i.e. mergers and acquisitions.  
Factors such as relatedness and the speed of a merger were shown to have a significant impact 
on M&A success. This study focused on an M&A between two organizations that operating in 
the steel-manufacturing sector. Both have the characteristic of “relatedness”, internal 
relatedness by way of manufacturing steel and external relatedness where both companies are 
serving the same market. The concept of relatedness has expanded to include the ownership 
type as the two organizations belong to the ‘business houses’ run by two Indian Business 
families who generally operate with great similarity. The entire merger process was completed 
in 12 working days. ISPAT’s Dolvi/Mumbai plant started running within one month of the 
merger. This speed of merger is another condition for success as highlighted below. 
Homburg & Bucerius (2006) argued that the relationship between the speed of integration and 
M&A success is likely to be strongly positive in cases of low external and high internal 
relatedness as per Cell-4 in Figure 7, however they have also concluded that in the case of low 
internal but high external relatedness as per Cell-1, the relationship between speed of integration 
and M&A success will be strongly negative. 
The Researcher has found that in the case of the JSW-ISPAT merger, the external relatedness 
in the market and customers is high as both entities are serving the same set of customers but 
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the internal relatedness is low. This finding was demonstrated in the qualitative analysis were 
JSW had a high level of centralization, in contrast to ISPAT, which made decisions based on 
scientific evidence, while JSW often followed gut feelings. Considering these dimensions, the 
speed of M&A combined with high external relatedness and low internal relatedness produced 
successful results contradicting theoretical position described in Cell-1 of Figure 7 of Homburg 
& Bucerius (2006). This finding could be explained by the fact that the conflicts were addressed 
from the first day of merger by the Human Resources Vice President who was an instrumental 
player in the M&A team. He ensured that all issues relating to both perks and designations were 
addressed and implemented within three months followed by ratification of the top 
management. A fast implementation process ensures that acculturation will be swift and 
therefore should lead to a faster integration of both the organizations. 
9.3 Strategic Change 
Organizations may engage in different strategic changes during their life cycles in order to 
enhance their competitive advantage. This can involve incremental changes to specific 
components of the establishment such as work processes and climate. Or for radical alterations 
that often involve challenging key assumptions of the system. Radical or transformative 
changes, consequently, would often require changes to strategy, culture and leadership in 
parliamentary procedures to bring about deep-rooted log-term changes. M&A represents a form 
of radical change as it involves the integration of two independent organizations into one in 
terms of culture, strategy, and leadership. While there are several approaches to enforcing 
radical changes, organizations usually take a top-down Economic Approach (E approach) or a 
more bottoms up Organizational Development Approach (OD approach), according to Beer and 
Nohria (2000), who concluded that large scale strategic changes can only be sustained when an 
integrated approach is used, with a focus on economic outcomes while developing intellectual 
capital. Adcroft et al. (2008) also advocated a holistic approach, proposing that irrespective of 
whether the approach to change is top-down or bottoms up, it must proceed in an integrated 
manner with active engagement of key stakeholders across all levels during all stages of the 
transformation process. The need for engagement across all levels is important as readiness for 
change at individual, group and organizational levels are different because their antecedents 
and consequences are different (Rafferty et al., 2013). 
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9.4 Strategic Alignment – discussion on alignment 
The importance of aligning internal organizational systems and the external environment for 
improved performance has been well researched in the strategy literature. Burns and Stalker’s 
(1961) study on alignment highlighted that a good fit between organizational structure 
(mechanistic vs. organic) and the environment (stable vs. uncertain) leads to improved 
performance. Alignment within internal organizational elements impacting performance was 
explored by Chandler’s (1962) work on strategy development. The study showed that unless 
structure is aligned with strategy, the result of strategic change will be sub-standard. Other 
research supports the concept of fit. For example, Miles and Snow (1984, p.11) see fit as "a 
process as well as a state”; a continuous search to align the organization with its environment 
and to arrange resources internally to achieve alignment. Many studies have proposed different 
approaches to alignment between internal organizational elements, as highlighted in the next 
section. 
9.5 Literature 
The researcher agrees with the previous literature that there are elements both of culture and 
climate that need to be studied in inter-organizational alignment. Nahavandi and Malekzadeh 
(1988) posited that the acculturation process in a merger is based on the nature of the acquirer’s 
and the acquired entity’s expectations, which may give rise to integration, assimilation, 
separation or de-acculturation. Cross-cultural psychology theories are adopted to enlighten the 
cultural acclimatization and acculturation processes during mergers. During the integration 
process, there will always be cultural friction among the employees of the two entities, and they 
are not expected to have similar preferences in the process of acculturation, based on the 
dimensions of the degree of relatedness and multiculturalism. Acculturation is also defined as 
the cultural change caused due to the dissemination and amalgamation of the cultural 
ingredients of both organizations (Berry, 1980, p, 215). The transformation takes place at the 
overall, team and individual levels in three phases, namely contact, conflict, and adaptation 
(Berry, 1983). 
There will always be an attempt to dictate and dominate the other culture (Keesing, 1953). This 
applies to both industrial and social organizations. The two merging organizations exist and 
settle in the merging environment within their limits. Those limits include a number of 
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individuals who are interdependent and intermingle to varying levels (Sales and Mirvis, 1984). 
The employees in the merged entity show their adaptive capacity to deal with the cultural 
conflicts and impart a set of shared values and perceptions that form the new culture to be 
followed and shared internally and with the external world. 
Homburg and Bucerius (2006) argued that the relationship between the speed of integration and 
M&A success is likely to be strongly positive in cases of low external and high internal 
relatedness as per Cell-2 in Figure 7. They have concluded that in the case of low internal but 
high external relatedness as per Cell-1, the relationship between speed of integration and M&A 
success will be strongly negative. 
However, in the case of the JSW-ISPAT merger, the external relatedness in the market and 
customers is high as they are serving the same set of customers. The internal relatedness is low. 
As demonstrated in the qualitative analysis, JSW had a high level of centralization, in contrast 
to ISPAT, which made of decisions based on scientific evidence, while JSW often followed gut 
feelings. Considering these dimensions speed of M&A combined with high external relatedness 
and low internal relatedness produced successful results contradicting theoretical position. 
This may be explained as the conflicts are addressed from first day of the merger with the help 
of Human Resources Vice President being in the M&A team who ensured that all issues relating 
to both perks and designations are addressed and implemented within three months and ratified 
by the top management. A fast implementation process ensures that acculturation will be swift. 
The mode of acculturation also leads to faster integration of both the organizations. 
Pfeffer (1972) asserted that firms buy competitors to reduce competitive pressure or 
commenalistic interdependence. In the case of JSW, the reduction of commensalistic 
interdependence was the primary goal and uses the strength of political power into economic 
power. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) four styles of creation of value. A careful examination 
of each of the interviews indicates the organization-adopted absorption that is characterised by 
low autonomy and high strategic interdependence. ISPAT’s autonomy to make decisions was 
reduced to a large extent. However, the emphasis on strategic interdependence is more 
underscored.  
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9.6  Limitation of the research 
Overall, an effective model had not previously been developed for mergers in the Indian 
context. The first limitation can be seen in the results, as they have limited generalizability. 
Whilst the case study provides rich insights, careful consideration is required before general 
observations or inferences are made based on the results. As indicated by William, Shadish, 
Cook, and Campbell (2002), the problem of generalization is whether a causal relationship 
holds over variations in units, treatments, outcomes and settings. This examined a specific 
industry in a specific location. Hence, the external validity of this research is likely to be low 
and, therefore, further research should consider the results of studies conducted in other 
countries and industries if it wishes to make generalizations about mergers. Although the M&A 
analysed in this study occurred in India, this study provides a holistic perspective on key 
alignment factors that need to be considered during different stages of inter-organizational 
integration. 
9.7  Directions for future research 
This research is based on a single case study; other ways that this research might be extended 
is by exploring multiple case studies in different industries. The majority of M&A initiatives 
failed due to non-economic issues. (King et al., 2004). Due diligence is being observed, but 
follow up of due diligence over a period of time is lacking.  
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ANNEXURE 1 - Interview	Questions	for	Top	Management		-	Qualitative	Study	
Question 1 
Interviewer – The first question is who conceived the idea for JSW Steel’s M&A of Ispat 
Industries?  
a. JSW Management  
b. M&A Consultant  
c. bankers  
Question 2 
Interviewer – What was the source of information / data about Ispat Industries, available with 
JSW Steel to take a decision on M&A? Did they get the information about the company from 
media news, stock market, bankers, shareholder, employees, etc? 
Question 3 
Interviewer – What was the idea of M&A based on 
Financial Advantage 
Technical Advantage 
Product Advantage 
Marketing Advantage 
Logistical Advantage 
Time Line Advantage 
Which one would you rate from 1 to 5 as the most important? 
Redefine Vision and Mission 
Question 4 
Interviewer – Now if we can take you to question no. 4. What is the vision of the new merged 
enterprise? In terms of core ideology today. 
Question 5 
Interviewer – What is the main goal of this merger? Was it to acquire bigger market share, or 
to acquire synergy between marketing, purchasing and procurement. What would you highlight 
the main goal of the merger? 
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Synergy Evaluation 
Question 6 
Interviewer – When JSW looked at taking over the ISPAT plant, did it have the synergy 
evaluation between the 2 organizations prior to taking a decision to go ahead with the M&A? 
Question 7 
Interviewer – What was the basis for Synergy Evaluation? Rate it on a scale of 1 to 5. 
Financial Synergy 
Technical Synergy 
Production Synergy 
Marketing Synergy 
HR Synergy 
 
Question 8 
Interviewer – What were the main areas identified by both the organizations where you could 
develop business synergies? 
Buyer or Seller Eliminating Overhead and improving Utilizations 
  Selling Potential Realized Due to Removal of Manufacturing Constraints 
  Achieving Operational Critical Mass 
  Combined Financial Structure Is an Improvement 
  Applying Superior Know-How to the Business 
  Obtaining Superior Technologies 
  Obtaining Future Benefit 
  Corporate Culture Is Improved 
Competitors & Peers A Competitor Is Acquired 
Suppliers Procurement – Economies of Scale 
  Achieving Backward Integration 
Customers/ Markets Achieving Forward Integration 
  New Products/Services for Existing Customers 
  Creation of One-Stop Shopping for Customers 
  Obtaining Superior Products/Services 
  New Customers for Existing Products/Services 
  New Distributors/Distribution Channels for Existing Products/Services 
  Image With Customers Is Improved 
  Image With Mutual Customers Is Strengthened 
  Continuing to Supply a Key Customer 
  Obtaining Superior Markets 
Regulatory Environ. Image With Regulators Is Improved 
Financial Markets Financial Critical Mass Is Achieved 
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  Image With Market Analysts Is Improved 
Other A Target Is Acquired to Prevent Someone Else From Acquiring It 
 
Selecting the M&A Team 
Question 9 
Interviewer - What was the main focus of JSW Steel Management, while selecting their M&A 
team members? 
Legal 
Finance 
Technical / Production 
Marketing / Commercial 
HR / Personnel 
 
Question 10 
Interviewer - What was the basis of selecting, each individual member of the M&A Team, 
from their respective departments? 
Past Experience of M&A Activities 
High Rated Skills in their area of activity 
Confidence of the management on each individual 
 
Integration Project Planning 
Question 11 
Interviewer - Who lead the integration planning effort? 
a. “two-in-the-box” leadership  
b. Key decision makers from JSW Steel alone lead the M&A team 
Question 12 
Interviewer – What factors were in closely or distinctly aligned with the integration guiding 
principles? 
Corporate strategy 
Organization culture 
Confidence of the management on each individual 
 
 
 
[237] 
 
Question 13 
Interviewer – What were the various business dilemmas encountered during the integration 
process? 
a.      Centralized vs. Decentralized excellence 
b.      JSW Culture vs. ISPAT Culture 
c.       Ante-chambering vs. Equal opportunities to contribute 
d.      Independence vs. Accountability 
e.      Proclaimed values vs. Opportunistic behaviour 
f.       Subtlety vs. Communicability 
g.      Entrepreneurial flair vs. Clear Codification 
 
Question 14 
Interviewer - What was the management approach towards Improvement and Development, 
continually monitored? 
Question 15 
Interviewer - What are JSW’s main organizational values? 
Change/Flexibility 
Learning 
Customer Focus 
Relationships 
Loyalty/Commitment 
Teamwork 
Corporate efficiency 
Structure 
Professional development 
Shareholder value 
Task orientation 
Strategic alignment 
 
Resolving Cultural Issues 
Question 16 
Interviewer - Were the organization cultures of two merging entities similar or dissimilar? You 
already answered this question. There were differences. 
Question 17 
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Interviewer - What focus / importance were given by the M&A Team in “Understanding & 
Resolving Cultural Issues” between the two organizations? 
Question 18 
Interviewer - What were the Cultural Issues in terms of importance given by the M&A team 
while “Understanding & Resolving Cultural Issues”? 
Management Culture 
HR / Compensation / Perk  Culture 
Financial Culture 
Manufacturing process & quality 
Culture 
Marketing Culture 
 
Internal & External Communications 
Question 19 
Interviewer - Was the M&A proposal internally communicated to shareholders/employees Or 
Was it kept in close quarters, until the deal was finalized? List out the reason. 
Was it secretive or was in common knowledge to everyone? 
Question 20 
Interviewer - What percentage of shareholders / employees were in favour or against the 
M&A? 
Question 21 
Interviewer – Were there view / opinions / suggestions / approval sought from anyone 
regarding the M&A. i.e. from the Stock Market, Law/ Court , Shareholders, Stakeholders, Trade 
unions, Government, Consultants, Bankers, Employees etc….?. 
Due Diligence 
Question 22 
Interviewer – Who did the Due Diligence process? Was this done in-house or any third party 
was hired for this? 
Interviewee – Not sure, but it was Head Office side 
Question 23 
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Interviewer – What was the order of importance (1-9) given to the following aspects in the 
Due Diligence Process? 
Interviewee – 
Legal Status of the merging entity 
Valuation 
Turnover 
Liabilities 
Product Profile & Capacity 
Market Presence 
Location 
Assets, Land & Building 
Human Resource 
 
Question 24 
Interviewer – What was the ‘Time Line’ drawn for completing the M&A Process? 
Question 25 
Interviewer – Were there any other organizations competing for M&A with the merging 
entity? 
Implementation of M&A Process - 8S Model 
Strategy 
Question 26.1 
Interviewer – What were considered to be the most important factors to focus during the pre-
merger activities? 
Question 26.2 
Interviewer – How similar and dissimilar were these factors between the two entities? 
Question 26.3 
Interviewer – Whether there was a clear roadmap for the change/ integration of these factors? 
Question 26.4 
Interviewer – Were there adequate resources available and sufficient efforts put to execute the 
plan? 
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Question 26.5 
Interviewer – What were the Bottle-necks faced during execution of above factors and what 
actions were taken to overcome the issues? 
Question 26.6 
Interviewer – How is the quality and progress in post-merger entity on these factors? Rate 
Structure 
Changing Organization Structure, Structural improvement & Development, Planning 
Functional integration, Aligning Structure to corporate strategy and culture 
Question 27.1 
Interviewer – What factors were considered important during the pre-merger time? 
Changing Organization Structure 
Structural improvement & Development 
Planning Functional integration 
Aligning Structure to corporate strategy and culture 
 
Question 27.2 
Interviewer – How similar and dissimilar were these factors between the two entities? 
 
Question 27.3 
Interviewer – Were there adequate resources available and sufficient efforts put to execute the 
plan? 
Question 27.4 
Interviewer – What were the Bottle-necks faced during execution of above factors and what 
actions were taken to overcome these issues? Did you have any key personnel walkout, any law 
suits in court, did you feel there was any demotivation or strikes? 
Question 27.5 
Interviewer – How is the quality and progress in post-merger entity on these factors? 
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Systems & Processes  
Management & Trade Union Relationship, Compatibility of Financial Budget with Strategic 
Plan, Accuracy, Relevance & Timeliness of effective Management Control Information, 
Importance to long run trends in cost and performance, innovation, benchmarking the deal, 
Management approach in line with company strategy 
Question 28.1 
Interviewer – What were the Key factors considered in terms on importance in aligning 
Systems & process during pre-merger activities? 
Management & Trade Union Relationship 
Compatibility of Financial Budget with Strategic Plan 
Accuracy 
Relevance & Timeliness of effective Management Control 
Information 
Importance to long run trends in cost and performance 
Innovation 
benchmarking the deal 
Management approach in line with company strategy 
 
Question 28.2 
Interviewer – How these factors were in conjunction between the two entities? 
 
Question 28.3 
Interviewer – Were there any major dissimilarity in these factors between the entities and what 
were they? 
Question 28.4 
Interviewer – What adequate actions/ efforts were taken to execute these factors in alignment 
during integration plan? 
Question 28.5 
Interviewer – Rate the performance of these factors after the post-merger entity? 
Style 
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Authoritarian, Consultative, Consensus, or Democratic Managers Approach towards 
Management Control Information, Responsiveness to Market or Competitive Pressures, 
Importance of Cross Functional Groups, Sharing Skills & Experiences across organization. 
Interviewer – This refers to the style of leadership. Do you have dictatorship or centralized 
style? 
Question 29.1 
Interviewer – What was the Management or Managers approach towards Management control 
information? 
Question 29.2 
Interviewer – How were the responsiveness of Market & competitive pressures evaluated and 
resolved? If somebody wants a new product, do you immediately plan, make budget and work 
on it? 
Question 29.3 
Interviewer – What and where was the role & importance of cross functional groups during 
integrations activities? 
Question 29.3 
Interviewer – Rate the level to which the skills & experience across the organization play a 
major factor during integration plan. 
Question 29.4 
Interviewer – What were the major similarities and dissimilarities on the style factors between 
the two entities? 
Staff 
Question 30.1 
Interviewer – How was Retention & Development of Intellectual Capital achieved? Has there 
been training in the new staff? Have you looked at their capability, do they need any skill 
improvement, character building, knowledge building or you looked at them as highly 
qualified? 
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Question 30.2 
Interviewer – Rate the degree of importance given to Evaluating Skills, Training & Experience 
of Personnel. Could you rate the level of skill of the employees acquired? 
Question 30.3 
Interviewer – What was the level of importance given to Selecting, Placement & Reorganizing 
Employees? 
Question 30.4 
Interviewer – Was Appraisal considered across all levels of the organization and what was the 
Procedure followed? 
Question 30.5 
Interviewer – What was the Importance given to Human Resource in formulating & 
Implementing Strategic Decisions? 
ReSources 
Any resources 
Question 31.1 
Interviewer – What were the 3 most important resources considered vital in the M&A Process? 
Question 31.2 
Interviewer – How were the various resources integrated between the 2 organizations? 
Question 31.3 
Interviewer – Who were responsible for the resource integration? 
Question 31.4 
Interviewer – Was evaluating value in use of each input in the Cost & Profit of the Product, 
meeting corporate objectives? 
Question 31.5 
Interviewer – What was the market position of each product? 
Question 31.6 
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Interviewer – Rate the extent to which the 2 organizations competing in Price, Quality & 
Delivery of products? Would you say before the merger have JSW and ISPAT were competing? 
Price 
Quality 
Delivery 
 
Question 31.7 
Interviewer – Rate the level of importance given to the following factors during M&A 
Age and state of repair of plant and equipment 
Formally recording Learning & Experience for enriching Human Resource 
Formal Communication Channel / Group discussions to deploy Learning & 
ensuring Implementation at all levels of the organization 
 
Question 31.8 
Interviewer – When something goes wrong, people at all levels look for reasons why, rather 
than blame individuals. How was this resolved? 
Shared Value 
Values that are recognized by the company’s employees and are engrained in the company’s 
culture.  
Question 32.1 
Interviewer – What was the extent of market research used to impact product development?  
How was it achieved? 
Question 32.2 
Interviewer – What was the level of cooperation between marketing and operations? Rate it 
How was the synergy achieved? 
Question 32.3 
Interviewer – What was the extent to which the organization was able to exploit outside for 
development purposes? Rate 
Question 32.4 
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Interviewer – What was the level of equitable distribution of resources, ascertained & 
achieved?  
Question 32.5 
Interviewer – What was the importance given to Participatory Improvement Process? Rate 
How was its Implementation ensured / achieved? 
Strategic Performance 
Holistic approach of integration of different functional areas to ensure financial performance.
  
Question 33.1 
Interviewer – How long did it take for completing the M&A process and was it achieved within 
the scheduled time frame? 
Question 33.2 
Interviewer – What were the strategic boundaries set, to achieve the corporate objective? This 
we discussed already. 
Question 33.3 
Interviewer – What initiatives were taken to control cost and to meet the budget? 
Question 33.4 
Interviewer – What was the level of inventory in relation to output and sales? 
 
Question 33.5 
Interviewer – What efforts were taken to ensure that the level of investment meets Industry 
average? 
Question 33.6 
Interviewer – Rate the importance given to Interactive Customer Feedback Program & 
Improvement Plan and how was it achieved? 
Question 33.7 
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Interviewer – Was customer feedback directly attributed to the performance of each 
individual? 
Question 33.8 
Interviewer – What was the importance given to Realizing Core Values? 
Question 34 
Interviewer – Overall, how would you rate the quality of integration that has been achieved 
post the merger? Now merger has finished, there has been integration, profit and loss has been 
declared. If you have to rate it, would you believe that integration has been complete? 
Overall integration achieved in the merged entity 
Achievement of Merger objectives set up before merger 
Question 35 
Interviewer – If you have to identify three critical reasons that you consider most responsible 
for the positive outcomes, which would they be? 
Question 36 
Interviewer – With the wisdom of hindsight, if you have to identify three areas that could have 
been focused more, on which would they be?  
Question 37 
Interviewer – Please provide details about your role in the merger? 
1. M&A team 
2. Senior Management  
3. Middle/Junior Management 
4. Others (Specify) 
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ANNEXURE 2 - Questionnaire	for	Mid-Management	Employees	on	Quantitative	Study	
 Statements 
Before merger After merger 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
 Structure  
          
1 
The jobs in this organization are clearly defined and 
logically structured                     
2 
In this organization, it is sometimes unclear who has 
the formal authority to make a decision (R)                     
3 
The policies and organizational structure of the 
organization have been clearly explained                     
4 Red-tape is kept to a minimum in this organization                     
5 
Excessive rules, administrative details, and red-tape 
make it difficult for new and original ideas to 
receive consideration (R)                     
6 
Our productivity sometimes suffers from lack of 
organization and planning (R)                      
7 
In some of the projects I've been on, I haven't been 
sure exactly who my boss was (R)                     
8 
Our management isn't so concerned about formal 
organization and authority, but concentrates instead 
on getting the right people together to do the job                     
 Responsibility  
          
9 
We don't rely too heavily on individual judgment in 
this organization; almost everything is double-
checked (R)                     
10 
Around here management resents your checking 
everything with them; if you think you've got the 
right approach you just go ahead                     
11 
Supervision in this organization is mainly a matter 
of setting guidelines for your subordinates; you let 
them take responsibility for the job                     
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12 
You won't get ahead in this organization unless you 
stick your neck out and try things on your own 
sometimes                     
13 
Our philosophy emphasizes that people should 
solve their problems by themselves                     
14 
There are an awful lot of excuses around here when 
somebody makes a mistake(R)                     
15 
One of the problems in this organization is that 
individuals won't take responsibility (R)                      
 
 
 Standards  
 
                    
16 
In this organization we set very high standards for 
performance                     
17 
Our management believes that no job is so well done 
that it couldn't be done better                     
18 
Around here there is a feeling of pressure to 
continually improve our personal and group 
performance                     
19 
Management believes that if the people are happy, 
productivity will take care of itself                     
20 
To get ahead in this organization it's more important 
to get along than it is to be a high producer                     
21 
In this organization people don't seem to take much 
pride in their performance                     
  Conflict                      
22 
The best way to make a good impression around 
here is to steer clear of open arguments and 
disagreements                     
23 
The attitude of our management is that conflict 
between competing units and individuals can be 
very healthy                     
24 
We are encouraged to speak our minds, even if it 
means disagreeing with our superiors                     
25 
In management meetings, the goal is to arrive at a 
decision as smoothly and quickly as possible                     
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 Identity  
          
26 People are proud of belonging to this organization                     
27 I feel that I am a member of a well-functioning team                     
28 
As far as I can see, there isn't very much personal 
loyalty to the company (R)                     
29 
In this organization people pretty much look out for 
their own interests (R)                     
 Organizational Culture  
          
  Team Work                      
30 
It is an easy task to conduct inter-departmental co-
ordination at my firm                     
31 There is no problem of sectionalism at my firm                     
32 There is no self-centre problem at my firm                     
33 
All employees can provide mutual support and co-
operate with each other                     
34 
The performance of inter-departmental support is 
excellent at my firm                     
  Warmth                      
35 
A friendly atmosphere prevails among the people in 
this organization                     
36 
This organization is characterized by a relaxed, 
easy-going working climate                     
37 
It's very hard to get to know people in this 
organization (R)                     
38 
People in this organization tend to be cool and aloof 
toward each other (R)                     
39 
There is a lot of warmth in the relationships between 
management and workers in this organization                     
  Support                      
40 
You don't get much sympathy from higher-ups in 
this organization if you make a mistake (R)                     
41 
Management makes an effort to talk with you about 
your career aspirations within the organization                     
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42 
People in this organization don't really trust each 
other enough (R)                     
43 
The philosophy of our management emphasizes the 
human factor, how people feel, ...                     
44 
When I am on a difficult assignment I can usually 
count on getting assistance from my boss and co-
workers                     
  Innovative Spirits                      
45 I would like to try a new difficult task in my job                     
46 I am a person of positive working attitude                     
47 
I will pour in extra efforts to help accomplish the 
goals of my firm                     
48 
I will commit myself to exert more efforts when 
compared with other colleagues                     
49 I will treat the goals of this organization as my own                     
50 
Innovative and venture-taking spirits are prevailing 
at my firm                     
  Service Quality                      
51 
My firm has provided the sufficient hardware 
facilities to accommodate the needs of customers                     
52 
Our customers are quite satisfied with the quality of 
the company’s products                     
53 
Most customers are keeping stable procurement 
relationships with our firm                     
54 
Our service can conform to the requirement of the 
customers                     
55 
I am quite satisfied with the quality of our firm’s 
products                     
56 
When the implementation quality of the upper 
process conforms to the specifications of the firm, 
only then will the process owner hand it over to the 
process owner of the next process. This is the 
process implementation quality in my firm.                     
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57 
There are customers’ complaint processes in my 
firm to respond to the unsatisfied customers in time                     
58 
Our customers are quite satisfied with the service of 
our firm                     
  Self-actualization                      
59 My current job means a lot to me                     
60 
I can master new knowledge and develop expertise 
by doing the current job                     
61 
By undertaking a job at my firm, I have a sense of 
achievement                     
62 
By undertaking a job at my firm, I have ample 
opportunities for fully utilizing my talents                     
63 
By undertaking a job at my firm, there are a lot of 
opportunities for personal advancement                     
 Recognition                      
64 
I understand clearly the promotional opportunities 
for myself                     
65 I understand clearly the criteria for promotion                     
66 
The messages of business objectives and programs 
at my firm are clearly delivered to every department 
through formal channels                     
67 
There is a detailed job description for each task 
assigned to employees at my firm                     
68 
Superiors and subordinates can trust each other in 
my department                     
  Rational Award system                      
69 
There are clearly specified procedures for 
promotion at my firm                     
70 
There are clearly specified compensation schemes 
at my firm                     
71 
I understand clearly the business processes that are 
associated with my job                     
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72 
There are well specified performance-evaluating-
methods governing awards and/or punishments for 
the persons who handle the task at the firm                     
73 
The performance evaluation system really can 
motivate employees to work harder                     
74 
Similar jobs with different compensations are very 
common at my firm                     
  Reward                     
75 
We have a promotion system here that helps the best 
man to rise to the top                     
76 
In this organization, the rewards and 
encouragements you get usually outweigh the 
threats and the criticism                     
77 
In this organization people are rewarded in 
proportion to the excellence of their job 
performance                     
78 There is a great deal of criticism in this organization                     
79 
There is not enough reward and recognition given in 
this organization for doing good work                     
80 
If you make a mistake in this organization, you will 
be punished                     
 Risk 
          
81 
The philosophy of our management is that in the 
long run we get ahead fastest by playing it slow, 
safe, and sure                     
82 
Our business has been built up by taking calculated 
risks at the right time                     
83 
Decision making in this organization is too cautious 
for maximum effectiveness                     
84 
Our management is willing to take a chance on a 
good idea                     
85 
We have to take some pretty big risks occasionally 
to keep ahead of the competition in the business 
we're in                     
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  Emotional Commitment                     
86 The goals of my firm are crystal clear                     
87 
The business objectives of my firm can meet the 
expectation of the customers                     
88 
The firm’s products are quite competitive in the 
marketplace                     
89 
The corporate image of our business group helps a 
lot in conducting business at my firm                     
90 
The corporate image of my firm has won the trust 
and approval of the public and our customers                     
  Continuous commitment                      
91 
Most employees feel that the goals of my 
organization are acceptable and achievable                     
92 
The Sales people understand their target customers 
fully                     
93 
I fully understand the managerial philosophy of my 
firm                     
94 I see a rosy future for my firm                     
95 
I am very satisfied with the current management 
team of my firm 
 
                  
  
 
 
96 Merger is a financial success  
     
97 
Merger has enhanced our commitment to 
organization  
     
98 
Merger helped me to achieve greater co-ordination 
among us  
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ANNEXURE 3 – Regression / Descriptive Statistics 
Regression 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.841249 .7566057 779 
Recoded Dept. 4.7304 2.02408 779 
Structure 3.78017 .699692 779 
Responsibility 3.782322 .7040082 779 
Standards 3.966410 .6787508 779 
Conflict 3.3286 .58623 779 
Identity 4.1518 .60217 779 
Organizational Culture 3.775013 .5450312 779 
Job satisfaction 3.312230 .5581568 779 
Organizational commitment 3.753145 .6230984 779 
Correlations 
 
Merger 
Success 
Recoded 
Dept. 
Structur
e 
Responsibili
ty Standards 
Pearson 
Correlation 
Merger Success 1.000 -.039 .780 .752 .735 
Recoded Dept. -.039 1.000 -.021 -.025 -.015 
Structure .780 -.021 1.000 .857 .795 
Responsibility .752 -.025 .857 1.000 .776 
Standards .735 -.015 .795 .776 1.000 
Conflict -.530 .071 -.601 -.590 -.440 
Identity .717 .003 .781 .779 .760 
Organizational 
Culture 
.813 -.030 .895 .882 .860 
Job satisfaction .789 -.011 .889 .875 .809 
Organizational 
commitment 
.750 .000 .818 .789 .848 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .139 .000 .000 .000 
Recoded Dept. .139 . .278 .245 .338 
Structure .000 .278 . .000 .000 
Responsibility .000 .245 .000 . .000 
Standards .000 .338 .000 .000 . 
Conflict .000 .023 .000 .000 .000 
Identity .000 .472 .000 .000 .000 
Organizational 
Culture 
.000 .198 .000 .000 .000 
Job satisfaction .000 .376 .000 .000 .000 
Organizational 
commitment 
.000 .500 .000 .000 .000 
N Merger Success 779 779 779 779 779 
Recoded Dept. 779 779 779 779 779 
Structure 779 779 779 779 779 
Responsibility 779 779 779 779 779 
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Standards 779 779 779 779 779 
Conflict 779 779 779 779 779 
Identity 779 779 779 779 779 
Organizational 
Culture 
779 779 779 779 779 
Job satisfaction 779 779 779 779 779 
Organizational 
commitment 
779 779 779 779 779 
Correlations 
 Conflict Identity 
Organization
al Culture 
Job 
satisfaction 
Organization
al 
commitment 
Pearson 
Correlation 
Merger Success -.530 .717 .813 .789 .750 
Recoded Dept. .071 .003 -.030 -.011 .000 
Structure -.601 .781 .895 .889 .818 
Responsibility -.590 .779 .882 .875 .789 
Standards -.440 .760 .860 .809 .848 
Conflict 1.000 -.534 -.615 -.637 -.421 
Identity -.534 1.000 .863 .797 .761 
Organizational 
Culture 
-.615 .863 1.000 .915 .850 
Job satisfaction -.637 .797 .915 1.000 .839 
Organizational 
commitment 
-.421 .761 .850 .839 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Recoded Dept. .023 .472 .198 .376 .500 
Structure .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Responsibility .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Standards .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Conflict . .000 .000 .000 .000 
Identity .000 . .000 .000 .000 
Organizational 
Culture 
.000 .000 . .000 .000 
Job satisfaction .000 .000 .000 . .000 
Organizational 
commitment 
.000 .000 .000 .000 . 
N Merger Success 779 779 779 779 779 
Recoded Dept. 779 779 779 779 779 
Structure 779 779 779 779 779 
Responsibility 779 779 779 779 779 
Standards 779 779 779 779 779 
Conflict 779 779 779 779 779 
Identity 779 779 779 779 779 
Organizational 
Culture 
779 779 779 779 779 
Job satisfaction 779 779 779 779 779 
Organizational 
commitment 
779 779 779 779 779 
Variables Entered/Removed 
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Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Recoded Deptb . Enter 
2 Identity, Conflict, 
Standards, 
Responsibility, 
Structureb 
. Enter 
3 Organizational 
commitment, Job 
satisfaction, 
Organizational 
Cultureb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
b. All requested variables entered. 
Model Summaryd 
Mode
l R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
1 .039a .002 .000 .7565197 .002 1.177 1 777 
2 .817b .668 .665 .4377144 .666 309.805 5 772 
3 .830c .688 .684 .4249866 .020 16.644 3 769 
Model Summaryd 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .278  
2 .000  
3 .000 2.028 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Recoded Dept. 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Recoded Dept., Identity, Conflict, Standards, Responsibility, Structure 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Recoded Dept., Identity, Conflict, Standards, Responsibility, Structure, 
Organizational commitment, Job satisfaction, Organizational Culture 
d. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
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ANOVAa 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .674 1 .674 1.177 .278b 
Residual 444.694 777 .572   
Total 445.368 778    
2 Regression 297.457 6 49.576 258.757 .000c 
Residual 147.910 772 .192   
Total 445.368 778    
3 Regression 306.476 9 34.053 188.540 .000d 
Residual 138.892 769 .181   
Total 445.368 778    
a. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Recoded Dept. 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Recoded Dept., Identity, Conflict, Standards, Responsibility, Structure 
d. Predictors: (Constant), Recoded Dept., Identity, Conflict, Standards, Responsibility, Structure, 
Organizational commitment, Job satisfaction, Organizational Culture 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlation
s 
B Std. Error Beta Zero-order 
1 (Constant) 3.910 .069  56.717 .000  
Recoded Dept. -.015 .013 -.039 -1.085 .278 -.039 
2 (Constant) .565 .219  2.582 .010  
Recoded Dept. -.007 .008 -.020 -.962 .336 -.039 
Structure .339 .050 .313 6.753 .000 .780 
Responsibility .163 .048 .152 3.417 .001 .752 
Standards .253 .042 .227 5.963 .000 .735 
Conflict -.098 .035 -.076 -2.819 .005 -.530 
Identity .177 .047 .141 3.779 .000 .717 
3 (Constant) .112 .236  .473 .636  
Recoded Dept. -.007 .008 -.020 -.974 .331 -.039 
Structure .163 .055 .151 2.971 .003 .780 
Responsibility .034 .050 .032 .671 .503 .752 
Standards .071 .049 .064 1.448 .148 .735 
Conflict -.065 .037 -.050 -1.772 .077 -.530 
Identity .041 .050 .033 .820 .412 .717 
Organizational Culture .427 .100 .308 4.269 .000 .813 
Job satisfaction .160 .081 .118 1.983 .048 .789 
Organizational 
commitment 
.170 .056 .140 3.015 .003 .750 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Correlations 
Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)     
Recoded Dept. -.039 -.039 1.000 1.000 
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2 (Constant)     
Recoded Dept. -.035 -.020 .992 1.008 
Structure .236 .140 .200 5.009 
Responsibility .122 .071 .218 4.589 
Standards .210 .124 .296 3.378 
Conflict -.101 -.058 .593 1.687 
Identity .135 .078 .310 3.227 
3 (Constant)     
Recoded Dept. -.035 -.020 .988 1.012 
Structure .107 .060 .157 6.387 
Responsibility .024 .014 .184 5.442 
Standards .052 .029 .207 4.837 
Conflict -.064 -.036 .500 2.001 
Identity .030 .017 .251 3.982 
Organizational Culture .152 .086 .078 12.807 
Job satisfaction .071 .040 .115 8.714 
Organizational commitment .108 .061 .188 5.317 
a. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Excluded Variablesa 
Model Beta In t Sig. 
Partial 
Correlation 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 Structure .780
b 34.755 .000 .780 1.000 1.000 
Responsibility .751b 31.746 .000 .752 .999 1.001 
Standards .735b 30.205 .000 .735 1.000 1.000 
Conflict -.530b -17.382 .000 -.529 .995 1.005 
Identity .717b 28.715 .000 .718 1.000 1.000 
Organizational Culture .813b 38.869 .000 .813 .999 1.001 
Job satisfaction .789b 35.850 .000 .790 1.000 1.000 
Organizational 
commitment 
.750b 31.620 .000 .750 1.000 1.000 
2 Organizational Culture .391
c 5.682 .000 .200 .087 11.444 
Job satisfaction .245c 4.400 .000 .156 .136 7.371 
Organizational 
commitment 
.202c 4.470 .000 .159 .206 4.846 
Excluded Variablesa 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Minimum Tolerance 
1 Structure 1.000 
Responsibility .999 
Standards 1.000 
Conflict .995 
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Identity 1.000 
Organizational Culture .999 
Job satisfaction 1.000 
Organizational commitment 1.000 
2 Organizational Culture .087 
Job satisfaction .136 
Organizational commitment .183 
a. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Recoded Dept. 
c. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Recoded Dept., Identity, Conflict, Standards, Responsibility, Structure 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa 
Mode
l 
Dimensio
n 
Eigenvalu
e 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant
) 
Recoded 
Dept. 
Structur
e 
Responsibili
ty Standards 
1 1 1.919 1.000 .04 .04    
2 .081 4.882 .96 .96    
2 1 6.762 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
2 .147 6.775 .00 .83 .00 .00 .00 
3 .069 9.887 .01 .16 .01 .01 .00 
4 .007 30.630 .09 .00 .02 .11 .83 
5 .006 33.612 .04 .00 .11 .26 .00 
6 .005 37.782 .02 .00 .77 .62 .01 
7 .004 43.762 .84 .00 .09 .00 .15 
3 1 9.734 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
2 .161 7.771 .00 .76 .00 .00 .00 
3 .073 11.508 .01 .23 .00 .00 .00 
4 .009 33.546 .08 .00 .01 .06 .27 
5 .006 39.658 .02 .00 .10 .21 .04 
6 .005 44.742 .02 .00 .35 .63 .06 
7 .004 48.404 .09 .00 .02 .01 .50 
8 .004 50.862 .20 .00 .45 .01 .01 
9 .002 63.560 .46 .00 .03 .05 .00 
10 .001 85.514 .12 .00 .04 .03 .12 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa 
Model Dimension 
Variance Proportions 
Conflict Identity 
Organizational 
Culture Job satisfaction 
Organizational 
commitment 
1 1      
2      
2 1 .00 .00    
2 .00 .00    
3 .17 .00    
4 .03 .02    
5 .15 .62    
6 .01 .02    
7 .64 .33    
3 1 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
2 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
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3 .14 .00 .00 .00 .00 
4 .03 .03 .00 .01 .15 
5 .11 .43 .01 .01 .01 
6 .01 .02 .00 .02 .03 
7 .04 .17 .00 .00 .45 
8 .19 .15 .00 .19 .12 
9 .44 .02 .00 .67 .23 
10 .04 .18 .99 .10 .00 
a. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.331722 4.744450 3.841249 .6276368 779 
Residual -1.2396580 1.0415003 .0000000 .4225213 779 
Std. Predicted Value -2.405 1.439 .000 1.000 779 
Std. Residual -2.917 2.451 .000 .994 779 
a. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
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ANNEXURE 4 – Regression Analysis with Moderators 
A4.1. Regression for merger success where Years of Service and Organisational 
Culture are the moderators 
Regression 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.738157 .8039194 387 
Organizational Culture 3.715686 .5963739 387 
Years of Service 6.98 1.836 387 
Moderator Years of Service and 
Org Culture 
.0265 .94603 387 
Correlations 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organiza
tional 
Culture 
Years of 
Service 
Moderat
or Years 
of 
Service 
and Org 
Culture 
Pearson 
Correlation 
 
Merger Success 1.000 .806 -.036 -.051 
Organizational 
Culture 
.806 1.000 .027 -.043 
Years of Service -.036 .027 1.000 .041 
Moderator Years 
of Service and 
Org Culture 
-.051 -.043 .041 1.000 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
Merger Success . .000 .238 .160 
Organizational 
Culture 
.000 . .301 .199 
Years of Service .238 .301 . .212 
Moderator Years 
of Service and 
Org Culture 
.160 .199 .212 . 
N Merger Success 387 387 387 387 
Organizational 
Culture 
387 387 387 387 
Years of Service 387 387 387 387 
Moderator Years 
of Service and 
Org Culture 
387 387 387 387 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
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1 Moderator 
Years of 
Service and 
Org Culture, 
Years of 
Service, 
Organization
al Cultureb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
b. All requested variables entered. 
Model Summaryb 
Mod
el R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
1 .808a .654 .651 .4749578 .654 240.955 3 383 
Model Summaryb 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 2.126 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator Years of Service and Org Culture, Years of Service, Organizational Culture 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 163.068 3 54.356 240.955 .000b 
Residual 86.399 383 .226   
Total 249.467 386    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator Years of Service and Org Culture, Years of Service, Organizational Culture 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
B 
B Std. Error Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
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1 (Constant) -.130 .176  -.739 .461 -.476 
Organizational Culture 1.088 .041 .807 26.809 .000 1.008 
Years of Service -.025 .013 -.057 -1.901 .058 -.051 
Moderator Years of 
Service and Org 
Culture 
-.011 .026 -.013 -.447 .655 -.062 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .216      
Organizational Culture 1.168 .806 .808 .806 .997 1.003 
Years of Service .001 -.036 -.097 -.057 .998 1.002 
Moderator Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.039 -.051 -.023 -.013 .996 1.004 
a. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizationa
l Culture 
Years of 
Service 
Moderator 
Years of 
Service and 
Org Culture 
1 1 2.942 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 .999 1.716 .00 .00 .00 1.00 
3 .048 7.831 .03 .14 .87 .00 
4 .011 16.049 .97 .85 .12 .00 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.276135 4.625071 3.738157 .6499652 387 
Std. Predicted Value -2.249 1.365 .000 1.000 387 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.024 .105 .046 .015 387 
Adjusted Predicted Value 2.274841 4.624445 3.738039 .6500707 387 
Residual -1.2268772 1.0125291 .0000000 .4731085 387 
Std. Residual -2.583 2.132 .000 .996 387 
Stud. Residual -2.590 2.136 .000 1.001 387 
Deleted Residual -1.2338626 1.0165499 .0001178 .4775360 387 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.610 2.146 .000 1.003 387 
Mahal. Distance .018 17.758 2.992 2.744 387 
Cook's Distance .000 .027 .002 .003 387 
Centered Leverage Value .000 .046 .008 .007 387 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Charts 
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DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=Monthlysalary 
Descriptives 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Monthly salary 387 1 5 3.03 .966 
Valid N (listwise) 387     
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A4.2: Regression for merger success where Salary Income and Organisational 
Culture are the moderators 
Regression 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.738157 .8039194 387 
Organizational Culture 3.715686 .5963739 387 
Monthly salary 3.03 .966 387 
Moderator Salary Income and Org 
Culture 
.0035 1.00717 387 
 
Correlations 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizational 
Culture 
Monthly 
salary 
Moderator 
Salary Income 
and Org 
Culture 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .806 -.030 .006 
Organizational Culture .806 1.000 .004 .000 
Monthly salary -.030 .004 1.000 .022 
Moderator Salary Income 
and Org Culture 
.006 .000 .022 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .280 .453 
Organizational Culture .000 . .472 .499 
Monthly salary .280 .472 . .330 
Moderator Salary Income 
and Org Culture 
.453 .499 .330 . 
N Merger Success 387 387 387 387 
Organizational Culture 387 387 387 387 
Monthly salary 387 387 387 387 
Moderator Salary Income 
and Org Culture 
387 387 387 387 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator Salary 
Income and Org 
Culture, 
Organizational 
Culture, Monthly 
salaryb 
. Enter 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
b. All requested variables entered. 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
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1 .807a .651 .649 .4766054 .651 238.411 3 383 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 2.142 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator Salary Income and Org Culture, Organizational Culture, Monthly salary 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 162.467 3 54.156 238.411 .000b 
Residual 86.999 383 .227   
Total 249.467 386    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator Salary Income and Org Culture, Organizational 
Culture, Monthly salary 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardi
zed 
Coefficie
nts 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confide
nce 
Interval 
for B 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
1 (Constant) -.218 .171  -1.279 
.202 -.554 
Organizational 
Culture 
1.087 .041 .806 26.72
5 
.000 1.007 
Monthly salary -.027 .025 -.033 -
1.086 
.278 -.077 
Moderator Salary 
Income and Org 
Culture 
.006 .024 .007 .229 .819 -.042 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidenc
e Interval 
for B Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Upper 
Bound 
Zero-
order Partial Part 
Toleran
ce VIF 
1 (Constant) .117      
Organizational 
Culture 
1.167 .806 .807 .806 1.000 1.00
0 
Monthly salary .022 -.030 -.055 -.033 .999 1.00
1 
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Moderator Salary 
Income and Org 
Culture 
.053 .006 .012 .007 .999 1.00
1 
a. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa 
Mode
l 
Dimensio
n 
Eigenvalu
e 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant
) 
Organization
al Culture 
Monthly 
salary 
Moderato
r Salary 
Income 
and Org 
Culture 
1 1 2.921 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 1.000 1.709 .00 .00 .00 1.00 
3 .067 6.595 .03 .09 .91 .00 
4 .012 15.779 .97 .91 .08 .00 
a. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.209977 4.623377 3.738157 .6487674 387 
Std. Predicted Value -2.356 1.364 .000 1.000 387 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.024 .135 .046 .016 387 
Adjusted Predicted Value 2.199195 4.620563 3.738008 .6488400 387 
Residual -1.2489455 1.0010362 .0000000 .4747497 387 
Std. Residual -2.621 2.100 .000 .996 387 
Stud. Residual -2.626 2.117 .000 1.001 387 
Deleted Residual -1.2540488 1.0173601 .0001488 .4790825 387 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.646 2.127 .000 1.003 387 
Mahal. Distance .002 30.029 2.992 3.460 387 
Cook's Distance .000 .034 .002 .003 387 
Centered Leverage Value .000 .078 .008 .009 387 
a. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Charts 
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A4.3 Descriptive statistics of Organisational culture, Monthly salary and Years 
of Service within department 	
Department of the employee = Accounting 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Organizational Culture 40 2.6471 4.4412 3.836029 .5043897 
Monthly salary 40 2 5 3.10 .955 
Years of Service 40 4 11 6.43 2.037 
Valid N (listwise) 40     
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
Department of the employee = Others 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Organizational Culture 7 4.0000 4.2941 4.180672 .0936702 
Monthly salary 7 2 4 3.14 .900 
Years of Service 7 5 10 7.43 1.988 
Valid N (listwise) 7     
a. Department of the employee = Others 
Department of the employee = Outsources 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Organizational Culture 43 2.7647 4.3235 3.914501 .4314910 
Monthly salary 43 2 5 2.74 .848 
Years of Service 43 4 10 6.40 1.978 
Valid N (listwise) 43     
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
Department of the employee = Production 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Organizational Culture 86 2.3824 4.3529 3.791040 .5283347 
Monthly salary 86 1 5 3.13 .980 
Years of Service 86 4 11 6.95 1.897 
Valid N (listwise) 86     
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
 
 
 
Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Organizational Culture 48 2.6176 4.3824 3.808824 .5152822 
Monthly salary 48 1 5 3.00 1.052 
Years of Service 48 4 10 6.94 2.128 
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Valid N (listwise) 48     
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
 
Department of the employee = R&D 
 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Organizational Culture 74 2.6471 4.4706 3.879173 .4438829 
Monthly salary 74 2 5 3.09 .995 
Years of Service 74 4 11 7.19 2.092 
Valid N (listwise) 74     
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
 
Department of the employee = Sales 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Organizational Culture 69 2.5588 4.3235 3.839727 .4444669 
Monthly salary 69 1 5 3.12 1.051 
Years of Service 69 4 11 7.29 2.008 
Valid N (listwise) 69     
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
 
Department of the employee = Service 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Organizational Culture 25 2.6176 4.2353 3.635294 .5343587 
Monthly salary 25 1 5 2.92 1.115 
Years of Service 25 4 11 7.04 2.169 
Valid N (listwise) 25     
a. Department of the employee = Service 
 
A4.4 Regressions for merger success where Salary Income and Organisational 
Culture are the moderators within each department 
 
Regression 
Department of the employee = Accounting 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 4.025000 .6466548 40 
Organizational Culture 3.836029 .5043897 40 
Monthly salary 3.10 .955 40 
Moderator of Monthly Salary and 
Org Culture 
-.1308 1.08336 40 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
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Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Monthly Salary 
and Org 
Culture 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .778 -.073 .275 
Organizational Culture .778 1.000 -.134 .305 
Monthly salary -.073 -.134 1.000 -.182 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.275 .305 -.182 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .326 .043 
Organizational Culture .000 . .205 .028 
Monthly salary .326 .205 . .131 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.043 .028 .131 . 
N Merger Success 40 40 40 40 
Organizational Culture 40 40 40 40 
Monthly salary 40 40 40 40 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
40 40 40 40 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of 
Monthly Salary and 
Org Culture, 
Monthly salary, 
Organizational 
Culturec 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .780b .609 .576 .4210642 .609 18.661 3 36 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 2.587 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Monthly Salary and Org Culture, Monthly salary, Organizational Culture 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 9.926 3 3.309 18.661 .000c 
Residual 6.383 36 .177   
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Total 16.308 39    
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Monthly Salary and Org Culture, Monthly salary, Organizational Culture 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) .167 .607  .275 .785 -1.064 
Organizational Culture .986 .141 .769 6.998 .000 .700 
Monthly salary .026 .072 .038 .362 .720 -.120 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.029 .066 .048 .432 .668 -.105 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1.399      
Organizational Culture 1.271 .778 .759 .730 .901 1.110 
Monthly salary .172 -.073 .060 .038 .960 1.041 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.163 .275 .072 .045 .887 1.128 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Monthly Salary 
and Org Culture Monthly salary 
Organizational 
Culture 
1 Correlations Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
1.000 .149 -.288 
Monthly salary .149 1.000 .084 
Organizational Culture -.288 .084 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.004 .001 -.003 
Monthly salary .001 .005 .001 
Organizational Culture -.003 .001 .020 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model 
Dimensio
n 
Eigenvalu
e 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant
) 
Organization
al Culture 
Monthly 
salary 
Moderator of 
Monthly 
Salary and 
Org Culture 
1 1 2.952 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 .981 1.735 .00 .00 .00 .88 
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3 .061 6.973 .02 .06 .89 .06 
4 .007 20.742 .98 .94 .10 .06 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.804814 4.619001 4.025000 .5044853 40 
Std. Predicted Value -2.419 1.177 .000 1.000 40 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.068 .304 .125 .046 40 
Adjusted Predicted Value 2.676276 4.639054 4.030250 .5035621 40 
Residual -.7919284 .9572720 .0000000 .4045454 40 
Std. Residual -1.881 2.273 .000 .961 40 
Stud. Residual -1.960 2.345 -.005 1.008 40 
Deleted Residual -.8817847 1.0182757 -.0052496 .4464382 40 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.044 2.512 -.007 1.035 40 
Mahal. Distance .032 19.402 2.925 3.349 40 
Cook's Distance .000 .153 .026 .038 40 
Centered Leverage Value .001 .497 .075 .086 40 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Charts 
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Department of the employee = Others 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 4.380952 .5245305 7 
Organizational Culture 4.180672 .0936702 7 
Monthly salary 3.14 .900 7 
Moderator of Monthly Salary 
and Org Culture 
.2920 .95496 7 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizational 
Culture 
Monthly 
salary 
Moderator of 
Monthly 
Salary and 
Org Culture 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .793 .336 -.878 
Organizational Culture .793 1.000 .341 -.887 
Monthly salary .336 .341 1.000 -.568 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
-.878 -.887 -.568 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .017 .230 .005 
Organizational Culture .017 . .227 .004 
Monthly salary .230 .227 . .092 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.005 .004 .092 . 
N Merger Success 7 7 7 7 
Organizational Culture 7 7 7 7 
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Monthly salary 7 7 7 7 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
7 7 7 7 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of 
Monthly Salary and 
Org Culture, 
Monthly salary, 
Organizational 
Culturec 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .901b .812 .624 .3214247 .812 4.326 3 3 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .130 2.742 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Monthly Salary and Org Culture, Monthly salary, Organizational Culture 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1.341 3 .447 4.326 .130c 
Residual .310 3 .103   
Total 1.651 6    
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
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b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Monthly Salary and Org Culture, Monthly salary, Organizational Culture 
 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) 8.316 14.426  .576 .605 -37.594 
Organizational Culture -.778 3.361 -.139 -.231 .832 -11.473 
Monthly salary -.159 .196 -.272 -.810 .477 -.783 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
-.635 .377 -1.155 -1.686 .190 -1.833 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 54.227      
Organizational Culture 9.918 .793 -.132 -.058 .174 5.756 
Monthly salary .465 .336 -.423 -.203 .553 1.809 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.564 -.878 -.697 -.422 .133 7.508 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Monthly Salary 
and Org Culture Monthly salary 
Organizational 
Culture 
1 Correlations Moderator of Monthly Salary 
and Org Culture 
1.000 .612 .896 
Monthly salary .612 1.000 .429 
Organizational Culture .896 .429 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Monthly Salary 
and Org Culture 
.142 .045 1.134 
Monthly salary .045 .038 .283 
Organizational Culture 1.134 .283 11.295 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Variance Proportions 
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Condition 
Index (Constant) 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Monthly Salary 
and Org 
Culture 
1 1 3.054 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 
2 .916 1.826 .00 .00 .00 .12 
3 .029 10.187 .00 .00 .79 .06 
4 3.639E-5 289.729 1.00 1.00 .20 .81 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 3.333333 4.714912 4.380952 .4727318 7 
Std. Predicted Value -2.216 .706 .000 1.000 7 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.185 .321 .236 .064 7 
Adjusted Predicted Value 4.357964 9.555555 5.416363 2.0481245 6 
Residual -.2894737 .3859649 .0000000 .2272816 7 
Std. Residual -.901 1.201 .000 .707 7 
Stud. Residual -1.511 1.511 -.282 1.221 6 
Deleted Residual -4.8888888 .6111111 -.8608070 2.0327588 6 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.524 2.524 -.438 1.940 6 
Mahal. Distance 1.136 5.143 2.571 1.861 7 
Cook's Distance .029 57.266 9.795 23.259 6 
Centered Leverage Value .189 .857 .429 .310 7 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Charts 
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Department of the employee = Outsources 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.968992 .6249400 43 
Organizational Culture 3.914501 .4314910 43 
Monthly salary 2.74 .848 43 
Moderator of Monthly Salary and 
Org Culture 
.3291 .82963 43 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizationa
l Culture 
Monthly 
salary 
Moderator of 
Monthly 
Salary and 
Org Culture 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .784 .194 -.395 
Organizational Culture .784 1.000 .337 -.514 
Monthly salary .194 .337 1.000 .278 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
-.395 -.514 .278 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .106 .004 
Organizational Culture .000 . .014 .000 
Monthly salary .106 .014 . .036 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.004 .000 .036 . 
N Merger Success 43 43 43 43 
Organizational Culture 43 43 43 43 
Monthly salary 43 43 43 43 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
43 43 43 43 
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a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of 
Monthly Salary and 
Org Culture, 
Monthly salary, 
Organizational 
Culturec 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .790b .623 .594 .3980082 .623 21.516 3 39 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 2.269 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Monthly Salary and Org Culture, Monthly salary, Organizational Culture 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 10.225 3 3.408 21.516 .000c 
Residual 6.178 39 .158   
Total 16.403 42    
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Monthly Salary and Org Culture, Monthly salary, Organizational Culture 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) -.729 .706  -1.033 .308 -2.157 
Organizational Culture 1.258 .204 .868 6.162 .000 .845 
Monthly salary -.090 .093 -.122 -.968 .339 -.277 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.064 .104 .085 .614 .542 -.147 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
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Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .699      
Organizational Culture 1.671 .784 .702 .606 .486 2.056 
Monthly salary .098 .194 -.153 -.095 .610 1.639 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.274 -.395 .098 .060 .506 1.975 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Monthly Salary 
and Org Culture Monthly salary 
Organizational 
Culture 
1 Correlations Moderator of Monthly Salary 
and Org Culture 
1.000 -.558 .672 
Monthly salary -.558 1.000 -.582 
Organizational Culture .672 -.582 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Monthly Salary 
and Org Culture 
.011 -.005 .014 
Monthly salary -.005 .009 -.011 
Organizational Culture .014 -.011 .042 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Monthly 
Salary and Org 
Culture 
1 1 3.138 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .01 
2 .812 1.966 .00 .00 .00 .49 
3 .047 8.178 .04 .01 .74 .06 
4 .003 31.150 .96 .99 .25 .44 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
siduals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.718155 4.457724 3.968992 .4934112 43 
Std. Predicted Value -2.535 .991 .000 1.000 43 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.067 .265 .113 .045 43 
Adjusted Predicted Value 2.841969 4.464817 3.972325 .4855343 43 
Residual -.9105188 .7486131 .0000000 .3835303 43 
Std. Residual -2.288 1.881 .000 .964 43 
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Stud. Residual -2.357 1.995 -.004 1.010 43 
Deleted Residual -.9667130 .8425349 -.0033325 .4220903 43 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.513 2.079 -.011 1.038 43 
Mahal. Distance .225 17.618 2.930 3.629 43 
Cook's Distance .000 .171 .026 .042 43 
Centered Leverage Value .005 .419 .070 .086 43 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Charts 
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Department of the employee = Production 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.918605 .7390792 86 
Organizational Culture 3.791040 .5283347 86 
Monthly salary 3.13 .980 86 
Moderator of Monthly Salary and 
Org Culture 
.0074 .98115 86 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Monthly Salary 
and Org 
Culture 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .871 -.007 -.083 
Organizational Culture .871 1.000 .007 -.066 
Monthly salary -.007 .007 1.000 -.021 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
-.083 -.066 -.021 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .474 .224 
Organizational Culture .000 . .473 .274 
Monthly salary .474 .473 . .424 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.224 .274 .424 . 
N Merger Success 86 86 86 86 
Organizational Culture 86 86 86 86 
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Monthly salary 86 86 86 86 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
86 86 86 86 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of 
Monthly Salary and 
Org Culture, 
Monthly salary, 
Organizational 
Culturec 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .871b .759 .750 .3693853 .759 86.095 3 82 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 1.551 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Monthly Salary and Org Culture, Monthly salary, Organizational Culture 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 35.242 3 11.747 86.095 .000c 
Residual 11.189 82 .136   
Total 46.430 85    
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Monthly Salary and Org Culture, Monthly salary, Organizational Culture 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) -.657 .317  -2.072 .041 -1.288 
Organizational Culture 1.216 .076 .869 15.997 .000 1.065 
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Monthly salary -.011 .041 -.014 -.261 .795 -.092 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
-.020 .041 -.026 -.483 .631 -.101 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -.026      
Organizational Culture 1.367 .871 .870 .867 .996 1.004 
Monthly salary .071 -.007 -.029 -.014 1.000 1.000 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.062 -.083 -.053 -.026 .995 1.005 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Monthly Salary 
and Org Culture Monthly salary 
Organizational 
Culture 
1 Correlations Moderator of Monthly Salary 
and Org Culture 
1.000 .021 .065 
Monthly salary .021 1.000 -.006 
Organizational Culture .065 -.006 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Monthly Salary 
and Org Culture 
.002 3.438E-5 .000 
Monthly salary 3.438E-5 .002 -1.894E-5 
Organizational Culture .000 -1.894E-5 .006 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Monthly 
Salary and Org 
Culture 
1 1 2.928 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 1.000 1.711 .00 .00 .00 1.00 
3 .063 6.800 .03 .07 .93 .00 
4 .009 18.098 .97 .93 .06 .00 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.200584 4.670228 3.918605 .6439008 86 
Std. Predicted Value -2.668 1.167 .000 1.000 86 
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Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.042 .142 .075 .028 86 
Adjusted Predicted Value 2.151231 4.670833 3.919915 .6436250 86 
Residual -1.0213608 .8520659 .0000000 .3628082 86 
Std. Residual -2.765 2.307 .000 .982 86 
Stud. Residual -2.789 2.373 -.002 1.004 86 
Deleted Residual -1.0392599 .9015929 -.0013101 .3789905 86 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.914 2.444 -.002 1.015 86 
Mahal. Distance .134 11.610 2.965 3.097 86 
Cook's Distance .000 .082 .011 .017 86 
Centered Leverage Value .002 .137 .035 .036 86 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Charts 
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Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.944444 .7850053 48 
Organizational Culture 3.808824 .5152822 48 
Monthly salary 3.00 1.052 48 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
-.0565 1.05513 48 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organization
al Culture 
Monthly 
salary 
Moderator of 
Monthly 
Salary and 
Org Culture 
Pearson 
Correlation 
Merger Success 1.000 .876 -.060 .016 
Organizational Culture .876 1.000 -.058 -.027 
Monthly salary -.060 -.058 1.000 -.050 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.016 -.027 -.050 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .342 .456 
Organizational Culture .000 . .348 .428 
Monthly salary .342 .348 . .368 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.456 .428 .368 . 
N Merger Success 48 48 48 48 
Organizational Culture 48 48 48 48 
Monthly salary 48 48 48 48 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
48 48 48 48 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
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Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 Moderator of 
Monthly Salary 
and Org 
Culture, 
Organizational 
Culture, 
Monthly salaryc 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .877b .768 .753 .3904592 .768 48.658 3 44 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 2.261 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Monthly Salary and Org Culture, Organizational Culture, Monthly salary 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 22.255 3 7.418 48.658 .000c 
Residual 6.708 44 .152   
Total 28.963 47    
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Monthly Salary and Org Culture, Organizational Culture, Monthly salary 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) -1.122 .464  -2.415 .020 -2.058 
Organizational Culture 1.335 .111 .876 12.052 .000 1.112 
Monthly salary -.006 .054 -.008 -.104 .918 -.115 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.029 .054 .040 .545 .589 -.080 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
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Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -.185      
Organizational Culture 1.558 .876 .876 .874 .996 1.004 
Monthly salary .104 -.060 -.016 -.008 .994 1.006 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.138 .016 .082 .040 .997 1.003 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Monthly Salary 
and Org Culture 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
1 Correlations Moderator of Monthly Salary 
and Org Culture 
1.000 .030 .052 
Organizational Culture .030 1.000 .059 
Monthly salary .052 .059 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Monthly Salary 
and Org Culture 
.003 .000 .000 
Organizational Culture .000 .012 .000 
Monthly salary .000 .000 .003 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Monthly Salary 
and Org 
Culture 
1 1 2.919 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 .995 1.713 .00 .00 .00 1.00 
3 .078 6.109 .02 .05 .91 .00 
4 .008 18.809 .98 .95 .07 .00 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.426360 4.686201 3.944444 .6881179 48 
Std. Predicted Value -2.206 1.078 .000 1.000 48 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.057 .237 .105 .041 48 
Adjusted Predicted Value 2.311300 4.718498 3.948733 .6870688 48 
Residual -.8254386 .9165155 .0000000 .3777923 48 
Std. Residual -2.114 2.347 .000 .968 48 
Stud. Residual -2.191 2.400 -.005 1.005 48 
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Deleted Residual -.8865844 .9579244 -.0042885 .4082493 48 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.295 2.545 -.004 1.031 48 
Mahal. Distance .024 16.382 2.938 3.307 48 
Cook's Distance .000 .156 .021 .035 48 
Centered Leverage Value .001 .349 .063 .070 48 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Charts 
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Department of the employee = R&D 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.981982 .6502356 74 
Organizational Culture 3.879173 .4438829 74 
Monthly salary 3.09 .995 74 
Moderator of Monthly Salary and 
Org Culture 
-.0227 .86361 74 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Monthly 
Salary and Org 
Culture 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .770 -.026 .170 
Organizational Culture .770 1.000 -.023 .135 
Monthly salary -.026 -.023 1.000 .226 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.170 .135 .226 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .414 .074 
Organizational Culture .000 . .423 .125 
Monthly salary .414 .423 . .027 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.074 .125 .027 . 
N Merger Success 74 74 74 74 
Organizational Culture 74 74 74 74 
Monthly salary 74 74 74 74 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
74 74 74 74 
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a. Department of the employee = R&D 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of 
Monthly Salary and 
Org Culture, 
Organizational 
Culture, Monthly 
salaryc 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .773b .598 .580 .4211960 .598 34.660 3 70 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 1.794 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Monthly Salary and Org Culture, Organizational Culture, Monthly salary 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 18.446 3 6.149 34.660 .000c 
Residual 12.418 70 .177   
Total 30.865 73    
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Monthly Salary and Org Culture, Organizational Culture, Monthly salary 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) -.283 .474  -.598 .552 -1.229 
Organizational Culture 1.113 .112 .760 9.910 .000 .889 
Monthly salary -.016 .051 -.024 -.313 .755 -.117 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.055 .059 .072 .921 .360 -.064 
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Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .662      
Organizational Culture 1.336 .770 .764 .751 .979 1.022 
Monthly salary .086 -.026 -.037 -.024 .946 1.057 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.173 .170 .109 .070 .929 1.076 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Monthly Salary 
and Org Culture 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
1 Correlations Moderator of Monthly Salary 
and Org Culture 
1.000 -.144 -.231 
Organizational Culture -.144 1.000 .055 
Monthly salary -.231 .055 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Monthly Salary 
and Org Culture 
.004 -.001 -.001 
Organizational Culture -.001 .013 .000 
Monthly salary -.001 .000 .003 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Monthly Salary 
and Org 
Culture 
1 1 2.928 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 1.003 1.709 .00 .00 .00 .92 
3 .063 6.808 .02 .04 .93 .04 
4 .006 22.258 .98 .96 .06 .04 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.532267 4.635824 3.981982 .5026837 74 
Std. Predicted Value -2.884 1.301 .000 1.000 74 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.049 .203 .091 .037 74 
Adjusted Predicted Value 2.401676 4.648130 3.980768 .5096691 74 
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Residual -.8141921 .9635891 .0000000 .4124505 74 
Std. Residual -1.933 2.288 .000 .979 74 
Stud. Residual -1.965 2.424 .001 1.011 74 
Deleted Residual -.8411199 1.0817244 .0012145 .4404573 74 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.007 2.514 .003 1.024 74 
Mahal. Distance .011 15.948 2.959 3.582 74 
Cook's Distance .000 .180 .018 .037 74 
Centered Leverage Value .000 .218 .041 .049 74 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Charts 
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Department of the employee = Sales 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.888889 .6899528 69 
Organizational Culture 3.839727 .4444669 69 
Monthly salary 3.12 1.051 69 
Moderator of Monthly Salary and 
Org Culture 
.0051 .83735 69 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Monthly 
Salary and 
Org Culture 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .793 .025 .039 
Organizational Culture .793 1.000 .005 -.005 
Monthly salary .025 .005 1.000 .325 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.039 -.005 .325 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .420 .376 
Organizational Culture .000 . .483 .485 
Monthly salary .420 .483 . .003 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.376 .485 .003 . 
N Merger Success 69 69 69 69 
Organizational Culture 69 69 69 69 
Monthly salary 69 69 69 69 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
69 69 69 69 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
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Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of 
Monthly Salary and 
Org Culture, 
Organizational 
Culture, Monthly 
salaryc 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .794b .631 .614 .4288647 .631 36.999 3 65 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 2.057 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Monthly Salary and Org Culture, Organizational Culture, Monthly salary 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 20.415 3 6.805 36.999 .000c 
Residual 11.955 65 .184   
Total 32.370 68    
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Monthly Salary and Org Culture, Organizational Culture, Monthly salary 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) -.854 .480  -1.781 .080 -1.812 
Organizational Culture 1.231 .117 .793 10.522 .000 .997 
Monthly salary .005 .052 .008 .096 .924 -.100 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.033 .066 .040 .502 .617 -.098 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
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Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .104      
Organizational Culture 1.465 .793 .794 .793 1.000 1.000 
Monthly salary .110 .025 .012 .007 .894 1.118 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.164 .039 .062 .038 .894 1.118 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Monthly Salary 
and Org Culture 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
1 Correlations Moderator of Monthly Salary 
and Org Culture 
1.000 .007 -.325 
Organizational Culture .007 1.000 -.007 
Monthly salary -.325 -.007 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Monthly Salary 
and Org Culture 
.004 5.120E-5 -.001 
Organizational Culture 5.120E-5 .014 -4.328E-5 
Monthly salary -.001 -4.328E-5 .003 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Monthly Salary 
and Org 
Culture 
1 1 2.925 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 1.005 1.706 .00 .00 .00 .88 
3 .063 6.807 .02 .04 .95 .12 
4 .006 21.505 .98 .96 .04 .00 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.321610 4.519038 3.888889 .5479273 69 
Std. Predicted Value -2.860 1.150 .000 1.000 69 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.052 .255 .096 .039 69 
Adjusted Predicted Value 2.319713 4.537219 3.890206 .5513487 69 
Residual -1.0715594 .9877921 .0000000 .4192977 69 
Std. Residual -2.499 2.303 .000 .978 69 
Stud. Residual -2.554 2.321 -.002 1.000 69 
Deleted Residual -1.1194302 1.0032846 -.0013171 .4386283 69 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.672 2.405 -.003 1.015 69 
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Mahal. Distance .025 22.999 2.957 3.986 69 
Cook's Distance .000 .081 .011 .017 69 
Centered Leverage Value .000 .338 .043 .059 69 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Charts 
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Department of the employee = Service 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.760000 .7039571 25 
Organizational Culture 3.635294 .5343587 25 
Monthly salary 2.92 1.115 25 
Moderator of Monthly Salary and 
Org Culture 
.1722 .88983 25 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizational 
Culture 
Monthly 
salary 
Moderator of 
Monthly 
Salary and 
Org Culture 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .812 .293 .084 
Organizational Culture .812 1.000 .179 -.046 
Monthly salary .293 .179 1.000 .186 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.084 -.046 .186 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .078 .345 
Organizational Culture .000 . .195 .413 
Monthly salary .078 .195 . .186 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.345 .413 .186 . 
N Merger Success 25 25 25 25 
Organizational Culture 25 25 25 25 
Monthly salary 25 25 25 25 
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Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
25 25 25 25 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of 
Monthly Salary and 
Org Culture, 
Organizational 
Culture, Monthly 
salaryc 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .831b .691 .647 .4185105 .691 15.634 3 21 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 1.618 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Monthly Salary and Org Culture, Organizational Culture, Monthly salary 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 8.215 3 2.738 15.634 .000c 
Residual 3.678 21 .175   
Total 11.893 24    
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Monthly Salary and Org Culture, Organizational Culture, Monthly salary 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) -.294 .600  -.491 .629 -1.542 
Organizational Culture 1.044 .163 .793 6.404 .000 .705 
Monthly salary .084 .079 .133 1.056 .303 -.081 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.076 .098 .096 .775 .447 -.128 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
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Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .953      
Organizational Culture 1.383 .812 .813 .777 .961 1.040 
Monthly salary .249 .293 .225 .128 .930 1.075 
Moderator of Monthly 
Salary and Org Culture 
.280 .084 .167 .094 .959 1.043 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Monthly Salary 
and Org Culture 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
1 Correlations Moderator of Monthly Salary 
and Org Culture 
1.000 .083 -.198 
Organizational Culture .083 1.000 -.192 
Monthly salary -.198 -.192 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Monthly Salary 
and Org Culture 
.010 .001 -.002 
Organizational Culture .001 .027 -.002 
Monthly salary -.002 -.002 .006 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Monthly Salary 
and Org 
Culture 
1 1 2.974 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .01 
2 .937 1.782 .00 .00 .00 .95 
3 .079 6.152 .04 .04 .99 .04 
4 .010 17.097 .96 .96 .00 .00 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.634792 4.707135 3.760000 .5850627 25 
Std. Predicted Value -1.923 1.619 .000 1.000 25 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.097 .314 .158 .058 25 
Adjusted Predicted Value 2.164310 4.730392 3.745833 .6400343 25 
Residual -.7201931 .7010925 .0000000 .3914807 25 
Std. Residual -1.721 1.675 .000 .935 25 
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Stud. Residual -1.884 1.766 .013 1.017 25 
Deleted Residual -.8631263 .8356900 .0141670 .4713052 25 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.017 1.867 .009 1.046 25 
Mahal. Distance .342 12.552 2.880 2.985 25 
Cook's Distance .000 .561 .056 .117 25 
Centered Leverage Value .014 .523 .120 .124 25 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
 
Charts 
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A4.5 Regression for merger success where Years of Service and Organisational 
Culture are the moderators within each department 
 
Regression 
Department of the employee = Accounting 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 4.025000 .6466548 40 
Organizational Culture 3.836029 .5043897 40 
Years of Service 6.43 2.037 40 
Moderator of Years of Service and 
Org Culture 
-.1125 .90563 40 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizationa
l Culture 
Years of 
Service 
Moderator of 
Years of 
Service and 
Org Culture 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .778 -.138 .193 
Organizational Culture .778 1.000 -.115 .211 
Years of Service -.138 -.115 1.000 .083 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.193 .211 .083 1.000 
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Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .198 .117 
Organizational Culture .000 . .239 .096 
Years of Service .198 .239 . .306 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.117 .096 .306 . 
N Merger Success 40 40 40 40 
Organizational Culture 40 40 40 40 
Years of Service 40 40 40 40 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
40 40 40 40 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of Years 
of Service and Org 
Culture, Years of 
Service, 
Organizational 
Culturec 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .781b .609 .577 .4207547 .609 18.707 3 36 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 2.666 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Years of Service and Org Culture, Years of Service, Organizational Culture 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 9.935 3 3.312 18.707 .000c 
Residual 6.373 36 .177   
Total 16.308 39    
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Years of Service and Org Culture, Years of Service, Organizational Culture 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
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Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) .376 .604  .622 .538 -.848 
Organizational Culture .980 .138 .765 7.106 .000 .700 
Years of Service -.017 .034 -.053 -.500 .620 -.085 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.026 .077 .036 .336 .739 -.130 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1.600      
Organizational Culture 1.260 .778 .764 .740 .938 1.066 
Years of Service .051 -.138 -.083 -.052 .975 1.026 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.181 .193 .056 .035 .944 1.059 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Years of Service 
and Org Culture Years of Service 
Organizational 
Culture 
1 Correlations Moderator of Years of Service 
and Org Culture 
1.000 -.110 -.222 
Years of Service -.110 1.000 .136 
Organizational Culture -.222 .136 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Years of Service 
and Org Culture 
.006 .000 -.002 
Years of Service .000 .001 .001 
Organizational Culture -.002 .001 .019 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
Culture 
Years of 
Service 
Moderator of 
Years of 
Service and 
Org Culture 
1 1 2.943 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 .983 1.730 .00 .00 .00 .94 
3 .067 6.628 .02 .06 .86 .00 
4 .007 20.508 .98 .94 .13 .06 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
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Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.773374 4.621726 4.025000 .5047236 40 
Std. Predicted Value -2.480 1.182 .000 1.000 40 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.074 .261 .126 .042 40 
Adjusted Predicted Value 2.759737 4.642211 4.030254 .5126823 40 
Residual -.7689805 .9044624 .0000000 .4042480 40 
Std. Residual -1.828 2.150 .000 .961 40 
Stud. Residual -1.924 2.192 -.006 1.010 40 
Deleted Residual -.8522532 .9400687 -.0052539 .4476673 40 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.003 2.321 -.008 1.035 40 
Mahal. Distance .225 14.072 2.925 2.851 40 
Cook's Distance .000 .139 .027 .038 40 
Centered Leverage Value .006 .361 .075 .073 40 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Charts 
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Department of the employee = Others 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 4.380952 .5245305 7 
Organizational Culture 4.180672 .0936702 7 
Years of Service 7.43 1.988 7 
Moderator of Years of Service and 
Org Culture 
-.1902 .59929 7 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizational 
Culture 
Years of 
Service 
Moderator of 
Years of 
Service and 
Org Culture 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .793 .030 -.256 
Organizational Culture .793 1.000 -.222 -.769 
Years of Service .030 -.222 1.000 .434 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
-.256 -.769 .434 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .017 .474 .290 
Organizational Culture .017 . .316 .022 
Years of Service .474 .316 . .165 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.290 .022 .165 . 
N Merger Success 7 7 7 7 
Organizational Culture 7 7 7 7 
Years of Service 7 7 7 7 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
7 7 7 7 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
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Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of Years 
of Service and Org 
Culture, Years of 
Service, 
Organizational 
Culturec 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .968b .937 .873 .1868004 .937 14.769 3 3 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .027 3.105 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Years of Service and Org Culture, Years of Service, Organizational Culture 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1.546 3 .515 14.769 .027c 
Residual .105 3 .035   
Total 1.651 6    
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Years of Service and Org Culture, Years of Service, Organizational Culture 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) -29.746 5.341  -5.570 .011 -46.742 
Organizational Culture 8.211 1.298 1.466 6.328 .008 4.082 
Years of Service -.007 .043 -.028 -.169 .876 -.145 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.773 .220 .883 3.522 .039 .075 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
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Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -12.749      
Organizational Culture 12.341 .793 .965 .920 .394 2.540 
Years of Service .131 .030 -.097 -.025 .781 1.281 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
1.472 -.256 .897 .512 .336 2.976 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Years of Service 
and Org Culture Years of Service 
Organizational 
Culture 
1 Correlations Moderator of Years of Service 
and Org Culture 
1.000 -.423 .765 
Years of Service -.423 1.000 -.194 
Organizational Culture .765 -.194 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Years of Service 
and Org Culture 
.048 -.004 .218 
Years of Service -.004 .002 -.011 
Organizational Culture .218 -.011 1.684 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
Culture 
Years of 
Service 
Moderator of 
Years of 
Service and 
Org Culture 
1 1 3.084 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .01 
2 .886 1.866 .00 .00 .00 .32 
3 .030 10.097 .00 .00 .97 .11 
4 8.607E-5 189.293 1.00 1.00 .03 .57 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 3.369146 5.071625 4.380952 .5076269 7 
Std. Predicted Value -1.993 1.361 .000 1.000 7 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.093 .187 .137 .037 7 
Adjusted Predicted Value 3.627119 5.146893 4.389001 .4905515 6 
Residual -.1212121 .2369146 .0000000 .1320878 7 
Std. Residual -.649 1.268 .000 .707 7 
Stud. Residual -.749 1.704 .025 1.069 6 
 
 
[331] 
 
Deleted Residual -.2937853 .4278607 -.0001119 .3018841 6 
Stud. Deleted Residual -.679 7.818 1.097 3.359 6 
Mahal. Distance .643 5.143 2.571 1.753 7 
Cook's Distance .047 .585 .306 .273 6 
Centered Leverage Value .107 .857 .429 .292 7 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Charts 
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Department of the employee = Outsources 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.968992 .6249400 43 
Organizational Culture 3.914501 .4314910 43 
Years of Service 6.40 1.978 43 
Moderator of Years of Service and 
Org Culture 
.2889 .71433 43 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizational 
Culture 
Years of 
Service 
Moderator of 
Years of 
Service and 
Org Culture 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .784 .145 -.353 
Organizational Culture .784 1.000 .296 -.497 
Years of Service .145 .296 1.000 .322 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
-.353 -.497 .322 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .177 .010 
Organizational Culture .000 . .027 .000 
Years of Service .177 .027 . .017 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.010 .000 .017 . 
N Merger Success 43 43 43 43 
Organizational Culture 43 43 43 43 
Years of Service 43 43 43 43 
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Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
43 43 43 43 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of Years 
of Service and Org 
Culture, Years of 
Service, 
Organizational 
Culturec 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .797b .636 .608 .3914866 .636 22.676 3 39 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 2.208 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Years of Service and Org Culture, Years of Service, Organizational Culture 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 10.426 3 3.475 22.676 .000c 
Residual 5.977 39 .153   
Total 16.403 42    
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Years of Service and Org Culture, Years of Service, Organizational Culture 
 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) -.905 .677  -1.337 .189 -2.275 
Organizational Culture 1.327 .194 .916 6.836 .000 .934 
Years of Service -.056 .039 -.178 -1.446 .156 -.135 
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Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.140 .118 .160 1.185 .243 -.099 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .464      
Organizational Culture 1.719 .784 .738 .661 .521 1.921 
Years of Service .022 .145 -.226 -.140 .620 1.614 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.379 -.353 .186 .115 .511 1.957 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Years of Service 
and Org Culture Years of Service 
Organizational 
Culture 
1 Correlations Moderator of Years of Service 
and Org Culture 
1.000 -.567 .655 
Years of Service -.567 1.000 -.555 
Organizational Culture .655 -.555 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Years of Service 
and Org Culture 
.014 -.003 .015 
Years of Service -.003 .002 -.004 
Organizational Culture .015 -.004 .038 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
Culture 
Years of 
Service 
Moderator of 
Years of 
Service and 
Org Culture 
1 1 3.147 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .01 
2 .803 1.980 .00 .00 .00 .49 
3 .046 8.275 .04 .01 .77 .09 
4 .003 30.225 .96 .99 .22 .41 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.500110 4.499926 3.968992 .4982324 43 
Std. Predicted Value -2.948 1.066 .000 1.000 43 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.066 .239 .113 .039 43 
Adjusted Predicted Value 2.564471 4.529133 3.966625 .5040318 43 
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Residual -.8963830 .7858818 .0000000 .3772460 43 
Std. Residual -2.290 2.007 .000 .964 43 
Stud. Residual -2.348 2.108 .002 1.013 43 
Deleted Residual -.9425972 .8665330 .0023673 .4187826 43 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.501 2.210 -.002 1.041 43 
Mahal. Distance .224 14.648 2.930 3.060 43 
Cook's Distance .000 .249 .029 .053 43 
Centered Leverage Value .005 .349 .070 .073 43 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
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Department of the employee = Production 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.918605 .7390792 86 
Organizational Culture 3.791040 .5283347 86 
Years of Service 6.95 1.897 86 
Moderator of Years of Service and 
Org Culture 
-.0247 .96181 86 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizational 
Culture 
Years of 
Service 
Moderator of 
Years of 
Service and 
Org Culture 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .871 .003 -.050 
Organizational Culture .871 1.000 -.025 -.052 
Years of Service .003 -.025 1.000 .047 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
-.050 -.052 .047 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .490 .325 
Organizational Culture .000 . .410 .318 
Years of Service .490 .410 . .334 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.325 .318 .334 . 
N Merger Success 86 86 86 86 
Organizational Culture 86 86 86 86 
Years of Service 86 86 86 86 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
86 86 86 86 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
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Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of Years 
of Service and Org 
Culture, Years of 
Service, 
Organizational 
Culturec 
. Enter 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .871b .759 .750 .3695612 .759 85.987 3 82 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 1.595 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Years of Service and Org Culture, Years of Service, Organizational Culture 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 35.231 3 11.744 85.987 .000c 
Residual 11.199 82 .137   
Total 46.430 85    
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Years of Service and Org Culture, Years of Service, Organizational Culture 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) -.768 .329  -2.337 .022 -1.423 
Organizational Culture 1.218 .076 .871 16.035 .000 1.067 
Years of Service .010 .021 .025 .459 .648 -.032 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
-.004 .042 -.006 -.105 .917 -.087 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -.114      
Organizational Culture 1.370 .871 .871 .870 .997 1.003 
Years of Service .052 .003 .051 .025 .997 1.003 
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Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.079 -.050 -.012 -.006 .995 1.005 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Years of Service 
and Org Culture Years of Service 
Organizational 
Culture 
1 Correlations Moderator of Years of Service 
and Org Culture 
1.000 -.046 .051 
Years of Service -.046 1.000 .023 
Organizational Culture .051 .023 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Years of Service 
and Org Culture 
.002 -4.029E-5 .000 
Years of Service -4.029E-5 .000 3.639E-5 
Organizational Culture .000 3.639E-5 .006 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
Culture 
Years of 
Service 
Moderator of 
Years of 
Service and 
Org Culture 
1 1 2.941 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 .999 1.716 .00 .00 .00 .99 
3 .051 7.628 .03 .09 .89 .00 
4 .009 18.462 .97 .91 .10 .00 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.186876 4.589790 3.918605 .6438034 86 
Std. Predicted Value -2.690 1.043 .000 1.000 86 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.042 .155 .075 .027 86 
Adjusted Predicted Value 2.121905 4.614703 3.919640 .6439590 86 
Residual -1.0112035 .8530789 .0000000 .3629810 86 
Std. Residual -2.736 2.308 .000 .982 86 
Stud. Residual -2.765 2.355 -.001 1.002 86 
Deleted Residual -1.0324793 .8878303 -.0010358 .3780900 86 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.886 2.424 -.001 1.013 86 
Mahal. Distance .084 13.997 2.965 2.961 86 
Cook's Distance .000 .065 .010 .014 86 
Centered Leverage Value .001 .165 .035 .035 86 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
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Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.944444 .7850053 48 
Organizational Culture 3.808824 .5152822 48 
Years of Service 6.94 2.128 48 
Moderator of Years of Service and 
Org Culture 
.0243 .99909 48 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizational 
Culture 
Years of 
Service 
Moderator of 
Years of 
Service and 
Org Culture 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .876 -.015 -.038 
Organizational Culture .876 1.000 .025 -.050 
Years of Service -.015 .025 1.000 .010 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
-.038 -.050 .010 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .460 .399 
Organizational Culture .000 . .433 .367 
Years of Service .460 .433 . .473 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.399 .367 .473 . 
N Merger Success 48 48 48 48 
Organizational Culture 48 48 48 48 
Years of Service 48 48 48 48 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
48 48 48 48 
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a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of Years 
of Service and Org 
Culture, Years of 
Service, 
Organizational 
Culturec 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .876b .768 .752 .3906906 .768 48.583 3 44 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 2.340 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Years of Service and Org Culture, Years of Service, Organizational Culture 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 22.247 3 7.416 48.583 .000c 
Residual 6.716 44 .153   
Total 28.963 47    
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Years of Service and Org Culture, Years of Service, Organizational Culture 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) -1.050 .460  -2.281 .027 -1.977 
Organizational Culture 1.336 .111 .877 12.060 .000 1.113 
Years of Service -.014 .027 -.037 -.505 .616 -.068 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.005 .057 .006 .088 .931 -.110 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
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Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -.122      
Organizational Culture 1.559 .876 .876 .875 .997 1.003 
Years of Service .040 -.015 -.076 -.037 .999 1.001 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.120 -.038 .013 .006 .997 1.003 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Years of Service 
and Org Culture Years of Service 
Organizational 
Culture 
1 Correlations Moderator of Years of Service 
and Org Culture 
1.000 -.011 .051 
Years of Service -.011 1.000 -.025 
Organizational Culture .051 -.025 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Years of Service 
and Org Culture 
.003 -1.711E-5 .000 
Years of Service -1.711E-5 .001 -7.526E-5 
Organizational Culture .000 -7.526E-5 .012 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
Culture 
Years of 
Service 
Moderator of 
Years of 
Service and 
Org Culture 
1 1 2.933 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 .999 1.713 .00 .00 .00 1.00 
3 .060 7.005 .03 .06 .94 .00 
4 .008 18.632 .97 .94 .05 .00 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.389845 4.720712 3.944444 .6879949 48 
Std. Predicted Value -2.260 1.128 .000 1.000 48 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.062 .212 .107 .035 48 
Adjusted Predicted Value 2.310019 4.743803 3.945266 .6881846 48 
Residual -.7956131 .9581790 .0000000 .3780162 48 
Std. Residual -2.036 2.453 .000 .968 48 
Stud. Residual -2.080 2.539 -.001 1.009 48 
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Deleted Residual -.8302256 1.0268680 -.0008213 .4121422 48 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.166 2.717 .001 1.035 48 
Mahal. Distance .223 12.862 2.938 2.729 48 
Cook's Distance .000 .183 .023 .039 48 
Centered Leverage Value .005 .274 .063 .058 48 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
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Department of the employee = R&D 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.981982 .6502356 74 
Organizational Culture 3.879173 .4438829 74 
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Years of Service 7.19 2.092 74 
Moderator of Years of Service and 
Org Culture 
-.0957 .90235 74 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizational 
Culture 
Years of 
Service 
Moderator of 
Years of 
Service and 
Org Culture 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .770 -.122 .255 
Organizational Culture .770 1.000 -.097 .260 
Years of Service -.122 -.097 1.000 .101 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.255 .260 .101 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .151 .014 
Organizational Culture .000 . .206 .013 
Years of Service .151 .206 . .196 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.014 .013 .196 . 
N Merger Success 74 74 74 74 
Organizational Culture 74 74 74 74 
Years of Service 74 74 74 74 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
74 74 74 74 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of Years 
of Service and Org 
Culture, Years of 
Service, 
Organizational 
Culturec 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .774b .599 .582 .4205231 .599 34.845 3 70 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 1.780 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
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b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Years of Service and Org Culture, Years of Service, Organizational Culture 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 18.486 3 6.162 34.845 .000c 
Residual 12.379 70 .177   
Total 30.865 73    
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Years of Service and Org Culture, Years of Service, Organizational Culture 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) -.135 .505  -.267 .790 -1.142 
Organizational Culture 1.095 .116 .747 9.453 .000 .864 
Years of Service -.017 .024 -.056 -.728 .469 -.065 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.048 .057 .066 .835 .407 -.066 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .872      
Organizational Culture 1.326 .770 .749 .716 .917 1.091 
Years of Service .030 -.122 -.087 -.055 .974 1.027 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.161 .255 .099 .063 .916 1.091 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Years of Service 
and Org Culture Years of Service 
Organizational 
Culture 
1 Correlations Moderator of Years of Service 
and Org Culture 
1.000 -.131 -.273 
Years of Service -.131 1.000 .128 
Organizational Culture -.273 .128 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Years of Service 
and Org Culture 
.003 .000 -.002 
Years of Service .000 .001 .000 
Organizational Culture -.002 .000 .013 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
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b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
Culture 
Years of 
Service 
Moderator of 
Years of 
Service and 
Org Culture 
1 1 2.949 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 .989 1.726 .00 .00 .00 .91 
3 .057 7.210 .02 .05 .88 .00 
4 .005 23.523 .98 .95 .11 .09 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.561871 4.631494 3.981982 .5032237 74 
Std. Predicted Value -2.822 1.291 .000 1.000 74 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.050 .235 .091 .036 74 
Adjusted Predicted Value 2.476012 4.643919 3.979003 .5106820 74 
Residual -.8098207 1.0055611 .0000000 .4117916 74 
Std. Residual -1.926 2.391 .000 .979 74 
Stud. Residual -1.943 2.582 .003 1.015 74 
Deleted Residual -.8244196 1.1723433 .0029792 .4435023 74 
Stud. Deleted Residual -1.983 2.695 .005 1.029 74 
Mahal. Distance .049 21.819 2.959 3.787 74 
Cook's Distance .000 .307 .020 .050 74 
Centered Leverage Value .001 .299 .041 .052 74 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Charts 
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Department of the employee = Sales 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.888889 .6899528 69 
Organizational Culture 3.839727 .4444669 69 
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Years of Service 7.29 2.008 69 
Moderator of Years of Service and 
Org Culture 
-.0349 .87527 69 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizational 
Culture 
Years of 
Service 
Moderator of 
Years of 
Service and 
Org Culture 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .793 .045 .220 
Organizational Culture .793 1.000 -.035 .214 
Years of Service .045 -.035 1.000 .206 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.220 .214 .206 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .357 .035 
Organizational Culture .000 . .386 .039 
Years of Service .357 .386 . .045 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.035 .039 .045 . 
N Merger Success 69 69 69 69 
Organizational Culture 69 69 69 69 
Years of Service 69 69 69 69 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
69 69 69 69 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of Years 
of Service and Org 
Culture, Years of 
Service, 
Organizational 
Culturec 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .797b .635 .619 .4260828 .635 37.768 3 65 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 1.990 
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a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Years of Service and Org Culture, Years of Service, Organizational Culture 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 20.570 3 6.857 37.768 .000c 
Residual 11.801 65 .182   
Total 32.370 68    
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Years of Service and Org Culture, Years of Service, Organizational Culture 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) -.964 .515  -1.872 .066 -1.992 
Organizational Culture 1.222 .119 .787 10.231 .000 .983 
Years of Service .022 .026 .065 .844 .402 -.030 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.030 .062 .038 .485 .629 -.094 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .065      
Organizational Culture 1.460 .793 .785 .766 .948 1.055 
Years of Service .075 .045 .104 .063 .951 1.052 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.154 .220 .060 .036 .908 1.101 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Years of Service 
and Org Culture Years of Service 
Organizational 
Culture 
1 Correlations Moderator of Years of Service 
and Org Culture 
1.000 -.219 -.226 
Years of Service -.219 1.000 .083 
Organizational Culture -.226 .083 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Years of Service 
and Org Culture 
.004 .000 -.002 
Years of Service .000 .001 .000 
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Organizational Culture -.002 .000 .014 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
Culture 
Years of 
Service 
Moderator of 
Years of 
Service and 
Org Culture 
1 1 2.944 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 1.001 1.715 .00 .00 .00 .90 
3 .049 7.741 .02 .06 .89 .02 
4 .006 22.782 .98 .94 .10 .07 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.289184 4.585563 3.888889 .5499979 69 
Std. Predicted Value -2.909 1.267 .000 1.000 69 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.053 .205 .097 .034 69 
Adjusted Predicted Value 2.275912 4.578209 3.890963 .5512434 69 
Residual -1.1363672 .9935520 .0000000 .4165779 69 
Std. Residual -2.667 2.332 .000 .978 69 
Stud. Residual -2.763 2.350 -.002 1.007 69 
Deleted Residual -1.2194163 1.0092328 -.0020741 .4425461 69 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.918 2.438 -.004 1.025 69 
Mahal. Distance .071 14.731 2.957 2.986 69 
Cook's Distance .000 .147 .016 .030 69 
Centered Leverage Value .001 .217 .043 .044 69 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
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Department of the employee = Service 
 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
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Merger Success 3.760000 .7039571 25 
Organizational Culture 3.635294 .5343587 25 
Years of Service 7.04 2.169 25 
Moderator of Years of Service and 
Org Culture 
.2034 1.10877 25 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizational 
Culture 
Years of 
Service 
Moderator of 
Years of 
Service and 
Org Culture 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .812 .507 .128 
Organizational Culture .812 1.000 .212 -.076 
Years of Service .507 .212 1.000 -.057 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.128 -.076 -.057 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .005 .271 
Organizational Culture .000 . .155 .359 
Years of Service .005 .155 . .392 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.271 .359 .392 . 
N Merger Success 25 25 25 25 
Organizational Culture 25 25 25 25 
Years of Service 25 25 25 25 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
25 25 25 25 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of Years 
of Service and Org 
Culture, Years of 
Service, 
Organizational 
Culturec 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .905b .819 .793 .3204479 .819 31.607 3 21 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 1.760 
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a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Years of Service and Org Culture, Years of Service, Organizational Culture 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 9.737 3 3.246 31.607 .000c 
Residual 2.156 21 .103   
Total 11.893 24    
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Years of Service and Org Culture, Years of Service, Organizational Culture 
 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) -.687 .468  -1.466 .157 -1.660 
Organizational Culture .990 .126 .752 7.888 .000 .729 
Years of Service .117 .031 .359 3.776 .001 .052 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.131 .059 .206 2.204 .039 .007 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .287      
Organizational Culture 1.251 .812 .865 .733 .951 1.051 
Years of Service .181 .507 .636 .351 .953 1.049 
Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.254 .128 .433 .205 .992 1.008 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Years of Service 
and Org Culture Years of Service 
Organizational 
Culture 
1 Correlations Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
1.000 .043 .065 
Years of Service .043 1.000 -.208 
Organizational Culture .065 -.208 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Years of 
Service and Org Culture 
.004 7.775E-5 .000 
Years of Service 7.775E-5 .001 -.001 
Organizational Culture .000 -.001 .016 
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a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
Culture 
Years of 
Service 
Moderator of 
Years of 
Service and 
Org Culture 
1 1 2.980 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .01 
2 .956 1.766 .00 .00 .00 .98 
3 .054 7.432 .05 .06 .99 .00 
4 .010 17.161 .94 .94 .00 .01 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.719755 5.056721 3.760000 .6369494 25 
Std. Predicted Value -1.633 2.036 .000 1.000 25 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.081 .250 .121 .043 25 
Adjusted Predicted Value 2.312511 5.086122 3.740716 .6797394 25 
Residual -.6150600 .7369957 .0000000 .2997516 25 
Std. Residual -1.919 2.300 .000 .935 25 
Stud. Residual -2.182 2.382 .023 1.031 25 
Deleted Residual -.7946682 .7908020 .0192841 .3737724 25 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.421 2.722 .027 1.095 25 
Mahal. Distance .583 13.682 2.880 3.096 25 
Cook's Distance .000 .702 .072 .155 25 
Centered Leverage Value .024 .570 .120 .129 25 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
 
Charts 
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A4.6: Descriptive statistics of Structure, Organisational Culture, 
Organisational Commitment, Years of Service and Monthly salary within 
each department 
Descriptives 
Department of the employee = Accounting 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Structure 86 2.250 4.875 3.80959 .705213 
Organizational Culture 86 2.3824 4.5000 3.808482 .5496283 
Organizational commitment 86 2.3000 4.9000 3.745349 .6159941 
Years of Service 86 4 11 6.69 1.784 
Monthly salary 86 2 5 3.19 1.000 
Valid N (listwise) 86     
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
 
Department of the employee = Others 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Structure 27 2.625 4.750 3.91667 .598476 
Organizational Culture 27 2.8824 4.4706 3.932462 .5162913 
Organizational commitment 27 2.9000 4.9000 3.848148 .5437550 
Years of Service 27 4 11 7.15 2.282 
Monthly salary 27 1 4 2.93 .917 
Valid N (listwise) 27     
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
 
Department of the employee = Outsources 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Structure 76 2.500 4.875 3.84375 .663678 
Organizational Culture 76 2.5000 4.5000 3.827399 .5183449 
Organizational commitment 76 2.1000 4.7000 3.807895 .6189805 
Years of Service 76 4 10 6.74 1.921 
Monthly salary 76 2 5 2.92 .860 
Valid N (listwise) 76     
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
 
Department of the employee = Production 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Structure 185 2.250 4.875 3.71284 .707746 
Organizational Culture 185 2.3824 4.4706 3.720509 .5730302 
Organizational commitment 185 2.0000 4.7000 3.688108 .6396069 
Years of Service 185 4 12 6.89 1.897 
Monthly salary 185 1 5 3.10 .979 
Valid N (listwise) 185     
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
 
Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
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Descriptive Statisticsa 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Structure 89 2.125 5.000 3.70927 .721961 
Organizational Culture 89 2.4706 4.4118 3.712492 .5694658 
Organizational commitment 89 2.6000 4.8000 3.726966 .6473309 
Years of Service 89 4 10 6.96 1.924 
Monthly salary 89 1 5 2.96 .952 
Valid N (listwise) 89     
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
 
Department of the employee = R&D 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Structure 136 2.250 4.750 3.86305 .688510 
Organizational Culture 136 2.5294 4.4706 3.830666 .5193858 
Organizational commitment 136 2.2000 4.8000 3.822794 .6106423 
Years of Service 136 4 11 7.20 2.014 
Monthly salary 136 2 5 3.21 1.048 
Valid N (listwise) 136     
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
 
Department of the employee = Sales 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Structure 124 2.375 5.000 3.82460 .694403 
Organizational Culture 124 2.5294 4.4412 3.795066 .5010038 
Organizational commitment 124 2.0000 4.8000 3.791129 .6047256 
Years of Service 124 4 11 7.01 1.957 
Monthly salary 124 1 5 2.88 1.001 
Valid N (listwise) 124     
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
 
Department of the employee = Service 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Structure 56 2.250 4.875 3.61830 .739863 
Organizational Culture 56 2.4118 4.5294 3.676471 .5911159 
Organizational commitment 56 2.2000 4.9000 3.648214 .6486324 
Years of Service 56 4 11 7.21 1.914 
Monthly salary 56 1 5 2.93 .912 
Valid N (listwise) 56     
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
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A4.7 Regression for merger success where Structure and Salary Income are the 
moderators within each department 
 
Regression 
 
Department of the employee = Accounting 
 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.953488 .6882065 86 
Structure 3.80959 .705213 86 
Monthly salary 3.19 1.000 86 
Moderator of Structure and Salary 
Income 
-.1806 .92555 86 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success Structure Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Structure and 
Salary Income 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .802 -.067 .162 
Structure .802 1.000 -.183 .123 
Monthly salary -.067 -.183 1.000 -.021 
Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.162 .123 -.021 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .270 .068 
Structure .000 . .046 .129 
Monthly salary .270 .046 . .424 
Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.068 .129 .424 . 
N Merger Success 86 86 86 86 
Structure 86 86 86 86 
Monthly salary 86 86 86 86 
Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
86 86 86 86 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of 
Structure and Salary 
Income, Monthly 
salary, Structurec 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summarya,c 
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Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .808b .653 .641 .4125733 .653 51.504 3 82 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 2.208 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Structure and Salary Income, Monthly salary, Structure 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 26.301 3 8.767 51.504 .000c 
Residual 13.958 82 .170   
Total 40.258 85    
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Structure and Salary Income, Monthly salary, Structure 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) .776 .313  2.477 .015 .153 
Structure .789 .065 .809 12.138 .000 .660 
Monthly salary .056 .046 .082 1.241 .218 -.034 
Moderator of Structure 
and Salary Income 
.048 .049 .064 .983 .328 -.049 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1.398      
Structure .919 .802 .802 .789 .952 1.050 
Monthly salary .147 -.067 .136 .081 .967 1.035 
Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.145 .162 .108 .064 .985 1.015 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
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Model 
Moderator of 
Structure and 
Salary Income Monthly salary Structure 
1 Correlations Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
1.000 -.001 -.121 
Monthly salary -.001 1.000 .182 
Structure -.121 .182 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.002 -3.311E-6 .000 
Monthly salary -3.311E-6 .002 .001 
Structure .000 .001 .004 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) Structure Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Structure and 
Salary Income 
1 1 2.963 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .01 
2 .949 1.767 .00 .00 .00 .97 
3 .075 6.265 .01 .13 .72 .00 
4 .013 15.362 .98 .87 .27 .02 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.641589 4.779021 3.953488 .5562545 86 
Residual -.9895708 .9699053 .0000000 .4052272 86 
Std. Predicted Value -2.358 1.484 .000 1.000 86 
Std. Residual -2.399 2.351 .000 .982 86 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
 
Charts 
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[377] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[378] 
 
 
 
Department of the employee = Others 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 4.000000 .6602253 27 
Structure 3.91667 .598476 27 
Monthly salary 2.93 .917 27 
Moderator of Structure and Salary 
Income 
.1828 .93363 27 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success Structure 
Monthly 
salary 
Moderator of 
Structure and 
Salary Income 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .823 .297 -.022 
Structure .823 1.000 .190 -.037 
Monthly salary .297 .190 1.000 -.052 
Moderator of Structure 
and Salary Income 
-.022 -.037 -.052 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .067 .457 
Structure .000 . .171 .427 
Monthly salary .067 .171 . .397 
Moderator of Structure 
and Salary Income 
.457 .427 .397 . 
N Merger Success 27 27 27 27 
Structure 27 27 27 27 
Monthly salary 27 27 27 27 
Moderator of Structure 
and Salary Income 
27 27 27 27 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
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Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of 
Structure and Salary 
Income, Structure, 
Monthly salaryc 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .836b .699 .659 .3854372 .699 17.762 3 23 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 2.610 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Structure and Salary Income, Structure, Monthly salary 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 7.916 3 2.639 17.762 .000c 
Residual 3.417 23 .149   
Total 11.333 26    
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Structure and Salary Income, Structure, Monthly salary 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
1 (Constant) .250 .524  .477 .638 -.834 
Structure .878 .129 .796 6.825 .000 .612 
Monthly salary .105 .084 .146 1.252 .223 -.069 
Moderator of Structure 
and Salary Income 
.011 .081 .015 .135 .894 -.157 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
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1 (Constant) 1.334      
Structure 1.145 .823 .818 .781 .963 1.038 
Monthly salary .279 .297 .253 .143 .962 1.040 
Moderator of Structure 
and Salary Income 
.179 -.022 .028 .015 .996 1.004 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Structure and 
Salary Income Structure Monthly salary 
1 Correlations Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
1.000 .028 .046 
Structure .028 1.000 -.188 
Monthly salary .046 -.188 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.007 .000 .000 
Structure .000 .017 -.002 
Monthly salary .000 -.002 .007 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) Structure 
Monthly 
salary 
Moderator of 
Structure and 
Salary Income 
1 1 2.984 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .01 
2 .948 1.774 .00 .00 .00 .98 
3 .056 7.271 .05 .07 .99 .00 
4 .011 16.484 .95 .93 .00 .00 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.948903 4.860878 4.000000 .5517947 27 
Residual -.6388236 .5889989 .0000000 .3625190 27 
Std. Predicted Value -1.905 1.560 .000 1.000 27 
Std. Residual -1.657 1.528 .000 .941 27 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
 
Charts 
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[383] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[384] 
 
 
 
 
Department of the employee = Outsources 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.846491 .7372437 76 
Structure 3.84375 .663678 76 
Monthly salary 2.92 .860 76 
Moderator of Structure and Salary 
Income 
-.0360 1.04613 76 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success Structure Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Structure and 
Salary Income 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .771 -.026 .010 
Structure .771 1.000 -.036 .004 
Monthly salary -.026 -.036 1.000 -.062 
Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.010 .004 -.062 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .411 .467 
Structure .000 . .377 .486 
Monthly salary .411 .377 . .299 
Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.467 .486 .299 . 
N Merger Success 76 76 76 76 
Structure 76 76 76 76 
Monthly salary 76 76 76 76 
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Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
76 76 76 76 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of 
Structure and Salary 
Income, Structure, 
Monthly salaryc 
. Enter 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .771b .595 .578 .4789405 .595 35.238 3 72 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 2.127 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Structure and Salary Income, Structure, Monthly salary 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 24.249 3 8.083 35.238 .000c 
Residual 16.516 72 .229   
Total 40.765 75    
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Structure and Salary Income, Structure, Monthly salary 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) .548 .381  1.436 .155 -.212 
Structure .857 .083 .771 10.275 .000 .691 
Monthly salary .002 .064 .002 .029 .977 -.127 
Moderator of Structure 
and Salary Income 
.005 .053 .006 .086 .931 -.101 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
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Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1.308      
Structure 1.023 .771 .771 .771 .999 1.001 
Monthly salary .130 -.026 .003 .002 .995 1.005 
Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.110 .010 .010 .006 .996 1.004 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Structure and 
Salary Income Structure Monthly salary 
1 Correlations Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
1.000 -.002 .061 
Structure -.002 1.000 .036 
Monthly salary .061 .036 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.003 -8.767E-6 .000 
Structure -8.767E-6 .007 .000 
Monthly salary .000 .000 .004 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) Structure Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Structure and 
Salary Income 
1 1 2.929 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 .998 1.713 .00 .00 .00 1.00 
3 .061 6.947 .02 .13 .84 .00 
4 .013 15.228 .97 .86 .15 .00 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.703544 4.731012 3.846491 .5686120 76 
Residual -1.0072701 1.2335800 .0000000 .4692639 76 
Std. Predicted Value -2.010 1.556 .000 1.000 76 
Std. Residual -2.103 2.576 .000 .980 76 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
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b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
 
Charts 
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[390] 
 
 
 
 
Department of the employee = Production 
 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.774775 .7926826 185 
Structure 3.71284 .707746 185 
Monthly salary 3.10 .979 185 
Moderator of Structure and Salary 
Income 
.0091 1.02161 185 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success Structure Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Structure and 
Salary Income 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .794 -.039 -.048 
Structure .794 1.000 .009 .023 
Monthly salary -.039 .009 1.000 -.032 
Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
-.048 .023 -.032 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .298 .259 
Structure .000 . .451 .378 
Monthly salary .298 .451 . .331 
Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.259 .378 .331 . 
N Merger Success 185 185 185 185 
Structure 185 185 185 185 
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Monthly salary 185 185 185 185 
Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
185 185 185 185 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of 
Structure and Salary 
Income, Structure, 
Monthly salaryc 
. Enter 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .798b .637 .631 .4815054 .637 105.890 3 181 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 1.876 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Structure and Salary Income, Structure, Monthly salary 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 73.651 3 24.550 105.890 .000c 
Residual 41.964 181 .232   
Total 115.616 184    
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Structure and Salary Income, Structure, Monthly salary 
 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) .588 .219  2.679 .008 .155 
Structure .891 .050 .796 17.768 .000 .792 
Monthly salary -.040 .036 -.049 -1.089 .277 -.111 
Moderator of Structure 
and Salary Income 
-.053 .035 -.068 -1.514 .132 -.121 
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Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1.021      
Structure .990 .794 .797 .796 .999 1.001 
Monthly salary .032 -.039 -.081 -.049 .999 1.001 
Moderator of Structure 
and Salary Income 
.016 -.048 -.112 -.068 .998 1.002 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Structure and 
Salary Income Structure Monthly salary 
1 Correlations Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
1.000 -.023 .032 
Structure -.023 1.000 -.010 
Monthly salary .032 -.010 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.001 -4.078E-5 4.101E-5 
Structure -4.078E-5 .003 -1.807E-5 
Monthly salary 4.101E-5 -1.807E-5 .001 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) Structure Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Structure and 
Salary Income 
1 1 2.916 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 1.000 1.708 .00 .00 .00 1.00 
3 .068 6.540 .03 .14 .86 .00 
4 .016 13.575 .97 .85 .13 .00 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.452354 4.951521 3.774775 .6326756 185 
Residual -1.2879170 1.2669940 .0000000 .4775639 185 
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Std. Predicted Value -2.090 1.860 .000 1.000 185 
Std. Residual -2.675 2.631 .000 .992 185 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
 
Charts 
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Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.782772 .8410268 89 
Structure 3.70927 .721961 89 
Monthly salary 2.96 .952 89 
Moderator of Structure and Salary 
Income 
-.0558 1.06153 89 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
 
Correlationsa 
 Merger Success Structure Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Structure and 
Salary Income 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .802 -.069 .066 
Structure .802 1.000 -.056 .108 
Monthly salary -.069 -.056 1.000 -.054 
Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.066 .108 -.054 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .260 .269 
Structure .000 . .300 .157 
Monthly salary .260 .300 . .308 
Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.269 .157 .308 . 
N Merger Success 89 89 89 89 
Structure 89 89 89 89 
Monthly salary 89 89 89 89 
Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
89 89 89 89 
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a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of 
Structure and Salary 
Income, Monthly 
salary, Structurec 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .803b .645 .633 .5098326 .645 51.489 3 85 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 1.971 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Structure and Salary Income, Monthly salary, Structure 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 40.151 3 13.384 51.489 .000c 
Residual 22.094 85 .260   
Total 62.245 88    
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Structure and Salary Income, Monthly salary, Structure 
 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) .375 .340  1.103 .273 -.301 
Structure .936 .076 .803 12.345 .000 .785 
Monthly salary -.022 .057 -.025 -.385 .701 -.136 
Moderator of Structure 
and Salary Income 
-.018 .052 -.022 -.340 .734 -.120 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
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Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1.051      
Structure 1.087 .802 .801 .798 .986 1.014 
Monthly salary .092 -.069 -.042 -.025 .995 1.006 
Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.085 .066 -.037 -.022 .986 1.014 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Structure and 
Salary Income Monthly salary Structure 
1 Correlations Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
1.000 .048 -.105 
Monthly salary .048 1.000 .051 
Structure -.105 .051 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.003 .000 .000 
Monthly salary .000 .003 .000 
Structure .000 .000 .006 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) Structure Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Structure and 
Salary Income 
1 1 2.915 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 .997 1.710 .00 .00 .00 .98 
3 .073 6.312 .02 .14 .82 .01 
4 .016 13.708 .98 .85 .17 .01 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Casewise Diagnosticsa,b 
Case Number Std. Residual Merger Success Predicted Value Residual 
437 -3.338 2.0000 3.702024 -1.7020241 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
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 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.336557 4.932459 3.782772 .6754687 89 
Residual -1.7020241 1.1848505 .0000000 .5010669 89 
Std. Predicted Value -2.141 1.702 .000 1.000 89 
Std. Residual -3.338 2.324 .000 .983 89 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Charts 
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Department of the employee = R&D 
 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.899510 .7124061 136 
Structure 3.86305 .688510 136 
Monthly salary 3.21 1.048 136 
Moderator of Structure and Salary 
Income 
.0302 .97262 136 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success Structure Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Structure and 
Salary Income 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .755 .005 .132 
Structure .755 1.000 .030 .083 
Monthly salary .005 .030 1.000 .113 
Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.132 .083 .113 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .478 .062 
Structure .000 . .363 .169 
Monthly salary .478 .363 . .095 
Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.062 .169 .095 . 
N Merger Success 136 136 136 136 
Structure 136 136 136 136 
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Monthly salary 136 136 136 136 
Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
136 136 136 136 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of 
Structure and Salary 
Income, Structure, 
Monthly salaryc 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .758b .575 .565 .4697370 .575 59.504 3 132 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 2.207 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Structure and Salary Income, Structure, Monthly salary 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 39.389 3 13.130 59.504 .000c 
Residual 29.126 132 .221   
Total 68.516 135    
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Structure and Salary Income, Structure, Monthly salary 
 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) .960 .260  3.692 .000 .446 
Structure .775 .059 .749 13.154 .000 .659 
Monthly salary -.018 .039 -.026 -.461 .646 -.095 
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Moderator of Structure 
and Salary Income 
.054 .042 .073 1.280 .203 -.029 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1.475      
Structure .892 .755 .753 .746 .993 1.007 
Monthly salary .059 .005 -.040 -.026 .987 1.013 
Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.137 .132 .111 .073 .981 1.020 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Structure and 
Salary Income Structure Monthly salary 
1 Correlations Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
1.000 -.080 -.111 
Structure -.080 1.000 -.021 
Monthly salary -.111 -.021 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.002 .000 .000 
Structure .000 .003 -4.854E-5 
Monthly salary .000 -4.854E-5 .002 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) Structure Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Structure and 
Salary Income 
1 1 2.919 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 .997 1.711 .00 .00 .00 .98 
3 .070 6.480 .03 .11 .90 .01 
4 .014 14.349 .97 .89 .09 .01 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
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 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.513357 4.671913 3.899510 .5401601 136 
Residual -1.3407283 1.3259383 .0000000 .4644884 136 
Std. Predicted Value -2.566 1.430 .000 1.000 136 
Std. Residual -2.854 2.823 .000 .989 136 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
 
Charts 
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Department of the employee = Sales 
 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.841398 .7392270 124 
Structure 3.82460 .694403 124 
Monthly salary 2.88 1.001 124 
Moderator of Structure and Salary 
Income 
.0725 .90869 124 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
 
Correlationsa 
 Merger Success Structure Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Structure and 
Salary Income 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .756 -.052 .045 
Structure .756 1.000 .073 .072 
Monthly salary -.052 .073 1.000 .284 
Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.045 .072 .284 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .284 .311 
Structure .000 . .210 .212 
Monthly salary .284 .210 . .001 
Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.311 .212 .001 . 
N Merger Success 124 124 124 124 
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Structure 124 124 124 124 
Monthly salary 124 124 124 124 
Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
124 124 124 124 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of 
Structure and Salary 
Income, Structure, 
Monthly salaryc 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .764b .583 .573 .4832313 .583 55.947 3 120 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 1.918 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Structure and Salary Income, Structure, Monthly salary 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 39.193 3 13.064 55.947 .000c 
Residual 28.021 120 .234   
Total 67.214 123    
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Structure and Salary Income, Structure, Monthly salary 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) .977 .271  3.610 .000 .441 
Structure .812 .063 .762 12.883 .000 .687 
Monthly salary -.084 .045 -.114 -1.846 .067 -.174 
Moderator of Structure 
and Salary Income 
.018 .050 .022 .352 .725 -.082 
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Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1.513      
Structure .936 .756 .762 .759 .992 1.008 
Monthly salary .006 -.052 -.166 -.109 .917 1.091 
Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.117 .045 .032 .021 .917 1.091 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Structure and 
Salary Income Structure Monthly salary 
1 Correlations Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
1.000 -.054 -.280 
Structure -.054 1.000 -.055 
Monthly salary -.280 -.055 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.003 .000 -.001 
Structure .000 .004 .000 
Monthly salary -.001 .000 .002 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) Structure Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Structure and 
Salary Income 
1 1 2.929 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 .985 1.724 .00 .00 .00 .91 
3 .071 6.430 .03 .10 .92 .07 
4 .015 13.963 .96 .89 .07 .02 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Case wise Diagnosticsa,b 
Case Number Std. Residual Merger Success Predicted Value Residual 
687 -3.029 2.0000 3.463648 -1.4636478 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.528171 4.733524 3.841398 .5644817 124 
Residual -1.4636478 1.1076764 .0000000 .4773018 124 
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Std. Predicted Value -2.326 1.580 .000 1.000 124 
Std. Residual -3.029 2.292 .000 .988 124 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
 
Charts 
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Department of the employee = Service 
 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.755952 .8052632 56 
Structure 3.61830 .739863 56 
Monthly salary 2.93 .912 56 
Moderator of Structure and Salary 
Income 
.1747 1.09693 56 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
Correlationsa 
 Merger Success Structure Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Structure and 
Salary Income 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .779 .273 .072 
Structure .779 1.000 .178 .162 
Monthly salary .273 .178 1.000 .125 
Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.072 .162 .125 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .021 .300 
Structure .000 . .095 .116 
Monthly salary .021 .095 . .180 
Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.300 .116 .180 . 
N Merger Success 56 56 56 56 
Structure 56 56 56 56 
Monthly salary 56 56 56 56 
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Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
56 56 56 56 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of 
Structure and Salary 
Income, Monthly 
salary, Structurec 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .794b .631 .609 .5033266 .631 29.593 3 52 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 1.892 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Structure and Salary Income, Monthly salary, Structure 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 22.491 3 7.497 29.593 .000c 
Residual 13.174 52 .253   
Total 35.665 55    
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Structure and Salary Income, Monthly salary, Structure 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) .376 .380  .990 .327 -.386 
Structure .832 .094 .765 8.836 .000 .643 
Monthly salary .129 .076 .146 1.694 .096 -.024 
Moderator of Structure 
and Salary Income 
-.052 .063 -.070 -.821 .415 -.178 
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Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1.139      
Structure 1.021 .779 .775 .745 .948 1.054 
Monthly salary .281 .273 .229 .143 .959 1.043 
Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.075 .072 -.113 -.069 .964 1.037 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Structure and 
Salary Income Monthly salary Structure 
1 Correlations Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
1.000 -.099 -.143 
Monthly salary -.099 1.000 -.161 
Structure -.143 -.161 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Structure and 
Salary Income 
.004 .000 -.001 
Monthly salary .000 .006 -.001 
Structure -.001 -.001 .009 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) Structure Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Structure and 
Salary Income 
1 1 2.970 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .01 
2 .952 1.766 .00 .00 .00 .96 
3 .059 7.106 .05 .16 .94 .00 
4 .019 12.583 .95 .84 .06 .03 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.635005 4.878046 3.755952 .6394760 56 
Residual -1.2516193 .9670221 .0000000 .4894070 56 
Std. Predicted Value -1.753 1.755 .000 1.000 56 
Std. Residual -2.487 1.921 .000 .972 56 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
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b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
 
Charts 
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A4.8: Regression for merger success where Organisational Culture and Salary 
Income are the moderators within each department 
 
Regression 
 
Department of the employee = Accounting 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.953488 .6882065 86 
Organizational Culture 3.808482 .5496283 86 
Monthly salary 3.19 1.000 86 
Moderator of Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
-.1610 .99952 86 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizationa
l Culture 
Monthly 
salary 
Moderator of 
Org Culture 
and Salary 
Income 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .808 -.067 .263 
Organizational Culture .808 1.000 -.163 .346 
Monthly salary -.067 -.163 1.000 -.038 
Moderator of Org 
Culture and Salary 
Income 
.263 .346 -.038 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .270 .007 
Organizational Culture .000 . .067 .001 
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Monthly salary .270 .067 . .366 
Moderator of Org 
Culture and Salary 
Income 
.007 .001 .366 . 
N Merger Success 86 86 86 86 
Organizational Culture 86 86 86 86 
Monthly salary 86 86 86 86 
Moderator of Org 
Culture and Salary 
Income 
86 86 86 86 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of Org 
Culture and Salary 
Income, Monthly 
salary, 
Organizational 
Culturec 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .811b .658 .645 .4100486 .658 52.478 3 82 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 2.282 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Culture and Salary Income, Monthly salary, Organizational Culture 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 26.471 3 8.824 52.478 .000c 
Residual 13.787 82 .168   
Total 40.258 85    
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Culture and Salary Income, Monthly salary, Organizational Culture 
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Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) -.134 .388  -.344 .731 -.905 
Organizational Culture 1.034 .087 .826 11.835 .000 .860 
Monthly salary .046 .045 .067 1.019 .311 -.044 
Moderator of Org 
Culture and Salary 
Income 
-.014 .047 -.020 -.294 .769 -.108 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .638      
Organizational Culture 1.208 .808 .794 .765 .858 1.166 
Monthly salary .136 -.067 .112 .066 .973 1.028 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
.080 .263 -.032 -.019 .880 1.137 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Org Culture and 
Salary Income Monthly salary 
Organizational 
Culture 
1 Correlations Moderator of Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
1.000 -.020 -.345 
Monthly salary -.020 1.000 .160 
Organizational Culture -.345 .160 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
.002 -4.350E-5 -.001 
Monthly salary -4.350E-5 .002 .001 
Organizational Culture -.001 .001 .008 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
Culture 
Monthly 
salary 
Moderator of 
Org Culture 
and Salary 
Income 
1 1 2.954 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 .970 1.745 .00 .00 .00 .87 
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3 .069 6.562 .02 .06 .83 .01 
4 .008 19.714 .98 .94 .16 .11 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.602908 4.689453 3.953488 .5580526 86 
Residual -1.0066944 1.0246145 .0000000 .4027474 86 
Std. Predicted Value -2.420 1.319 .000 1.000 86 
Std. Residual -2.455 2.499 .000 .982 86 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
 
Charts 
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Department of the employee = Others 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 4.000000 .6602253 27 
Organizational Culture 3.932462 .5162913 27 
Monthly salary 2.93 .917 27 
Moderator of Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
.2426 .90001 27 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
Correlationsa 
 Merger Success 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
Pearson 
Correlation 
Merger Success 1.000 .727 .297 -.122 
Organizational 
Culture 
.727 1.000 .252 -.376 
Monthly salary .297 .252 1.000 .064 
Moderator of 
Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
-.122 -.376 .064 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .067 .272 
Organizational 
Culture 
.000 . .102 .027 
Monthly salary .067 .102 . .375 
Moderator of 
Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
.272 .027 .375 . 
N Merger Success 27 27 27 27 
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Organizational 
Culture 
27 27 27 27 
Monthly salary 27 27 27 27 
Moderator of 
Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
27 27 27 27 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of Org 
Culture and Salary 
Income, Monthly 
salary, 
Organizational 
Culturec 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .750b .563 .506 .4641195 .563 9.871 3 23 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 2.161 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Culture and Salary Income, Monthly salary, Organizational Culture 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 6.379 3 2.126 9.871 .000c 
Residual 4.954 23 .215   
Total 11.333 26    
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Culture and Salary Income, Monthly salary, Organizational Culture 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) -.062 .767  -.081 .936 -1.648 
Organizational Culture .975 .199 .763 4.892 .000 .563 
Monthly salary .068 .104 .094 .651 .521 -.148 
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Moderator of Org 
Culture and Salary 
Income 
.116 .111 .159 1.048 .305 -.113 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1.524      
Organizational Culture 1.388 .727 .714 .674 .782 1.279 
Monthly salary .284 .297 .135 .090 .907 1.102 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
.346 -.122 .214 .145 .832 1.202 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of Org 
Culture and 
Salary Income Monthly salary 
Organizational 
Culture 
1 Correlations Moderator of Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
1.000 -.177 .406 
Monthly salary -.177 1.000 -.299 
Organizational Culture .406 -.299 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
.012 -.002 .009 
Monthly salary -.002 .011 -.006 
Organizational Culture .009 -.006 .040 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Org Culture 
and Salary 
Income 
1 1 3.030 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .01 
2 .909 1.826 .00 .00 .00 .81 
3 .054 7.477 .05 .03 .98 .01 
4 .007 21.044 .95 .97 .02 .16 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.933579 4.638611 4.000000 .4953233 27 
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Residual -.8274606 .7980668 .0000000 .4365229 27 
Std. Predicted Value -2.153 1.289 .000 1.000 27 
Std. Residual -1.783 1.720 .000 .941 27 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
 
Charts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[430] 
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Department of the employee = Outsources 
 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.846491 .7372437 76 
Organizational Culture 3.827399 .5183449 76 
Monthly salary 2.92 .860 76 
Moderator of Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
.0059 1.11466 76 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
 
 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
Moderator 
of Org 
Culture 
and Salary 
Income 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .817 -.026 .056 
Organizational Culture .817 1.000 .006 .092 
Monthly salary -.026 .006 1.000 -.094 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
.056 .092 -.094 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .411 .316 
Organizational Culture .000 . .480 .214 
Monthly salary .411 .480 . .210 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
.316 .214 .210 . 
N Merger Success 76 76 76 76 
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Organizational Culture 76 76 76 76 
Monthly salary 76 76 76 76 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
76 76 76 76 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of Org 
Culture and Salary 
Income, 
Organizational 
Culture, Monthly 
salaryc 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .818b .669 .655 .4332210 .669 48.401 3 72 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 2.243 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Culture and Salary Income, Organizational Culture, Monthly salary 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 27.252 3 9.084 48.401 .000c 
Residual 13.513 72 .188   
Total 40.765 75    
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Culture and Salary Income, Organizational Culture, Monthly salary 
 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
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B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) -.528 .409  -1.292 .201 -1.344 
Organizational Culture 1.165 .097 .819 12.018 .000 .972 
Monthly salary -.029 .058 -.033 -.490 .626 -.145 
Moderator of Org 
Culture and Salary 
Income 
-.015 .045 -.023 -.333 .740 -.105 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .287      
Organizational Culture 1.358 .817 .817 .815 .991 1.009 
Monthly salary .088 -.026 -.058 -.033 .991 1.009 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
.075 .056 -.039 -.023 .983 1.018 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
1 Correlations Moderator of Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
1.000 -.093 .095 
Organizational Culture -.093 1.000 -.015 
Monthly salary .095 -.015 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
.002 .000 .000 
Organizational Culture .000 .009 -8.350E-5 
Monthly salary .000 -8.350E-5 .003 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
Culture 
Monthly 
salary 
Moderator of 
Org Culture 
and Salary 
Income 
1 1 2.935 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 1.001 1.712 .00 .00 .00 .98 
3 .056 7.249 .03 .07 .93 .01 
4 .008 18.694 .97 .93 .06 .00 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
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Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.334093 4.626034 3.846491 .6027894 76 
Residual -1.0534191 .9208951 .0000000 .4244681 76 
Std. Predicted Value -2.509 1.293 .000 1.000 76 
Std. Residual -2.432 2.126 .000 .980 76 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Charts 
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Department of the employee = Production 
 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.774775 .7926826 185 
Organizational Culture 3.720509 .5730302 185 
Monthly salary 3.10 .979 185 
Moderator of Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
.0077 .98752 185 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
 
 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Org Culture 
and Salary 
Income 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .827 -.039 -.083 
Organizational Culture .827 1.000 .008 -.058 
Monthly salary -.039 .008 1.000 -.015 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
-.083 -.058 -.015 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .298 .131 
Organizational Culture .000 . .459 .217 
Monthly salary .298 .459 . .421 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
.131 .217 .421 . 
N Merger Success 185 185 185 185 
Organizational Culture 185 185 185 185 
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Monthly salary 185 185 185 185 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
185 185 185 185 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of Org 
Culture and Salary 
Income, Monthly 
salary, 
Organizational 
Culturec 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .829b .688 .683 .4463817 .688 133.078 3 181 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 1.837 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Culture and Salary Income, Monthly salary, Organizational Culture 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 79.550 3 26.517 133.078 .000c 
Residual 36.065 181 .199   
Total 115.616 184    
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Culture and Salary Income, Monthly salary, Organizational Culture 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) -.359 .240  -1.498 .136 -.832 
Organizational Culture 1.142 .058 .826 19.857 .000 1.029 
Monthly salary -.037 .034 -.046 -1.113 .267 -.104 
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Moderator of Org 
Culture and Salary 
Income 
-.029 .033 -.036 -.858 .392 -.094 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .114      
Organizational Culture 1.256 .827 .828 .824 .997 1.003 
Monthly salary .029 -.039 -.082 -.046 1.000 1.000 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
.037 -.083 -.064 -.036 .996 1.004 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Org Culture and 
Salary Income Monthly salary 
Organizational 
Culture 
1 Correlations Moderator of Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
1.000 .014 .058 
Monthly salary .014 1.000 -.007 
Organizational Culture .058 -.007 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
.001 1.601E-5 .000 
Monthly salary 1.601E-5 .001 -1.330E-5 
Organizational Culture .000 -1.330E-5 .003 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Org Culture 
and Salary 
Income 
1 1 2.924 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 1.000 1.710 .00 .00 .00 1.00 
3 .066 6.680 .03 .08 .92 .00 
4 .011 16.429 .97 .92 .07 .00 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.243428 4.644394 3.774775 .6575240 185 
Residual -1.1803406 .9467440 .0000000 .4427278 185 
Std. Predicted Value -2.329 1.323 .000 1.000 185 
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Std. Residual -2.644 2.121 .000 .992 185 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
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[442] 
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Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.782772 .8410268 89 
Organizational Culture 3.712492 .5694658 89 
Monthly salary 2.96 .952 89 
Moderator of Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
-.0604 .99089 89 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Org Culture 
and Salary 
Income 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .842 -.069 -.027 
Organizational Culture .842 1.000 -.061 -.080 
Monthly salary -.069 -.061 1.000 .043 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
-.027 -.080 .043 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .260 .402 
Organizational Culture .000 . .285 .228 
Monthly salary .260 .285 . .346 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
.402 .228 .346 . 
N Merger Success 89 89 89 89 
Organizational Culture 89 89 89 89 
Monthly salary 89 89 89 89 
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Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
89 89 89 89 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of Org 
Culture and Salary 
Income, Monthly 
salary, 
Organizational 
Culturec 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .843b .711 .701 .4602497 .711 69.614 3 85 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 2.185 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Culture and Salary Income, Monthly salary, Organizational Culture 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 44.239 3 14.746 69.614 .000c 
Residual 18.006 85 .212   
Total 62.245 88    
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Culture and Salary Income, Monthly salary, Organizational Culture 
 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) -.792 .367  -2.160 .034 -1.522 
Organizational Culture 1.246 .087 .844 14.397 .000 1.074 
Monthly salary -.017 .052 -.019 -.330 .742 -.120 
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Moderator of Org 
Culture and Salary 
Income 
.035 .050 .042 .709 .480 -.064 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -.063      
Organizational Culture 1.419 .842 .842 .840 .990 1.010 
Monthly salary .086 -.069 -.036 -.019 .995 1.005 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
.134 -.027 .077 .041 .992 1.008 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of Org 
Culture and 
Salary Income Monthly salary 
Organizational 
Culture 
1 Correlations Moderator of Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
1.000 -.038 .077 
Monthly salary -.038 1.000 .058 
Organizational Culture .077 .058 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
.002 -9.713E-5 .000 
Monthly salary -9.713E-5 .003 .000 
Organizational Culture .000 .000 .007 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Org Culture 
and Salary 
Income 
1 1 2.925 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 .995 1.715 .00 .00 .00 .99 
3 .070 6.487 .02 .08 .88 .01 
4 .010 16.847 .97 .92 .11 .00 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.232527 4.629363 3.782772 .7090259 89 
Residual -1.2246809 .9709819 .0000000 .4523365 89 
Std. Predicted Value -2.186 1.194 .000 1.000 89 
Std. Residual -2.661 2.110 .000 .983 89 
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a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
 
Charts 
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Department of the employee = R&D 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.899510 .7124061 136 
Organizational Culture 3.830666 .5193858 136 
Monthly salary 3.21 1.048 136 
Moderator of Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
.0199 .97341 136 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Org Culture 
and Salary 
Income 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .803 .005 .136 
Organizational Culture .803 1.000 .020 .097 
Monthly salary .005 .020 1.000 .079 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
.136 .097 .079 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .478 .057 
Organizational Culture .000 . .408 .130 
Monthly salary .478 .408 . .181 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
.057 .130 .181 . 
N Merger Success 136 136 136 136 
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Organizational Culture 136 136 136 136 
Monthly salary 136 136 136 136 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
136 136 136 136 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of Org 
Culture and Salary 
Income, Monthly 
salary, 
Organizational 
Culturec 
. Enter 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .805b .648 .640 .4275894 .648 80.915 3 132 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 1.907 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Culture and Salary Income, Monthly salary, Organizational Culture 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 44.382 3 14.794 80.915 .000c 
Residual 24.134 132 .183   
Total 68.516 135    
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Culture and Salary Income, Monthly salary, Organizational Culture 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) -.254 .296  -.858 .392 -.840 
Organizational Culture 1.093 .071 .797 15.354 .000 .952 
Monthly salary -.011 .035 -.016 -.309 .758 -.081 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
.044 .038 .060 1.158 .249 -.031 
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Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .332      
Organizational Culture 1.234 .803 .801 .793 .990 1.010 
Monthly salary .059 .005 -.027 -.016 .994 1.006 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
.119 .136 .100 .060 .985 1.016 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of Org 
Culture and 
Salary Income Monthly salary 
Organizational 
Culture 
1 Correlations Moderator of Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
1.000 -.077 -.096 
Monthly salary -.077 1.000 -.013 
Organizational Culture -.096 -.013 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
.001 .000 .000 
Monthly salary .000 .001 -3.145E-5 
Organizational Culture .000 -3.145E-5 .005 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Org Culture 
and Salary 
Income 
1 1 2.925 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 .999 1.711 .00 .00 .00 .98 
3 .068 6.574 .03 .06 .94 .00 
4 .009 18.495 .97 .94 .05 .01 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.267298 4.589739 3.899510 .5733696 136 
Residual -1.1966354 .9489688 .0000000 .4228117 136 
Std. Predicted Value -2.847 1.204 .000 1.000 136 
Std. Residual -2.799 2.219 .000 .989 136 
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a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
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Department of the employee = Sales 
 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.841398 .7392270 124 
Organizational Culture 3.795066 .5010038 124 
Monthly salary 2.88 1.001 124 
Moderator of Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
.0220 .87312 124 
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a. Department of the employee = Sales 
 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizational 
Culture 
Monthly 
salary 
Moderator of 
Org Culture 
and Salary 
Income 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .791 -.052 -.044 
Organizational Culture .791 1.000 .022 -.146 
Monthly salary -.052 .022 1.000 .233 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
-.044 -.146 .233 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .284 .314 
Organizational Culture .000 . .403 .053 
Monthly salary .284 .403 . .005 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
.314 .053 .005 . 
N Merger Success 124 124 124 124 
Organizational Culture 124 124 124 124 
Monthly salary 124 124 124 124 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
124 124 124 124 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of Org 
Culture and Salary 
Income, 
Organizational 
Culture, Monthly 
salaryc 
. Enter 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .800b .639 .630 .4494660 .639 70.904 3 120 
Model Summarya,c 
 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson 
 
Sig. F Change  
1 .000 1.975  
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Culture and Salary Income, Organizational Culture, Monthly salary 
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c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 42.972 3 14.324 70.904 .000c 
Residual 24.242 120 .202   
Total 67.214 123    
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Culture and Salary Income, Organizational Culture, Monthly salary 
 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) -.485 .329  -1.474 .143 -1.137 
Organizational Culture 1.191 .082 .807 14.542 .000 1.029 
Monthly salary -.068 .042 -.092 -1.626 .107 -.150 
Moderator of Org 
Culture and Salary 
Income 
.080 .048 .095 1.663 .099 -.015 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .167      
Organizational Culture 1.353 .791 .799 .797 .975 1.025 
Monthly salary .015 -.052 -.147 -.089 .942 1.061 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
.176 -.044 .150 .091 .923 1.084 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
1 Correlations Moderator of Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
1.000 .155 -.239 
Organizational Culture .155 1.000 -.058 
Monthly salary -.239 -.058 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
.002 .001 .000 
Organizational Culture .001 .007 .000 
Monthly salary .000 .000 .002 
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a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
Culture 
Monthly 
salary 
Moderator of 
Org Culture 
and Salary 
Income 
1 1 2.919 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 1.002 1.707 .00 .00 .00 .91 
3 .070 6.457 .03 .05 .97 .07 
4 .008 18.888 .97 .95 .02 .01 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.335095 4.613470 3.841398 .5910704 124 
Residual -1.1208633 .9917235 .0000000 .4439509 124 
Std. Predicted Value -2.548 1.306 .000 1.000 124 
Std. Residual -2.494 2.206 .000 .988 124 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
 
Charts 
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Department of the employee = Service 
 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.755952 .8052632 56 
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Organizational Culture 3.676471 .5911159 56 
Monthly salary 2.93 .912 56 
Moderator of Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
.2407 .89956 56 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Org Culture 
and Salary 
Income 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .814 .273 -.067 
Organizational Culture .814 1.000 .245 -.184 
Monthly salary .273 .245 1.000 .114 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
-.067 -.184 .114 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .021 .312 
Organizational Culture .000 . .034 .088 
Monthly salary .021 .034 . .201 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
.312 .088 .201 . 
N Merger Success 56 56 56 56 
Organizational Culture 56 56 56 56 
Monthly salary 56 56 56 56 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
56 56 56 56 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of Org 
Culture and Salary 
Income, Monthly 
salary, 
Organizational 
Culturec 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .820b .673 .654 .4734805 .673 35.696 3 52 
 
Model Summarya,c 
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Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 2.231 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Culture and Salary Income, Monthly salary, Organizational Culture 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 24.007 3 8.002 35.696 .000c 
Residual 11.658 52 .224   
Total 35.665 55    
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Culture and Salary Income, Monthly salary, Organizational Culture 
 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) -.493 .424  -1.164 .250 -1.344 
Organizational Culture 1.105 .114 .811 9.678 .000 .876 
Monthly salary .058 .073 .066 .792 .432 -.089 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
.067 .073 .074 .910 .367 -.080 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .357      
Organizational Culture 1.334 .814 .802 .767 .895 1.118 
Monthly salary .205 .273 .109 .063 .914 1.094 
Moderator of Org Culture 
and Salary Income 
.214 -.067 .125 .072 .939 1.065 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of Org 
Culture and 
Salary Income Monthly salary 
Organizational 
Culture 
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1 Correlations Moderator of Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
1.000 -.167 .220 
Monthly salary -.167 1.000 -.272 
Organizational Culture .220 -.272 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Org Culture and 
Salary Income 
.005 -.001 .002 
Monthly salary -.001 .005 -.002 
Organizational Culture .002 -.002 .013 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
Culture Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Org Culture 
and Salary 
Income 
1 1 3.030 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .01 
2 .904 1.831 .00 .00 .00 .92 
3 .054 7.476 .07 .06 .99 .02 
4 .012 15.938 .93 .93 .00 .04 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.433418 4.700861 3.755952 .6606763 56 
Residual -1.1104376 .9112665 .0000000 .4603863 56 
Std. Predicted Value -2.002 1.430 .000 1.000 56 
Std. Residual -2.345 1.925 .000 .972 56 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
 
Charts 
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A4.9: Regression for merger success where Organisational Commitment and 
Salary Income are the moderators within each department 
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Regression 
 
Department of the employee = Accounting 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.953488 .6882065 86 
Organizational commitment 3.745349 .6159941 86 
Monthly salary 3.19 1.000 86 
Moderator of Org Commitment and 
Salary Income 
-.1345 .96075 86 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizational 
commitment Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Org 
Commitment 
and Salary 
Income 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .772 -.067 .170 
Organizational 
commitment 
.772 1.000 -.136 .163 
Monthly salary -.067 -.136 1.000 -.058 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.170 .163 -.058 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .270 .059 
Organizational 
commitment 
.000 . .106 .067 
Monthly salary .270 .106 . .297 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.059 .067 .297 . 
N Merger Success 86 86 86 86 
Organizational 
commitment 
86 86 86 86 
Monthly salary 86 86 86 86 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
86 86 86 86 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of Org 
Commitment and 
Salary Income, 
Monthly salary, 
Organizational 
committmentc 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summarya,c 
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Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .774b .599 .585 .4434854 .599 40.897 3 82 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 2.339 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Commitment and Salary Income, Monthly salary, Organizational commitment 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 24.131 3 8.044 40.897 .000c 
Residual 16.128 82 .197   
Total 40.258 85    
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Commitment and Salary Income, Monthly salary, Organizational 
commitment 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) .648 .358  1.811 .074 -.064 
Organizational 
commitment 
.860 .080 .770 10.776 .000 .701 
Monthly salary .028 .049 .040 .573 .569 -.069 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.033 .051 .046 .655 .514 -.068 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1.360      
Organizational 
commitment 
1.019 .772 .766 .753 .957 1.045 
Monthly salary .124 -.067 .063 .040 .980 1.020 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.134 .170 .072 .046 .972 1.029 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
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b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and 
Salary Income Monthly salary 
Organizational 
commitment 
1 Correlations Moderator of Org Commitment 
and Salary Income 
1.000 .037 -.157 
Monthly salary .037 1.000 .128 
Organizational commitment -.157 .128 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Org Commitment 
and Salary Income 
.003 9.144E-5 -.001 
Monthly salary 9.144E-5 .002 .000 
Organizational commitment -.001 .000 .006 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
commitment Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Org 
Commitment 
and Salary 
Income 
1 1 2.946 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 .973 1.740 .00 .00 .00 .96 
3 .070 6.479 .02 .10 .81 .01 
4 .011 16.556 .98 .90 .18 .02 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.623736 4.934273 3.953488 .5328138 86 
Residual -1.0708904 .9392288 .0000000 .4355889 86 
Std. Predicted Value -2.496 1.841 .000 1.000 86 
Std. Residual -2.415 2.118 .000 .982 86 
 
a. Department of the employee = Accounting 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Charts 
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Department of the employee = Others 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 4.000000 .6602253 27 
Organizational commitment 3.848148 .5437550 27 
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Monthly salary 2.93 .917 27 
Moderator of Org Commitment and 
Salary Income 
.3489 .90505 27 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizational 
commitment Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Org 
Commitment 
and Salary 
Income 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .736 .297 -.037 
Organizational 
commitment 
.736 1.000 .362 -.169 
Monthly salary .297 .362 1.000 -.034 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
-.037 -.169 -.034 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .067 .428 
Organizational 
commitment 
.000 . .032 .200 
Monthly salary .067 .032 . .434 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.428 .200 .434 . 
N Merger Success 27 27 27 27 
Organizational 
commitment 
27 27 27 27 
Monthly salary 27 27 27 27 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
27 27 27 27 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of Org 
Commitment and 
Salary Income, 
Monthly salary, 
Organizational 
committmentc 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
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1 .742b .550 .491 .4708862 .550 9.371 3 23 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 1.824 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Commitment and Salary Income, Monthly salary, Organizational commitment 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 6.233 3 2.078 9.371 .000c 
Residual 5.100 23 .222   
Total 11.333 26    
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Commitment and Salary Income, Monthly salary, Organizational 
commitment 
 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) .456 .679  .672 .508 -.948 
Organizational 
commitment 
.898 .185 .739 4.856 .000 .515 
Monthly salary .023 .108 .032 .211 .835 -.201 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.065 .104 .090 .631 .535 -.149 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1.860      
Organizational commitment 1.280 .736 .712 .679 .844 1.185 
Monthly salary .246 .297 .044 .030 .868 1.152 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.280 -.037 .130 .088 .971 1.030 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
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Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and 
Salary Income Monthly salary 
Organizational 
commitment 
1 Correlations Moderator of Org Commitment 
and Salary Income 
1.000 -.030 .168 
Monthly salary -.030 1.000 -.362 
Organizational commitment .168 -.362 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Org Commitment 
and Salary Income 
.011 .000 .003 
Monthly salary .000 .012 -.007 
Organizational commitment .003 -.007 .034 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
commitment Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Org 
Commitment 
and Salary 
Income 
1 1 3.112 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .02 
2 .828 1.939 .00 .00 .00 .94 
3 .052 7.729 .07 .04 .96 .00 
4 .009 18.725 .93 .96 .03 .04 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 3.219986 5.093963 4.000000 .4896410 27 
Residual -.8959132 .8406013 .0000000 .4428872 27 
Std. Predicted Value -1.593 2.234 .000 1.000 27 
Std. Residual -1.903 1.785 .000 .941 27 
 
a. Department of the employee = Others 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
 
 
Charts 
 
 
 
[477] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[478] 
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Department of the employee = Outsources 
 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
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 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.846491 .7372437 76 
Organizational commitment 3.807895 .6189805 76 
Monthly salary 2.92 .860 76 
Moderator of Org Commitment and 
Salary Income 
-.1199 1.09007 76 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizationa
l commitment 
Monthly 
salary 
Moderator of 
Org 
Commitment 
and Salary 
Income 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .777 -.026 .028 
Organizational 
commitment 
.777 1.000 -.121 .007 
Monthly salary -.026 -.121 1.000 -.072 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.028 .007 -.072 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .411 .406 
Organizational 
commitment 
.000 . .148 .475 
Monthly salary .411 .148 . .267 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.406 .475 .267 . 
N Merger Success 76 76 76 76 
Organizational 
commitment 
76 76 76 76 
Monthly salary 76 76 76 76 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
76 76 76 76 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of Org 
Commitment and 
Salary Income, 
Organizational 
commitment, 
Monthly salaryc 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
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1 .780b .609 .593 .4704377 .609 37.399 3 72 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 1.901 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Commitment and Salary Income, Organizational commitment, Monthly salary 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 24.830 3 8.277 37.399 .000c 
Residual 15.934 72 .221   
Total 40.765 75    
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Commitment and Salary Income, Organizational commitment, Monthly 
salary 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) .109 .407  .267 .790 -.703 
Organizational 
commitment 
.935 .088 .785 10.580 .000 .759 
Monthly salary .061 .064 .071 .954 .343 -.066 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.018 .050 .027 .368 .714 -.081 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .921      
Organizational 
commitment 
1.112 .777 .780 .780 .985 1.015 
Monthly salary .188 -.026 .112 .070 .980 1.020 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.118 .028 .043 .027 .995 1.005 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and 
Salary Income 
Organizational 
commitment Monthly salary 
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1 Correlations Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
1.000 .002 .072 
Organizational commitment .002 1.000 .121 
Monthly salary .072 .121 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.002 6.808E-6 .000 
Organizational commitment 6.808E-6 .008 .001 
Monthly salary .000 .001 .004 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
commitment Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Org 
Commitment 
and Salary 
Income 
1 1 2.946 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 .980 1.734 .00 .00 .00 .99 
3 .063 6.841 .02 .11 .79 .00 
4 .011 16.612 .98 .88 .20 .00 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.251183 4.690454 3.846491 .5753861 76 
Residual -1.1285144 1.1539087 .0000000 .4609329 76 
Std. Predicted Value -2.773 1.467 .000 1.000 76 
Std. Residual -2.399 2.453 .000 .980 76 
 
a. Department of the employee = Outsources 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
 
Charts 
 
 
 
 
[483] 
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Department of the employee = Production 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.774775 .7926826 185 
Organizational commitment 3.688108 .6396069 185 
Monthly salary 3.10 .979 185 
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Moderator of Org Commitment and 
Salary Income 
.0657 .95807 185 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizational 
commitment 
Monthly 
salary 
Moderator of 
Org 
Commitment 
and Salary 
Income 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .782 -.039 -.047 
Organizational 
commitment 
.782 1.000 .066 -.003 
Monthly salary -.039 .066 1.000 -.033 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
-.047 -.003 -.033 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .298 .263 
Organizational 
commitment 
.000 . .186 .483 
Monthly salary .298 .186 . .328 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.263 .483 .328 . 
N Merger Success 185 185 185 185 
Organizational 
commitment 
185 185 185 185 
Monthly salary 185 185 185 185 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
185 185 185 185 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of Org 
Commitment and 
Salary Income, 
Organizational 
commitment, 
Monthly salaryc 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .789b .622 .616 .4911076 .622 99.454 3 181 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model Change Statistics Durbin-Watson 
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Sig. F Change 
1 .000 1.837 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Commitment and Salary Income, Organizational commitment, Monthly salary 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 71.961 3 23.987 99.454 .000c 
Residual 43.655 181 .241   
Total 115.616 184    
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Commitment and Salary Income, Organizational commitment, Monthly 
salary 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) .408 .235  1.737 .084 -.055 
Organizational 
commitment 
.977 .057 .788 17.219 .000 .865 
Monthly salary -.075 .037 -.093 -2.030 .044 -.149 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
-.039 .038 -.047 -1.038 .301 -.114 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .871      
Organizational commitment 1.089 .782 .788 .786 .996 1.004 
Monthly salary -.002 -.039 -.149 -.093 .995 1.005 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.035 -.047 -.077 -.047 .999 1.001 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and 
Salary Income 
Organizational 
commitment Monthly salary 
1 Correlations Moderator of Org Commitment 
and Salary Income 
1.000 .001 .033 
Organizational commitment .001 1.000 -.066 
Monthly salary .033 -.066 1.000 
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Covariances Moderator of Org Commitment 
and Salary Income 
.001 2.175E-6 4.610E-5 
Organizational commitment 2.175E-6 .003 .000 
Monthly salary 4.610E-5 .000 .001 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
commitment Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Org 
Commitment 
and Salary 
Income 
1 1 2.928 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 .994 1.717 .00 .00 .00 1.00 
3 .064 6.744 .04 .11 .92 .00 
4 .014 14.532 .96 .89 .07 .00 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.125376 4.945954 3.774775 .6253730 185 
Residual -1.1684574 1.1651770 .0000000 .4870876 185 
Std. Predicted Value -2.637 1.873 .000 1.000 185 
Std. Residual -2.379 2.373 .000 .992 185 
 
a. Department of the employee = Production 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Charts 
 
 
 
 
[489] 
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Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.782772 .8410268 89 
Organizational commitment 3.726966 .6473309 89 
Monthly salary 2.96 .952 89 
Moderator of Org Commitment and 
Salary Income 
-.0837 1.04737 89 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizational 
commitment 
Monthly 
salary 
Moderator of 
Org 
Commitment 
and Salary 
Income 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .820 -.069 .029 
Organizational 
commitment 
.820 1.000 -.085 -.027 
Monthly salary -.069 -.085 1.000 .102 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.029 -.027 .102 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .260 .392 
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Organizational 
commitment 
.000 . .215 .402 
Monthly salary .260 .215 . .170 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.392 .402 .170 . 
N Merger Success 89 89 89 89 
Organizational 
commitment 
89 89 89 89 
Monthly salary 89 89 89 89 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
89 89 89 89 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of Org 
Commitment and 
Salary Income, 
Organizational 
commitment, 
Monthly salaryc 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .822b .675 .664 .4877335 .675 58.887 3 85 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 1.871 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Commitment and Salary Income, Organizational commitment, Monthly salary 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 42.025 3 14.008 58.887 .000c 
Residual 20.220 85 .238   
Total 62.245 88    
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Commitment and Salary Income, Organizational commitment, Monthly 
salary 
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Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) -.177 .357  -.494 .622 -.887 
Organizational 
commitment 
1.067 .081 .821 13.231 .000 .906 
Monthly salary -.004 .055 -.005 -.078 .938 -.114 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.042 .050 .052 .835 .406 -.058 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .534      
Organizational 
commitment 
1.227 .820 .820 .818 .993 1.008 
Monthly salary .105 -.069 -.008 -.005 .983 1.017 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.141 .029 .090 .052 .989 1.011 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and 
Salary Income 
Organizational 
commitment Monthly salary 
1 Correlations Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
1.000 .018 -.100 
Organizational commitment .018 1.000 .082 
Monthly salary -.100 .082 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.002 7.328E-5 .000 
Organizational commitment 7.328E-5 .006 .000 
Monthly salary .000 .000 .003 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
commitment 
Monthly 
salary 
Moderator of 
Org 
Commitment 
and Salary 
Income 
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1 1 2.922 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 .993 1.715 .00 .00 .00 .98 
3 .072 6.379 .02 .11 .83 .01 
4 .013 15.212 .98 .89 .16 .00 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.500000 4.829408 3.782772 .6910512 89 
Residual -1.1153805 .9033088 .0000000 .4793478 89 
Std. Predicted Value -1.856 1.515 .000 1.000 89 
Std. Residual -2.287 1.852 .000 .983 89 
 
a. Department of the employee = Quality Assurance 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Charts 
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Department of the employee = R&D 
 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.899510 .7124061 136 
Organizational commitment 3.822794 .6106423 136 
Monthly salary 3.21 1.048 136 
Moderator of Org Commitment and 
Salary Income 
-.0912 .99685 136 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizationa
l commitment 
Monthly 
salary 
Moderator of 
Org 
Commitment 
and Salary 
Income 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .696 .005 .075 
Organizational 
commitment 
.696 1.000 -.092 .015 
Monthly salary .005 -.092 1.000 .012 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.075 .015 .012 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .478 .192 
Organizational 
commitment 
.000 . .144 .431 
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Monthly salary .478 .144 . .446 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.192 .431 .446 . 
N Merger Success 136 136 136 136 
Organizational 
commitment 
136 136 136 136 
Monthly salary 136 136 136 136 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
136 136 136 136 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of Org 
Commitment and 
Salary Income, 
Monthly salary, 
Organizational 
committmentc 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .702b .493 .482 .5128352 .493 42.838 3 132 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 1.931 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Commitment and Salary Income, Monthly salary, Organizational commitment 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 33.800 3 11.267 42.838 .000c 
Residual 34.716 132 .263   
Total 68.516 135    
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Commitment and Salary Income, Monthly salary, Organizational 
commitment 
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Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) .626 .323  1.939 .055 -.013 
Organizational 
commitment 
.818 .073 .701 11.271 .000 .675 
Monthly salary .047 .042 .068 1.100 .273 -.037 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.046 .044 .064 1.028 .306 -.042 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1.265      
Organizational 
commitment 
.962 .696 .700 .698 .991 1.009 
Monthly salary .130 .005 .095 .068 .991 1.009 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.133 .075 .089 .064 1.000 1.000 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Org 
Commitment 
and Salary 
Income Monthly salary 
Organizational 
commitment 
1 Correlations Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
1.000 -.013 -.016 
Monthly salary -.013 1.000 .092 
Organizational commitment -.016 .092 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.002 -2.468E-5 -5.220E-5 
Monthly salary -2.468E-5 .002 .000 
Organizational commitment -5.220E-5 .000 .005 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Variance Proportions 
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Condition 
Index (Constant) 
Organizationa
l commitment 
Monthly 
salary 
Moderator of 
Org 
Commitment 
and Salary 
Income 
1 1 2.927 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 .988 1.721 .00 .00 .00 1.00 
3 .074 6.309 .02 .09 .85 .00 
4 .011 16.355 .98 .91 .14 .00 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.546759 4.816940 3.899510 .5003668 136 
Residual -1.1567314 1.1667857 .0000000 .5071050 136 
Std. Predicted Value -2.704 1.834 .000 1.000 136 
Std. Residual -2.256 2.275 .000 .989 136 
 
a. Department of the employee = R&D 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
 
 
 
Charts 
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Department of the employee = Sales 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Merger Success 3.841398 .7392270 124 
Organizational commitment 3.791129 .6047256 124 
Monthly salary 2.88 1.001 124 
Moderator of Org Commitment and 
Salary Income 
.1448 .93910 124 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizational 
commitment Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Org 
Commitment 
and Salary 
Income 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .694 -.052 .052 
Organizational 
commitment 
.694 1.000 .146 .054 
Monthly salary -.052 .146 1.000 .322 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.052 .054 .322 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .284 .283 
Organizational 
commitment 
.000 . .053 .275 
Monthly salary .284 .053 . .000 
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Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.283 .275 .000 . 
N Merger Success 124 124 124 124 
Organizational 
commitment 
124 124 124 124 
Monthly salary 124 124 124 124 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
124 124 124 124 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of Org 
Commitment and 
Salary Income, 
Organizational 
commitment, 
Monthly salaryc 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .714b .510 .498 .5238512 .510 41.644 3 120 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 1.732 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Commitment and Salary Income, Organizational commitment, Monthly salary 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 34.284 3 11.428 41.644 .000c 
Residual 32.930 120 .274   
Total 67.214 123    
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Commitment and Salary Income, Organizational commitment, Monthly 
salary 
 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
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Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) .895 .317  2.825 .006 .268 
Organizational 
commitment 
.876 .079 .716 11.090 .000 .719 
Monthly salary -.132 .050 -.179 -2.630 .010 -.232 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.056 .053 .071 1.049 .296 -.049 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1.522      
Organizational commitment 1.032 .694 .711 .709 .979 1.022 
Monthly salary -.033 -.052 -.233 -.168 .880 1.137 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.161 .052 .095 .067 .896 1.116 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of 
Org Commitment 
and Salary 
Income 
Organizational 
commitment Monthly salary 
1 Correlations Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
1.000 -.008 -.318 
Organizational commitment -.008 1.000 -.136 
Monthly salary -.318 -.136 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.003 -3.252E-5 -.001 
Organizational commitment -3.252E-5 .006 -.001 
Monthly salary -.001 -.001 .003 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Variance Proportions 
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Condition 
Index (Constant) 
Organizational 
commitment Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Org 
Commitment 
and Salary 
Income 
1 1 2.969 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .01 
2 .954 1.765 .00 .00 .00 .89 
3 .065 6.744 .04 .07 .97 .10 
4 .012 15.594 .95 .93 .02 .01 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Case wise Diagnosticsa,b 
Case Number Std. Residual Merger Success Predicted Value Residual 
690 3.089 5.0000 3.381803 1.6181975 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.229011 4.633070 3.841398 .5279486 124 
Residual -1.1371455 1.6181974 .0000000 .5174233 124 
Std. Predicted Value -3.054 1.500 .000 1.000 124 
Std. Residual -2.171 3.089 .000 .988 124 
 
a. Department of the employee = Sales 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
 
Charts 
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Department of the employee = Service 
 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
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Merger Success 3.755952 .8052632 56 
Organizational commitment 3.648214 .6486324 56 
Monthly salary 2.93 .912 56 
Moderator of Org Commitment and 
Salary Income 
.2293 1.07014 56 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
 
Correlationsa 
 
Merger 
Success 
Organizational 
commitment Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Org 
Commitment 
and Salary 
Income 
Pearson Correlation Merger Success 1.000 .699 .273 -.079 
Organizational 
commitment 
.699 1.000 .233 -.349 
Monthly salary .273 .233 1.000 .261 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
-.079 -.349 .261 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Merger Success . .000 .021 .281 
Organizational 
commitment 
.000 . .042 .004 
Monthly salary .021 .042 . .026 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.281 .004 .026 . 
N Merger Success 56 56 56 56 
Organizational 
commitment 
56 56 56 56 
Monthly salary 56 56 56 56 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
56 56 56 56 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Moderator of Org 
Commitment and 
Salary Income, 
Monthly salary, 
Organizational 
committmentc 
. Enter 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model R R Square Change Statistics 
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Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
1 .723b .523 .495 .5721213 .523 18.986 3 52 
 
Model Summarya,c 
Model 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson Sig. F Change 
1 .000 1.964 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Commitment and Salary Income, Monthly salary, Organizational commitment 
c. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 18.644 3 6.215 18.986 .000c 
Residual 17.021 52 .327   
Total 35.665 55    
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Moderator of Org Commitment and Salary Income, Monthly salary, Organizational 
commitment 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 (Constant) .211 .484  .435 .665 -.761 
Organizational 
commitment 
.924 .136 .744 6.796 .000 .651 
Monthly salary .049 .094 .056 .526 .601 -.139 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.125 .083 .166 1.507 .138 -.041 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1.182      
Organizational 
commitment 
1.197 .699 .686 .651 .765 1.307 
Monthly salary .238 .273 .073 .050 .812 1.231 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.292 -.079 .205 .144 .754 1.326 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
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Coefficient Correlationsa,b 
Model 
Moderator of Org 
Commitment and 
Salary Income Monthly salary 
Organizational 
commitment 
1 Correlations Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
1.000 -.376 .437 
Monthly salary -.376 1.000 -.359 
Organizational commitment .437 -.359 1.000 
Covariances Moderator of Org 
Commitment and Salary 
Income 
.007 -.003 .005 
Monthly salary -.003 .009 -.005 
Organizational commitment .005 -.005 .018 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa,b 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Organizational 
commitment Monthly salary 
Moderator of 
Org 
Commitment 
and Salary 
Income 
1 1 2.997 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .01 
2 .942 1.784 .00 .00 .00 .73 
3 .049 7.840 .10 .06 .98 .11 
4 .013 15.207 .90 .94 .02 .15 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
Residuals Statisticsa,b 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.627455 4.906664 3.755952 .5822198 56 
Residual -1.0509487 1.2205646 .0000000 .5562992 56 
Std. Predicted Value -1.938 1.976 .000 1.000 56 
Std. Residual -1.837 2.133 .000 .972 56 
 
a. Department of the employee = Service 
b. Dependent Variable: Merger Success 
 
 
 
Charts 
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